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ABSTRACT
The implementation of ubiquitous computing (or pervasive computing) can leverage various
types of resource-constrained wireless networks such as wireless sensor networks and wireless
personal area networks. These resource-constrained wireless networks are vulnerable to many
malicious attacks that often cause leakage, alteration and destruction of critical information
due to the insecurity of wireless communication and the tampers of devices. Meanwhile, the
constraints of resources, the lack of centralized management, and the demands of mobility of
these networks often make traditional security mechanisms inefficient or infeasible. So, the
resource-constrained wireless networks pose new challenges for information assurance and call
for practical, efficient and effective solutions.
In this research, we focus on wireless sensor networks and aim at enhancing confidentiality,
authenticity, availability and integrity, for wireless sensor networks. Particularly, we identify
three important problems as our research targets: (1) key management for wireless sensor net-
works (for confidentiality), (2) filtering false data injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor
networks (for authenticity and availability), and (3) secure network coding (for integrity).
We investigate a diversity of malicious attacks against wireless sensor networks and design
a number of practical schemes for establishing pairwise keys between sensor nodes, filtering
false data injection and DoS attacks, and securing network coding against pollution attacks
for wireless sensor networks. Our contributions from this research are fourfold: (1) We give
a taxonomy of malicious attacks for wireless sensor networks. (2) We design a group-based
key management scheme using deployment knowledge for wireless sensor networks to estab-
lish pair-wise keys between sensor nodes. (3) We propose an en-route scheme for filtering
false data injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. (4) We present two efficient
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schemes for securing normal and XOR network coding against pollution attacks. Simulation
and experimental results show that our solutions outperform existing ones and are suitable for
resource-constrained wireless sensor networks in terms of computation overhead, communica-
tion cost, memory requirement, and so on.
1CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
Ubiquitous computing [74] (or pervasive computing) integrates computing technology into
our day lives, embeds computing devices into our physical surroundings, and provides us the
ability of computing (or information processing) everywhere. The implementation of ubiqui-
tous computing can leverage the techniques such as wireless sensor networks [2, 3] and wireless
personal area networks [80]. We term these networks resource-constrained wireless networks,
which typically contain a lot of tiny wireless devices that are limited in power resource, com-
putation capacity, memory size and communication range.
The resource-constrained wireless networks suffer various malicious attacks, because wire-
less communication through the air is insecurely open to the public and the wireless devices
are not tamper-resistant. For instance, adversaries can easily eavesdrop on wireless commu-
nication to gain confidential information. They can interfere with wireless communication to
change or disrupt the transmitted information. Through compromises devices, the adversaries
can inject false information into networks, alter or drop the forwarded messages, or flood a
large number of messages to cause networks unavailable. These attacks lead to leakage, alter-
ation and destruction of critical information, and violate the basic requirement of information
assurance such as confidentiality, authenticity, availability and integrity.
Besides the property of resource-constrained, these networks are often distributed and lack
centralized management, while their wireless devices may even be mobile. Thus, many tradi-
tional security mechanisms supporting information assurance become inefficient or infeasible
for these networks. For example, public-key cryptography may not be suitable for these net-
works due to the high computation overhead and the lack of the desired infrastructure within
2the networks, while the mobility of wireless devices greatly increase the complexity of group key
manage. So, the resource-constrained wireless networks pose new challenges for information
assurance and call for more practical, efficient and effective solutions.
Among different types of resource-constrained wireless networks, wireless sensor networks
are the most popular one that has been widely used for various applications such as battlefield
surveillance, target tracking and traffic control. In this research, we focus on wireless sen-
sor networks and aim at enhancing confidentiality, authenticity, availability and integrity for
wireless sensor networks. Particularly, we identify three important problems as our research
targets:
1. Key management for wireless sensor networks (for confidentiality). Wireless communica-
tion between sensor nodes should be secured, which demands the efficient distribution of
secret keys. Key management provides not only the fundamental cryptographic services,
but also the basic component to construct other security mechanisms, hence, should be
carefully studied.
2. Filtering false data injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks (for authenticity
and availability). For various applications to function correctly, it is important to make
sure that valid information can be delivered to desired destinations. However, false data
injection produces invalid information and DoS attacks disrupts information delivery. So,
they must be efficiently filtered.
3. Secure network coding (for integrity). Network coding [1, 50] is promising to maximize
network throughput and gains more and more applications in wireless networks. However,
it poses a lot of new security problems that have not been well addressed.
We investigate a diversity of malicious attacks against wireless sensor networks and design
a number of practical schemes for establishing pairwise keys between sensor nodes, filtering
false data injection and DoS attacks, and securing network coding against pollution attacks.
Our contributions from this research are as follows:
31. We classify the malicious attacks into different categories and provide a taxonomy of
these attacks.
2. For enhancing confidentiality, we design a group-based key management scheme for wire-
less sensor networks to establish pair-wise keys between sensor nodes.
3. For enhancing authenticity and availability, we propose a dynamic en-route scheme for
filtering false data injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks.
4. For enhancing integrity, we present two schemes for securing network coding against
pollution attacks, where one of our solutions is the first one addressing secure XOR
coding problem.
1.2 Resource-constrained Wireless Networks
1.2.1 Ubiquitous Computing
Mark Weiser, the Chief Technologist of Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, coined the term
Ubiquitous Computing [74] as ”Computers everywhere. Making many computers available
throughout the physical environment, while making them effectively invisible to the user.”
He also said that ”The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave
themselves into the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.”
Ubiquitous computing provides us the ability to process information everywhere. For ex-
ample, a person’s location can be automatically tracked by sensor networks (Active Badge [77])
so that the telephone calls or emails could be forwarded to the correct location, while a user
may use a handheld personal device (Xerox PARCTAB [82]) to gain access to other personal
devices, LAN or Internet. We envision that a lot of small, inexpensive, wireless devices such as
sensor nodes, mobile phones, PDAs and RFID tags, can be distributed at all scales throughout
everyday life and turned to distinctly quotidian ends to support ubiquitous computing. That
is, the implementation of ubiquitous computing can leverage the techniques such as wireless
sensor networks [2, 3] and wireless personal area networks [80].
41.2.2 Wireless Sensor Networks
Akyildiz et al, [3] stated that ”Recent advances in micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS)
technology, wireless communications, and digital electronics have enabled the development of
low-cost, low-power, multifunctional sensor nodes that are small in size and communicate un-
tethered in short distances. These tiny sensor nodes, which consist of sensing, data processing,
and communicating components, leverage the idea of sensor networks based on collaborative
effort of a large number of nodes.”
The specifications of some types of sensor nodes can be found as follows:
Crossbow MICAz [55]:
• Microprocessor: Atmel ATmega 128L (8 MHz)
• Program Memory: 4K RAM
• External Memory: 128K Flash ROM
• RF Transceiver: 802.15.4/ZigBee compliant (2.4 GHz)
• Data Rate: 250 kbps
• Communication Range: 20-100 m
• Battery: 2× AA
• Weight: 0.7 oz
Crossbow TelosB [71]:
• Microprocessor: TI MSP430 (8 MHz)
• Program Memory: 10K RAM
• External Memory: 48K Flash ROM
• RF Transceiver: 802.15.4 compliant (2.4 GHz)
• Data Rate: 250 kbps
• Communication Range: 20-100 m
• Battery: 2× AA
• Weight: 0.8 oz
ETH Zurich BTnode [11]:
• Microprocessor: Atmel ATmega 128L (8 MHz)
• Program Memory: 64+128K RAM
• External Memory: 128K Flash ROM + 4K EEPROM
• RF Transceiver: Chipcon CC1000 (433-915 MHz) and Bluetooth (2.4 GHz)
• Battery: 2× AA
• Size: 58.15 x 33 mm attached to a 2× AA battery holder
51.2.3 Wireless Personal Area Networks
A wireless personal area network (WPAN) is a personal, short distance area wireless net-
work for interconnecting devices centered around an individual person’s workspace. The initial
incarnation of ubiquitous computing was in the form of Tab [82], Pad [83], and Board built at
Xerox PARC, 1988-1994, while the Tab and Pad can be assumed as devices of WPAN.
The Tab was a prototype handheld computer, which was 2”×3”×0.5”, had a 2 week battery
life on rechargeable batteries, and weighed 7 oz. It used a Phillips 8051 processor with 128k
NVRAM. It featured an external I2C external bus, a custom resistive touch screen, and a
128×64 mono display. A complete Tab system included an infrared base station in the ceiling
for LAN connectivity.
The Pad was a prototype pen computer, which was 9”×11”×1”, had a four 4 hour battery
life, and weighed 5 oz. It used a Motorola 683×× processor with 4MB RAM running a unique
real-time operating system. The Pad featured a PCMCIA slot, an electronic pen of our own
design with a built-in microphone, a 640×480 4 level display, keyboard and serial ports. The
Pad could communicate through infrared at 19.2kbs, through a unique near field radio at
240kbs, and through a 1Mbs tether which also supplied external power for operation and
recharging. A complete Pad system also had a radio base station that served as a recharging
station and Ethernet gateway for the Pads.
1.2.4 Observations
From the specifications of sensor nodes, Tab and Pad, we conclude that they are typi-
cally tiny wireless devices with limited power resource, computation capacity, memory space,
data rate and communication range. Thus, we term the networks of these devices resource-
constrained wireless networks, because these devices are often wireless with limited resources.
We also observe that the resource-constrained wireless networks are typically distributed,
because a base station is unnecessary to be present during all the life time of the networks.
Thus, such networks may lack a centralized management. In addition, the mobility is often
demanded for the devices of these networks.
61.3 Taxonomy of Malicious Attacks against Wireless Networks
Wireless networks are vulnerable to various malicious attacks. We list some possible attacks
as follows:
• Eavesdropping : The adversaries may obtain critical or sensitive information by eaves-
dropping on wireless communication.
• Eavesdropping : The adversaries may observe traffic flows to deduce information from
the patterns of wireless communication, even when the flows are encrypted and cannot
be decrypted.
• Removing/Moving : The adversaries may remove some wireless nodes or move them to
other locations to make the network partitioned or the topology changed,
• Jamming : The adversaries can broadcast a high-power signal to disrupt or interfere with
wireless communication.
• Replaying : The adversaries may replay the previously received messages to disturb the
functionalities of wireless networks.
• Wormhole: The adversaries can record the information received at one location and
replay them at another location via some wormhole tunnel, e.g., a fast wired link, which
fools the wireless nodes far from each other to believe they are neighbors.
• Dropping/Selective Forwarding : The adversaries may compromise some nodes, and drop
all or some of the messages that should be forwarded by those nodes.
• Flooding : The adversaries may inject a huge amount of useless information into wireless
networks via some compromised nodes to disrupt wireless communication and/or deplete
the energy of wireless nodes.
• Modification/Pollution: The adversaries can modify or corrupt the information trans-
mitted in wireless networks.
7• False Data Injection: The adversaries can inject false information into wireless networks
to disturb the functionalities of wireless networks and/or deplete the energy of wireless
nodes.
• Impersonating/Sybil Attack : A compromised node can impersonate another legal node
or claim the identities of multiple legal nodes.
We categorize these attacks into different ways and provide the following taxonomy. Careful
and thorough classification is important for correctly addressing these attacks.
• Attacks can be passive or active. Passive attacks do not generate new (malicious) infor-
mation or modify old information. They are hard to observe and hence may not be well
protected without careful design. For example, traffic analysis is a passive attack and
can not be protected using encryption mechanisms solely. Active attacks either produce
new (malicious) information and/or change old one. One example is flooding.
• The targets of malicious attacks may be different. Information, wireless node, or network
services are all possible targets. Identifying the targets of attacks is crucial to address
these attacks. For example, the target of eavesdropping is information that should be
encrypted, while that of impersonating attacks is wireless nodes that should be authen-
ticated.
• Attacks may occur at different protocol layers such as physical layer, MAC layer, network
layer, transport layer and application layer. This classification help us select security
mechanisms properly. For example, jamming is a physical layer attack that can be
addressed using advanced modulation techniques such as DSSS or FHSS, while sybil
attack works on application layer and can be countered using authentication approaches.
• Some attacks happen only when some special condition is satisfied. For example, drop-
ping attacks require some nodes compromised, but replaying attacks do not. So, making
nodes tamper-resistant can effectively deal with dropping attacks, but cannot prevent
replaying.
8• Attacks can be intermittent or persistent from the perspective of how long they last.
Persistent attacks last long, but intermittent ones happen and disappear very quickly. So
in most cases, intermittent attacks do not demand us to design specific countermeasures.
We note that some complicated attack may even consist of multiple attacks from different
categories. For example, a Blackhole attack [42] against routing protocols consists of a worm-
hole and a dropping attack, where the adversaries first create a wormhole to attract data from
victim nodes and then drop the data.
1.4 Information Assurance
National Information Assurance Glossary, Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS)
Instruction No. 4009 [21], defines Information Assurance as:
Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. These measures
include providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection,
and reaction capabilities.
Generally, we consider the following security goals of information assurance.
• Confidentiality : Confidential information cannot be disclosed to unauthorized users, pro-
cesses, or devices.
• Integrity : Information cannot be created, modified or deleted without proper authoriza-
tion.
• Availability : Information, the computing systems used to process the information, and
the security controls used to protect the information are all available and functioning
correctly when the information is needed.
• Authenticity : The identity of users, processes, or devices, and the source of information
can be correctly verified or is genuine.
9• Non-repudiation: The sender of information cannot deny having sent the information
and the receiver cannot deny having received it.
• Access control : The access to information is only granted to an authorized user.
• Privacy : A user is secure from unauthorized disclosure of information about oneself.
Among these goals, confidentiality, integrity and availability (known as CIA triad) are the
most important and core principles.
Although these security goals are suitable for any type of networking systems such as
Internet, WLAN and mobile ad-hoc networks, achieving these goals in resource-constrained
wireless networks pose new challenges. For example, the traditional approaches for achieving
authenticity based on public-key cryptography may be impractical for wireless sensor networks,
because (1) public-key algorithms are too expensive for sensor nodes due their high computation
requirement and energy consumption, and (2) the distributed wireless sensor networks might
not be able to provide the desire public-key infrastructure. Another example is that achieving
availability is difficult in wireless sensor networks, because sensor nodes are often failed or
temporarily unavailable due to power depletion or unexpected interference. Our research is
motivated by addressing these special challenges to enhance information assurance for resource-
constrained wireless networks.
1.5 Objectives of Research
Resource-constrained wireless networks are subject to malicious attacks and demand effi-
cient mechanisms for providing information assurance. In this research, we focus on wireless
sensor networks and aim to enhance confidentiality, integrity, availability and authenticity for
wireless sensor networks, because these are the core principles of information assurance. Par-
ticularly, we identify three problems as our research targets, which are: (1) key management for
wireless sensor networks (for confidentiality), (2) filtering false data injection and DoS attacks
in wireless sensor networks (for authenticity and availability), and (3) secure network coding
(for integrity).
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Wireless communication is prone to eavesdropping. In wireless sensor networks, distributing
secret keys among sensor nodes allows them to secure their communication with encryption.
Key management, including key generation, distribution, revocation and update, not only
provides the basic cryptographic service, but also are critical to implement other security
mechanisms. However, there are still a lot of unsolved problems in providing efficient key
management for wireless sensor networks. For example, sensor nodes may not have suffice
memory for key storage and cannot support heavy public-key algorithms. These problems
motivate us to study key management for wireless sensor networks.
Wireless sensor networks support various applications such as battlefield surveillance, target
tracking or traffic control, in which sensor nodes should report detected events or sensing
readings to the base station. However, the data reports are vulnerable to forging, modifying
and dropping and the adversaries can inject false data into networks. The forged reports
about battlefield may cause false alarms in the base station and the dropped reports might be
critical for traffic control. So, it is important to ensure that the information transmitted with
wireless sensor networks is valid, correct and available. Some solutions for filtering false data
injection are not efficient and robust for dynamic sensor networks, while few of them consider
DoS attacks simultaneously. Thus, we are inspired to address both attacks for wireless sensor
networks.
Network coding [1, 50] is a new forwarding technique that allows a forwarder to encode
its input messages for creating a output one. The advantages of network coding include (but
not limited to) (1) maximizing network throughput, (2) reducing the number of forwarding
messages, and (3) reducing the number of retransmissions. These nice properties make network
coding technique widely applied in peer-to-peer systems, wireless networks and sensor networks.
However, network coding poses new challenges to security. For example, because each forwarder
(including compromised ones) decides how to generate its output messages independently, it
is hard to detect if a message is a corrupted one or a valid one. Moreover, a smart adversary
can generate valid messages that are linearly dependent on other previously transmitted ones.
These valid messages are useless for decoding by receivers. Few research has been conducted
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on security issues in network coding. We identify secure network coding as a promising research
area that involves a diversity of problems, which have not been discovered and solved.
1.6 Contributions of Research
From this research, we make the following contributions.
1. We classify the malicious attacks into different categories and provide a taxonomy of
these attacks.
2. For enhancing confidentiality, we design a group-based key management scheme for wire-
less sensor networks to establish pair-wise keys between sensor nodes. Compared with
others, our scheme has a stronger resilience against node capture, while achieving higher
connectivity with lower memory cost and shorter transmission range.
3. For enhancing authenticity and availability, we propose a dynamic en-route scheme for
filtering false data injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. Compared with
others, our scheme offers higher filtering capacity with lower memory cost and can better
deal with dynamic topology of wireless sensor networks.
4. For enhancing integrity, we present two schemes for securing network coding against
pollution attacks, where one of our solutions is the first one addressing secure XOR
coding problem. Compared with others, our schemes do not need any extra security
channels and are two to three orders of magnitude faster. Hence, they are promising for
wireless sensor networks.
1.7 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation contains 6 chapters that are organized as follows: In chapter
2, we provide a review of literature for the three problems targeted in our research. In chapter
3, we study how to provide efficient key management for wireless sensor networks for enhanc-
ing confidentiality and design a group-based key pre-distribution scheme using deployment
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knowledge for establishing pair-wise keys between sensor nodes. In chapter 4, we consider how
to filter false data injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks for enhancing au-
thenticity and availability simultaneously. We propose a dynamic en-route scheme that filters
false data injection and mitigates the impact of DoS attacks. In chapter 5 and 6, we research
how to secure network coding against pollution attacks for enhancing integrity. We present
a homomorphic signature scheme for securing normal network coding systems in chapter 5.
In chapter 6, we further propose an efficient solution that is specifically designed for securing
XOR network coding. In chapter 7, we summarize our research and discuss our future work.
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 Key Management for Wireless Sensor Networks
2.1.1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks may be deployed in uncontrolled or even hostile environments and
hence are subject to various attacks. For example, an adversary can easily gain access to mis-
sion critical information by monitoring wireless communication among sensor nodes, or inject
false messages into the networks through some compromised nodes. Therefore, it is crucial to
deploy secret keys into wireless sensor networks to encrypt wireless communication or establish
authentication among sensor nodes. The challenge is how to efficiently generate, distribute and
maintain secret keys among sensor nodes. This problem is called key management problem for
wireless sensor networks and can be solved by carefully designed key management schemes.
In this work, we survey existing key management schemes for wireless sensor networks
and provide a taxonomy of them. Most of schemes deal with symmetric key management,
while a few of them discuss public key management. Since public key algorithms are generally
considered too expensive for the use in wireless sensor networks, we focus our discussion on
symmetric key management schemes. We divide these schemes into pairwise key, group key and
global key schemes depending on what kind of keys they distribute and manage, and category
them into probabilistic, deterministic and hybrid depending on how possible the keys can be
generated. We also classify these schemes depending on whether they exploit deployment
knowledge or not. In the rest of this section, we first introduce threat model and goals of key
management schemes, and then discuss the pairwise key schemes, the group key schemes and
a global key scheme.
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2.1.2 Threat Model and Goals
The adversaries can launch malicious attacks in passive and active modes. In passive mode,
they can eavesdrop wireless communications among sensor nodes to capture mission critical
or private information. In active mode, they may deploy their own malicious nodes or capture
some sensor nodes in the networks. Once some nodes are captured and compromised, all secret
keys or secret information stored in these nodes will be revealed and the adversaries may fully
control these nodes. Through these malicious nodes or compromised nodes, the adversaries can
inject false messages, and modify or drop the messages transmitted in the networks. Using the
secret keys obtained from the compromised nodes, the adversaries could eavesdrop additional
communications encrypted by these keys.
The purpose of key management for wireless sensor networks is to distribute and manage
the secret keys of sensor nodes to secure wireless communications among sensor nodes and
provide a basic mechanism for other security protocols. Specifically, key management schemes
are expected to achieve the following goals:
1. Connectivity : The deployed sensor networks should be highly connected. Here, we em-
phasis key connectivity, which means two nodes are only considered as connected when
two conditions are satisfied: (1) they are physical neighbors; and (2) they share at least
one secret key.
2. Resilience: The sensor networks should be resilient against node capture. That is, the
compromise of some secret keys (or secret information) would not reveal much informa-
tion of additional communications or links.
3. Efficiency : The designed schemes should be efficient for sensor nodes with limited mem-
ory, computation and communication capacity.
4. Scalability : The schemes should be able to support large-scale sensor networks.
These goals may be contradictive to each other. Hence, we should make tradeoffs among these
goals when designing key management schemes.
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2.1.3 Taxonomy of Key Management Schemes
In general, key management process involves three phases, key setup phase, key discovery
phase and key update phase. In key setup phase, secret keys or secret information are generated
and carefully preloaded into sensor nodes. In key discovery phase, the deployed sensor nodes
communicate with each other and exchange information to discover or generate secret keys.
Moreover, two neighbors may establish secret keys through other discovered secure path(s) if
they cannot find secret keys directly. In key update phase, compromised or obsolete keys are
revoked and new keys are distributed or generated. We notice that key update (or rekeying)
is a hard problem and has not been fully solved so far.
Key management schemes for wireless sensor networks can be classified into various cate-
gories. Table 2.1 provides a taxonomy of these schemes. First, depending on what kind of keys
the schemes deal with, we divide these schemes into three classes, pairwise key schemes, group
key schemes and global key schemes. These keys are used for encryption or authentication of
communications between a pair of nodes, among a group (or cluster) of nodes and over the
whole networks. We further classify the schemes into probabilistic, deterministic and hybrid,
depending on whether the keys can be established with some probability or deterministically.
Hybrid schemes apply some deterministic approach over a probabilistic one. Typically, we
assume key distribution process is secure before sensor nodes are deployed. However, some
researchers also suppose there exists a short security period even after the nodes are deployed
to target field, because they believe adversaries need at least such a short period of time to find
and compromise a sensor. Thus, we have two classes, pre-deployment and post-deployment
security schemes. Depending on whether using deployment knowledge for the design schemes,
we divide the schemes into two categories, with or without deployment knowledge. There
are other metrics to classify the schemes, for example, (1) what kind of secret information
is pre-loaded into sensors, secret key, key vector or polynomial; and (2) the pairwise key is
pre-distributed into sensors or dynamically generated after sensors are deployed. Due to page
limit, we do not discuss these classifications here.
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2.1.4 Pairwise Key Management Schemes
2.1.4.1 Probabilistic Schemes without Using Deployment Knowledge
Eschenauer and Gligor [25] proposed the first probabilistic key pre-distribution scheme,
called basic scheme. In key setup phase, each node is randomly preloaded with m keys from a
global key pool of size M . Hence, a pair of nodes can establish a secure link with probability
p = 1− (M−mm )
(Mm )
. From random graph theory, the desired probability Pc that the entire network
is connected can be achieved by choosing a proper p. The drawback of this scheme is that
a pairwise key may be used by multiple pair of nodes. Given x nodes compromised, the
adversaries can compromise an additional link with probability 1− (1− mM )x.
To improve resilience, Chan et al. [17] extended the basic scheme to q-composite scheme,
which requires a pair to share at least q > 1 keys to establish a secure link. However, this
scheme sacrifices the achievable connectivity. Hence, the authors proposed random pairwise-
key scheme, which keeps the achievable connectivity when improving resilience. The idea is
tat for each node, a set of m nodes are randomly chosen, and a unique pairwise key is assigned
for this node and every node in the set. Since all pairwise keys are distinct, the scheme has a
perfect resilience against node capture, but the size of network is limited by mp .
In the basic scheme, each node is preloaded with m keys and has to broadcast all m key
IDs to discover the shared key(s). Hwang et al. [37] proposed cluster grouping scheme to
reduce the communication overhead of sensor nodes. In this scheme, the keys stored by each
node are divided into c (c < m) equal-length clusters where each cluster has a start key ID.
The remaining key IDs within the cluster are implicitly known from the start key ID. Hence,
each node only needs to broadcast c start key IDs, instead of m key IDs. Zhu et al. [97]
presented a pairwise key scheme which can reduce not only the communication overhead and
but also the required storage. In this scheme, each sensor is assigned with a unique ID and a
pseudo-random function f , where its key IDs can be determined by executing f(ID). Thus,
each node only needs to broadcast its IDs to discover the shared key(s). Similarly, Ren et al.
[66] also proposed to use hash chains to construct the global key pool. Hence, for each chain
assigned to a node, the node only needs to store the corresponding generation key and the
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hash function. In addition, Hwang and Kim [38] revisited the basic scheme and its derivatives,
and proposed to reduce the number of keys stored by each node while still keeping a certain
probability of sharing a key between two nodes. The basic idea is that probability is sufficient
to guarantee the largest component, instead of the whole network, to be almost connected.
2.1.4.2 Deterministic Schemes
Blom [8] proposed a deterministic scheme to set up pairwise keys for a group of N nodes.
First, a key distribution center constructs a (t+1)×(t+1) symmetric matrix D and a (t+1)×n
public matrix G over a finite field, where (DG)T is called secret matrix. All pairwise keys of
these N nodes are stored in a symmetric matrix K = (DG)TG. Then, each node i is preloaded
with the i-th row of secret matrix and the i-th column of public matrix. After deployment, any
two nodes i and j can individually derive their pairwise key kij = kji by only exchanging their
columns. This scheme is called t-secure, that is, no additional key is revealed given that up
to t nodes are compromised. However, when more than t nodes are compromised, the whole
matrix is broken. Although we can improve the resilience of the scheme by increasing t, each
node has to store more amount of secret information, which is O(t).
Blundo [9] presented a polynomial-based key management scheme, which is a special case of
Blom’s scheme when matrix D is a Vandermonde matrix. The basic component of this scheme
is t-degree bivariate polynomial f(x, y) =
∑t
i=0
∑t
j=0 aijx
iyj over a finite filed, where we have
f(x, y) = f(y, x) by choosing aij = aji. Each node i is preloaded with a polynomial share
f(i, y). After deployment, any two nodes i and j can individually derive their pairwise key
f(i, j) = f(j, i) by evaluating their own share at the point of the peer’s IDs. Similar to Blom’s
scheme, Blundo’s scheme is also t-secure.
Chan and Perrig [18] introduced a deterministic scheme called Peer Intermediaries for Key
Establishment (PIKE), in which all N nodes are organized into a two-dimensional space and
each node has a unique coordinate (x, y), where x, y ∈ [0,√N − 1]. Each node shares unique
pairwise keys with 2(
√
N − 1) nodes that have the same x or y coordinate. If two nodes with
no common x or y coordinate, they need to choose an intermediate node that has common x
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or y coordinate with both of them to help them establish a pairwise key securely. The problem
of PIKE is its high communication overhead, because a node can only establish pairwise keys
with 2(
√
N − 1) nodes directly and needs to find multi-link path for any of other neighbors.
All deterministic schemes discussed above have a common assumption, that is, the adver-
saries can compromise sensor nodes as long as they are deployed. However, this assumption
might be too strong. Although sensor nodes are not tamper-resist, the adversaries need at
least some short period of time to find, break, and control a sensor node. We call that period
post-deployment security window. Based on this weak threat model, key management schemes
can be designed more efficiently and effectively. One solution is Localized Encryption and Au-
thentication Protocol (LEAP) proposed by Zhu et al. Each node i is first preloaded with an
initial key KI and a pseudo-random function f , which can determine the node’s master key
ki = fKI (i). Within the security window after deployment, two nodes i and j exchange their
IDs and can calculate the pairwise key Kij = fkj (i). At the end of security window, all nodes
remove KI from their memory, so the adversaries cannot calculate the pairwise keys of other
links, even when they compromise some nodes. With this scheme, node addition is also simple.
Each new node maintains KI within the period of security window after deployment and hence
it can calculate the pairwise keys with its neighbors. Moreover, Dutertre et al. [24] proposed
a similar solution with the same post-deployment security assumption.
2.1.4.3 Hybrid Schemes
Deterministic schemes such as Blom’s and Blundo’s ones provide perfect resilience as long
as the number of compromised nodes is below the threshold value. They can be applied over
probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes to further improve the resilience of these schemes.
Du et al. [22] combined the basic scheme and Blom’s scheme together and designed a multi-
space key pre-distribution scheme. First, one public matrix G and ω symmetric matrices Di
(where i = 1, ..., ω) are constructed. These matrices form ω spaces (Di, G). Then, each node
randomly selects τ spaces and stores the corresponding rows of spaces. After deployment, any
two nodes can establish a pairwise key if they happen to select the same space. This scheme
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has a similar threshold property as that of original Blom’s scheme, which is that no additional
links will be compromised given the number of compromised nodes less than a threshold value.
However, after that threshold value, the whole network will be quickly broken. Similarly, Liu
and Ning [51] proposed to use Blundo’s scheme to improve the security of the basic scheme. In
one approach, each node randomly selects a subset of polynomials from a pool and stores the
corresponding polynomial shares of the selected polynomials. In another approach, N nodes
are organized into m×m grids, where each node is assigned with a coordinate (i, j) and each
row i or column j of grids is associated with a polynomial f ci (x, y) or f
r
j (x, y). Each node then
is preloaded with the polynomial shares corresponding to its row and column polynomials.
Both approaches improve the resilience.
2.1.4.4 Probabilistic and Hybrid Schemes with Deployment Knowledge
Deployment knowledge is a priori information about the expected locations of sensor nodes
or the distribution of nodes’ location. It can tell us which sensor nodes are more likely to
become neighbors and which local area a sensor node is more likely to reside. With the help of
deployment knowledge, the schemes with better performance can be designed, because sensor
nodes do not need to establish pairwise keys with those far away from them.
Liu and Ning [52] proposed closest pairwise key scheme in which each node shares pairwise
keys with its c closest neighbors whose expected locations are closest to the node. In the
extension version of this scheme, each node A has a unique key KA. For node A and its c
closest neighbors B1, B2, ..., Bc, the pairwise keys are f(KBi |IDA), where f is a pseudo-random
function. Node A stores all c pairwise keys, while node Bi only stores its key KBi and f . This
scheme has good resilience and connectivity and it also reduces the memory requirement of
sensors. But its performance will be degraded with the growth of location error and it is hard
to estimate sensors’ expected locations accurately.
In [23], Du et al. first proposed the concept of deployment knowledge. They described a
group-based deployment model in which the target filed is divided into square grids and nodes
are categorized into groups. Each group of nodes pick their keys from a corresponding sub
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key pool and they are supposed to be deployed into a fixed grid. Sub key pools should be
carefully designed. Specifically, the sub key pool of one group overlaps with the pools of the
group’s two horizontally and vertically neighboring groups with ratio α and with the group’s
four diagonally neighboring groups with ratio β, where 0 < β < α < 1. Since neighboring key
pools overlap, the nodes from neighboring groups have higher probability to establish pairwise
keys than those nodes whose groups are far from each other. This scheme outperforms the
basic one in term of resilience. However, if smarter adversaries selectively compromise nodes
within the same group, the scheme cannot keep the same good performance in resilience. That
is, it cannot deal with selective node captures very well. In [53], the authors proposed a general
group-based key pre-distribution framework. In the framework, the nodes from the same group
establish pairwise keys using some existing approaches, while every group has an exact node
to form cross-groups which are used to bridge neighboring groups. Whenever two nodes from
different groups want to establish a pairwise key, they always need to exploit the bridging
nodes. Hence, one problem of the framework is that those bridging nodes may consume up
their energy earlier than other nodes. Huang et al. [36] introduced a location-aware key
management scheme which is similar to the framework proposed by Liu and Ning.
We have already discussed some schemes that use deterministic approaches to improve re-
silience of probabilistic schemes, and also introduced some schemes that exploit deployment
knowledge to improve the performance of schemes. Naturally, both deterministic approaches
and deployment knowledge can be combined together to facilitate the design of key manage-
ment schemes with better performance. Liu and Ning [52] integrated Blundo’s polynomial-
based technique with group-based deployment model and designed location-based key pre-
distribution using bivariate polynomials. First, a bivariate polynomial is assigned to each grid
of the target field. Then, for every node to be deployed into some grid, it is preloaded with the
polynomial shares of polynomials from its own grid and four directly neighboring grids (i.e.,
two horizontally and two vertically neighboring grids). This scheme can easily achieve high
connectivity with good resilience.
Similarly, Yu and Guan [88] depicted an approach to combine Blom’s scheme with group-
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based deployment model. There are two significant differences between Yu’s approach and
other schemes. First, the authors divided the target field into hexagon grids, instead of square
grids. Since hexagon grids are symmetric and have less neighboring grids, this scheme can
achieve high connectivity with more efficient use of memory. Second, the authors proposed to
use geometric random graph [61], instead of (Bernoulli) random graph, to model wireless sensor
networks. The reason is that geometric random graph takes into consideration of the limited
communication range of sensor nodes, but (Bernoulli) random graph does not. In addition,
Zhou et al. [94, 95] discussed how to incorporate Blundo’s polynomial-based technique and
group-based deployment model with hexagon and triangle grids.
2.1.5 Group Key Management Schemes
Based on established pairwise keys, establishing a group key becomes straightforward. As
depicted by Zhu et al. in [96], one node can directly send a group key to its neighbors through
the links secured with pairwise keys.
Another approach is to exploit the pre-distributed polynomial shares of sensor nodes to gen-
erate a common group key. Blundo [9] proposed two models. The first model is non-interactive,
where users compute a common key without any interaction. A random symmetric polynomial
f(x1, · · · , xt) with t variables of degree λ is selected initially, where the coefficients come from a
finite field GF (q). Each user i receives share f(i, x2, · · · , xt). Users j1, · · · , jt can generate the
conference key Kj1,··· ,jt by evaluating their polynomial shares. That is, each user ji can obtain
the conference key Kj1,··· ,jt independently by evaluating f(ji, j1, · · · , ji−1, ji+1, · · · , jt). In the
second model, interactions are allowed in key computation. A symmetric polynomial f(x, y)
of degree (λ+ t− 2) is selected initially. Each user i receives share f(i, y). Users j1, · · · , jt can
establish the conference key K as follows: (1) the user with the largest identity, that is, user
jt, selects a random key K, (2) jt calculates Kjt,jl = f(jt, jl) for each l = 1, · · · , t − 1, (3) jt
sends xl = Kjt,jl ⊕K to each jl, and (4) each jl generates Kjl,jt = fjl(jt) = Kjt,jl , and derives
the secret K = xl ⊕Kjl,jt . User jt performs (t− 1) polynomial evaluations, and sends (t− 1)
messages which carry a single x value to establish the group key.
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2.1.6 Global Key Management Scheme
Perrig et al. [63] proposed µTESLA for authenticated broadcast and global key update. It
requires the base station and sensor nodes to be loosely time synchronized. First, base station
picks the last key Kn of a chain and generates the rest keys K0,K1, · · · ,Kn−1 of the chain
using a one-way hash function H such that Ki = Ki+1. Given Ki, each node can generate the
sequence K0,K1, · · · ,Ki−1, but not Ki+1, · · · ,Kn. At i-th time slot, base station broadcasts
message M along with its message authentication code MACKi(M). Sensors need to store
this message until base station discloses the authentication key Ki at (i + 1)-th time slot.
This is called delayed disclosure. Receiving (i + 1)-th message, sensor nodes can verify the
disclosed authentication key Ki by using the previous disclosed key Ki−1 as Ki−1 = Ki. This
scheme requires sensor nodes to store a message until the authentication key disclosed. This
brings communication delay, causes storage problem and may be exploited by the adversaries
to launch DoS attacks. For example, the adversaries may jam key disclosure messages to
saturate sensor nodes’ storage.
2.2 Filtering False Data Injection and DoS Attacks in Wireless Sensor Net-
works
2.2.1 Introduction
Sensor nodes are not tamper-resistant, hence, the adversaries can easily compromise some
nodes and launch various attacks through the compromised nodes. They can inject false data
into the networks. These attacks not only cause false alarms in the base station, but also
consume up the limited energy of forwarding nodes. Moreover, the adversaries can launch
DoS attacks by selectively dropping some forwarding data, or intentionally contaminating
the authentication information of data to make it dropped by other benign nodes if some
authentication mechanisms are enforced.
False data injection is a violation of data authenticity and the DoS attacks cause data
communication unavailable in wireless sensor networks. So, it is important to filter false data
24
injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. The desired solutions should drop the
false data as soon as possible, while still being efficient for wireless sensor networks in terms
of communication overhead, memory cost and energy consumption.
In this work, we investigate existing solutions for filtering false data injection in wireless
sensor networks and provide a survey of these solutions in the rest of the section. Most of
these solutions do not consider DoS attacks. We also note that some of solutions assume a
fixed path between some sensor nodes and the base station. We believe that this assumption
is not appropriate for wireless sensor networks, because the topology of sensor networks may
be changed frequently due to node failures or node changing their mode between active and
sleeping ones.
2.2.2 Survey of Existing Solutions
Ye et al. proposed a statistical en-route filtering (SEF) scheme [86] based on probabilistic
key distribution. In SEF, a global key pool is divided into n partitions, each containing m keys.
Every node randomly picks k keys from one partition. When some event occurs, each sensing
node (that detects this event) attaches to each report a MAC that is produced using one
random key. The cluster head guarantees that a legitimate report contain T MACs generated
using the keys from different partitions. Given that no more than T−1 nodes are compromised
in the network, each node can detect a false report with probability proportional to 1n . The
filtering capacity of SEF is independent of the network topology, but is constrained by the
value of n. To increase the filtering capacity, we need a smaller value of n, which however
makes it possible to break all partitions. In addition, since the keys are shared by multiple
nodes, the compromised nodes can report forged or non-existent events that “occurs” within
any clusters.
Zhu et al. designed an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication (IHA) scheme [98]. In this
scheme, the base station periodically initiates an association process to make each node estab-
lish pairwise keys with others that are t+1 hops away, where t is a security threshold. In IHA,
each sensing node generates a MAC using its multi-hop pairwise key, and a legitimate report
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should contain t + 1 distinct MACs. Since each multi-hop pairwise key is distinct, IHA can
tolerate up to t compromised nodes in each cluster, instead of in the whole network as SEF.
However, IHA requires the existence of a fixed path for transmitting control messages between
the base station and every cluster head, which cannot be guaranteed when the network adopts
some routing protocols such as GPSR [43] and GEAR [87]. In addition, the high communica-
tion overhead incurred by the association process makes IHA unsuitable for the sensor network
whose topology is highly dynamic.
Yang et al. presented a commutative cipher based en-route filtering (CCEF) scheme [86].
In CCEF, each node is preloaded with a distinct authentication key. When a report is needed,
the base station sends a session key to the cluster head and a witness key to every forwarding
node along the path from itself to the cluster head. The report is appended with multiple
MACs generated by sensing nodes and one generated by the cluster head using the session key.
When the report is delivered to the base station along the same path, each forwarding node
can verify the cluster head’s MAC using the witness key. The MACs generated by sensing
nodes are only verified by the base station. CCEE has several drawbacks. First, it has the
same requirement for fixed paths as IHA. Second, it relies on expensive public-key algorithms
to implement commutative ciphers. Third, it can only filter the false reports generated by
a malicious node without the session key, excluding those generated by compromised cluster
head or other sensing nodes.
Yang et al. further proposed a location based resilient security (LBRS) solution [85]. In
LBRS, a sensor field is divided into square cells and each cell is associated with some cell keys
that are determined from the cell’s location. Each node stores two types of cell keys. One type
contains the keys bounded to its sensing cells for authenticating its sensing reports. The other
type contains the keys of some randomly chosen remote cells, which are very likely to forward
their reports through the residing cell of the node. The authors define several types of report
disruption attacks, in which the adversaries intentionally attach invalid MACs to reports to
make them dropped by others. However, no concrete solutions are given in detail. In addition,
LBRS suffers a severe drawback: It requires a short secure time slot within which all nodes
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can safely determine their locations and generate location-based keys. However, to the best
of our knowledge, most practical sensor localization approaches [12, 33, 58] cannot be finished
in such a short time slot, and the localization process itself is vulnerable to various attacks
[14, 48, 49].
Recently, Ren et al. proposed a location-aware end-to-end data security (LEDS) scheme
[66], which addresses both false report injection and some DoS attacks. Like LBRS, LEDS
assumes that sensor nodes can generate location-based keys bounded to cells within a secure
short time slot. LEDS provides end-to-end security by making sensing nodes encrypt their
messages using cell key. A legitimate report contains T distinct shares produced from the
encrypted message using nodes’ secret keys, where the base station can always recover the
original message from any t (t < T ) valid shares. In LEDS, reports are forwarded through
cells along report-auth route. Each node stores the authentication keys shared between its
cell and others in its downstream report-auth area and on report-auth route. Each report
contain T + 1 MACs generated by sensing nodes using authentication keys shared with the
cells on report-auth route, and each forwarding node updates the MACs in the reports using
its own authentication key. This process is similar to that in IHA. LEDS mitigates the impact
of report disruption attacks by allowing t invalid MACs in reports, which invites adversaries
to send false reports with less than t valid shares. In addition, LEDS addresses selective
forwarding attacks by letting the whole cell of nodes to forward reports, which incurs high
communication overhead.
2.3 Secure Network Coding
2.3.1 Introduction
2.3.1.1 Network Coding
Network coding [1, 50] is a new message forwarding technique that allows a forwarder
to encode multiple input messages together to form an output one. Unlike the traditional
approach that always duplicates every forwarding message, network coding is able to maximize
27
the throughput of multicast networks. In 2003, Li et al. [50] further proved that linear network
coding is sufficient to achieve the optimal throughput, which is the minimum of the max-flows
from the single source to sinks. Because of this nice property, network coding has been widely
used not only in wired networks [20, 29], but also in wireless networks [7, 16, 45, 46, 62, 67].
Figure 2.1 illustrates an example multicast network with linear network coding. In this
network, source s can simultaneously send messages M1 and M2 to both sinks t1 and t2
through forwarders 1 to 4, as long as linear network coding is allowed at node 3. In this
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Figure 2.1 An example of linear network coding
example, the output message of node 3 is encoded as M1 +M2. In fact, other coding functions
such as aM1 +bM2 and M1⊕M2 are also feasible, where a and b are two integer coefficients and
⊕ denotes exclusive OR (XOR). When a sink receives sufficient number of encoded messages,
it can recover source messages by decoding, which is just solving a number of linear equations.
Without network coding, node 3 has to transmit M1 and M2 separately, which not only
increases the number of forwarding messages, but also lowers throughput, that is, two sinks
cannot receive (and recover) both source messages simultaneously. We define encoding vector
as a sequence of coefficients used to generate an encoded message. For example, the encoding
vector of encoded message M1 +M2 is (1, 1), while that of aM1 + bM2 is (a, b).
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2.3.1.2 Secure Network Coding
The research on ”secure network coding” studies how to make network coding systems
secure in the presence of various malicious attacks that are generally classified into passive
ones and active ones. Precisely speaking, current research of secure network coding focuses on
wiretapping attacks (out of passive ones) and pollution attacks (out of active ones).
In wiretapping attacks, the adversaries are assumed to be able to wiretap or eavesdrop on
a subset of all the links of some network coding system and gain access to the information
transmitted through the links. The problem is how to prevent the source information from
leaking to the adversaries without using cryptographic mechanisms such as encryption. The
basic idea to solve the problem is to introduce some random information into source messages
and make the transmitted messages through the links ”randomized”. Several solutions based
on this idea have been proposed and they mainly focus on how to transfer an existing feasible
network coding scheme into a secure one and under what the condition that such a secure
scheme exists.
We categorize these solutions into two classes, Shannon-secure ones and weakly-secure ones.
Simply speaking, the difference between these two classes is that Shannon-secure does not allow
the leakage of any information about the source, while weakly-secure disallows the leakage of
any meaningful information. For instance, given two source messages M1 and M2, weakly-
secure allows the adversaries to gain M1 + M2, because this information is not meaningful.
However, Shannon-secure does not permit such leakage.
In pollution attacks, the adversaries may compromise some forwarders and modify (or
pollute) their output messages. Pollution attacks not only prevent the sinks from recovering
the source messages correctly, but also consume up the limited energy of the forwarders, which
is especially harmful to resource-constrained wireless networks. Filtering pollution attacks is
challenging in network coding systems, because traditional hashing or signature mechanisms
no longer work. With traditional mechanisms, the source generates the hashes or signatures
for all messages, which can be utilized by others to verify these messages. However, in network
coding systems, the encoded messages are generated by the forwarders themselves and the
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source does not know how to produce the hashes or signatures for these encoded messages.
We classify the existing solutions for securing network coding against pollution attacks
into two categories depending on whether the pollution attacks (or polluted messages) are
filtered by the forwarders or only the sinks. Basically, the solutions of the first category
utilize some homomorphic function and allow the forwarders to generate and verify the hashes
or signatures of encoded messages without contacting the source. Similarly, the solutions of
the second category create some error correction information for the source messages. This
information is either appended to the source messages or sent to the sinks in advance, and
will be used by the sinks to detect or filter polluted messages. Compared with those of the
second category, the solutions of the first category save energy of the forwarders by filtering
polluted messages as early as possible, however, they are typically much slower due to the
heavy public-key operations for generating and verifying the hashes or signatures
2.3.2 Solutions to Wiretapping Attacks
2.3.2.1 Models and Goal
A network coding system can be represented by a tuple (G, α,U). In the tuple, G = (V,E)
is a directed acyclic graph, and V and E are the set of nodes and edges of G. The capacity
of each edge e ∈ E denotes the maximum average rate of information that can be transmitted
on this edge. α is the single source that generates and sends out a message vector X =
(x1, x2, · · · , xn)T ∈ Fnq every time unit. U is the set of users (can be more than one) that
receive and recover the multicast information. In linear coding systems, the message (symbol)
on any outgoing edge of a node is a linear combination of the messages (symbols) on its incoming
edges, thus, the message (symbol) on any edge is eventually a linear combination of the source
messages (symbols). We denote the message (symbol) transmitted on edge e by TeX, where Te,
named the global encoding vector on edge e, is a row vector over Fq. (Note: When we discuss
the solutions to wiretapping attacks, we may use message and symbol interchangeablly.)
In wiretapping attacks, adversaries can wiretap or eavesdrop on any of a collection of sets of
edges, where the collection is denoted as A = {A1, A2, · · · , A|A|} and |A| denotes the number
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of sets in the collection. Each Ai is a subset of all edges in the network. It is assumed that
an eavesdropper can access any member but no more than one member of A. Let Mi denote
an eavesdropping matrix of dimension ki × n for each Ai, where ki is the maximum number
of linearly independent encoding vectors of the edges in Ai. All the eavesdropping matrixes
corresponding to A = {A1, · · · , A|A|} are M = {M1, · · · ,M|A|}. Hence, the information
available to the eavesdropper is a set of linear equations MiX = Bi for any Mi ∈ M. Some
other model also assumes that the eavesdropper has access to at most k edges of the network.
This is actually a special case of the first model in which the collection A contains all non-empty
subsets of at most k edges of all the edges in the graph.
Suppose a feasible network coding solution already exists that enables the source to mul-
ticast the message vector X = (x1, x2, · · ·xn)T to all receivers. The goal is to transform this
insecure coding solution into a secure one that allows no information leakage to the eaves-
dropper. The solutions can be Shannon-secure and weakly-secure [6] depending on the extend
to which the system can tolerate information leakage. Shannon-secure requires that for all
i ∈ {1, · · · , |A|}, the eavesdropper gains no information about the source. However, weakly-
secure requires that the eavesdropper receives no meaningful information about the source. For
example, if the eavesdropper knows the sum of x1 + x2, where x1 and x2 are i.i.d. information
symbols generated at the source, then she gets some information about the combinations of
the source symbols, but no meaningful information about the value of either x1 or x2 alone.
The system is weakly-secure but not Shannon-secure.
2.3.2.2 Shannon-secure Network Coding Schemes
Cai & Yeung [13] studied the problem of how to make a linear network coding system
to transmit information ”securely” in the presence of a wiretapper(or eavesdropper) who can
eavesdrop on a bounded number of network links. They gave the definition of secure (i.e.,
Shannon-secure) network code, proposed a method to transform a given linear network code
into a secure one, and presented the sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of such
a secure transformation.
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The basic idea of Cai & Yeung’s method is to insert some random symbols into the message
vector sent by the source, such that the symbols transmitted on all edges are “randomized”, i.e.,
are the combination of the information symbols and the random symbols. More specifically,
the input vector at the source is divided into two portions, the first r = n − k symbols
are information symbols and the remaining k = max{ki} symbols are random symbols chosen
uniformly from Fq, i.e., X = (S,W ) = ((s1, · · · , sr)T , (w1, · · · , wk)T ). When properly designed,
a linear network code is ”secure”, i.e., the eavesdropper cannot eliminate the randomness or
learn any combinations of solely the information symbols.
Definition of security: The secure network code defined by Cai & Yeung is Shannon-secure,
that is,
H(S|MiX = Bi) = H(S), ∀Mi ∈M . (2.1)
This definition is equivalent to that the eavesdropper cannot learn any linear combinations of
the first r information symbols, namely, ∀(t1, t2, · · · , tki) 6= 0 and ∀(β1, β2, · · · , βr) 6= 0,
(t1, t2, · · · , tki)MiX 6= (β1, β2, · · · , βr, 0 · · · 0)X . (2.2)
Cai and Yeung also proved that a network code is secure, if ∀Bi ∈ F kiq and ∀S ∈ F rq , there
exists
|C(Bi)
∗⋂
(S)| = qk−ki , (2.3)
where C(Bi) = {X ∈ Fnq : MiX = Bi}, ∀b ∈ Fnq and C∗(S) = {X ∈ Fnq : X = (S,W )},∀S ∈
F rq .
Transformation matrix: Let C denote an n × n secure transformation matrix. Cai &
Yeung’s method is to apply this matrix to an insecure network code and transform it into
a secure one. More specifically, for any edge e ∈ E of encoding vector Te, the transformed
encoding vector is T ′e = TeC. Thus, the symbol transmitted on edge e becomes T ′eX = TeCX.
The properties that matrix C should satisfy such that the transformed network code is both
feasible and secure, are given as follows:
Theorem 1 The matrix C is full-rank i.f.f. the transformed network code is feasible, i.e., all
receivers can recover the information symbols S = (x1, · · · , xr)T .
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Theorem 2 The first r row vectors of matrix C−1 and all row vectors of matrix Mi are
linearly independent i.f.f. the transformed network code is secure.
Lower bound: To guarantee the existence of a secure transformation matrix C, the larger
field size is required. Cai & Yeung proved that a lower bound of q > |A| is sufficient (but not
necessary).
Feldman et al. [26] generalized and simplified Cai & Yeung’s method, and showed that
making a linear network code secure is equivalent to finding a code with certain generalized
distance properties. They also presented a necessary (but not sufficient) condition that guar-
antees the existence of a secure transformation.
Definition of security: Feldman et al. defined that a secure network code should satisfy
that ∀Bi ∈ F kiq and ∀S, S′ ∈ F rq ,
|R(S,Bi)| = |R(S′, Bi)| , (2.4)
where R(S,Bi) = {W ∈ F kq : Mi(S,W ) = Bi},∀S ∈ F rq . R(S,Bi) is the set of all possible ran-
dom vectors W , such that when message vector X = (S,W ) is sent, the observed information
on the linearly independent edges in Ai is Bi. This definition shows that when W is chosen
randomly, whatever information Bi that an eavesdropper observes gives no information about
the transmitted S.
Transformation matrix: Unlike Cai & Yeung, Feldman applied the transformation matrix
C to the message vector sent by the source, while keeping the code unchanged. Thus, the
message vector sent by the source is X ′ = CX. For any edge e ∈ E of encoding vector Te, the
symbol transmitted on edge e becomes TeX ′ = TeCX. This transformation is equivalent in
power to that of Cai & Yeung, but it is simpler because it does not need to change the code.
Feldman et al. also proved that finding a secure transformation matrix is equivalent to
solving some generalized coding problem. Let N be the number of all edges in the network.
Let ZG be an n×N matrix whose columns are the encoding vectors of all edges in the graph
G. Since ZG has rank n (i.e., the message vector can be decoded by the receivers), thus the
null space of ZG has rank N − n, which can be generated by an (N − n)×N matrix Z ′G.
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Theorem 3 Given an (N − n)×N matrix Z ′G, a r×N matrix F that satisfies the Hamming
distance δ(Z ′G, F ) > n− r exists i.f.f. an n× n secure transformation matrix C exists.
Based on this theorem, the existence of matrix C is equivalent to the existence of matrix
F , while finding the latter one is a generalized coding problem, i.e., Span Distance Problem.
When solving the Span Distance Problem, the following result can be derived:
Theorem 4 If n = logNlog q − log Volq(d,N)log q + 2 logN + log q+ log ln q and d ≤ n− r, then there is
an (N − n)×N matrix Z ′G, such that for any r ×N matrix F , the Hamming distance
δ(Z ′G, F ) > n− r cannot be satisfied.
Volq(d,N) denotes the number of vectors in a ball of radius d around x, where given x ∈ FNq ,
the ball is the set of all vectors in FNq which differ from x in at most d coordinates. In this
theorem, let q = NΩ(
√
n−r
logN
). It can be seen that as long as r takes any value within the range
r < (NΩ(
√
n−r
logN
) − 3) logN , the inequality d ≤ n− r is held.
Lower bound: Based on Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, the necessary lower bound of field size,
i.e., q > NΩ(
√
n−r
logN
), can be obtained for the existence of a secure transformation matrix C.
2.3.2.3 Weakly-secure Network Coding Schemes
Bhattad & Narayanan [6] observed that the security requirement [13] can be relaxed in prac-
tice. They believe that it is suffice if no meaningful information is leaked to the eavesdropper.
For example, a network code is secure if the eavesdropper only get x1 + x2, but is unaware
of x1 and x2, where x1 and x2 are two information symbols sent by the source. They defined
a weakly-secure model, proposed a secure transformation to convert an insecure code into a
secure one, and proved the sufficient condition for the existence of a secure transformation.
Definition of security: They defined that a weakly-secure network code should satisfy,
H(xj |MiX = Bi) = H(xj) ∀xj ∈ X . (2.5)
Transformation matrix: Unlike the Shannon-secure code, a weakly-secure code does not
require any random symbols inserted into the message vector. A secure transformation matrix
C can be applied either to the message vector sent from the source or to the encoding vectors
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of all edges. After transformation, the message available to the eavesdropper is M ′iX = MiCX
for all Mi ∈M.
Theorem 5 The matrix C is full-rank iff the transformed coding solution is feasible; any row
vector of the matrix C−1 and all row vectors of matrix Mi are linearly independent i.f.f. the
transformed encoding solutions is weak-secure.
Lower bound: Bhattad & Narayanan proved that if qn > |A|qk + qn−1, then the secure
transformation matrix C must exist.
2.3.3 Solutions to Pollution Attacks
2.3.3.1 Filtering Pollution Attacks by Forwarders
Krohn et al. [47] proposed using a homomorphic hash function to verify the check blocks
of a downloaded file in peer-to-peer systems, where the check blocks are linear combinations of
original file blocks. Gkantsidis and Rodriguez [30] extended Krohn’s approach and presented
a homomorphic hashing scheme (called GR’s scheme for short) for securing peer-to-peer file
distribution systems with network coding against pollution attacks. Assuming multiple users
want to download a file that is divided into n blocks b1, b2, · · · , bn. The source (and the
system) transmits these blocks with linear network coding, that is, each forwarder transmits
some encoded block e =
∑n
i=1 cibi mod q, where (c1, c2, · · · , cn) denotes the encoding vector
and q is a prime. With a homomorphic hash function, the hash of this encoded block can be
represented as h(e) =
∏n
i=1 h
ci(bi) mod p, where p is another prime. Hence, if a downstream
node obtains the source blocks’ hashes in advance, it is able to verify the encoded block e.
However, GR’s scheme has a severe drawback, i.e., it needs some extra secure channels for
the source to transmit all of its hashes to the forwarders and sinks before sending the source
blocks. Unfortunately, such secure channels do not exist in most networks. Otherwise, if we
can find such a secure channel, we can directly send all the source blocks to the sinks and
easily solve the pollution attack problem. So, the requirement of extra secure channels makes
GR’s scheme inapplicable or impractical in most cases. In addition, GR’s scheme is based on
heavy modular exponentiations and hence inefficient for wireless sensor networks.
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Charles, Jain and Lauter [19] designed a new homomorphic signature scheme (called CJL’s
scheme for short) based on Weil pairing [54, 56] over elliptic curves. CJL’s scheme utilizes a
”linear” signature function based on some torsion points over elliptic curves, while the signature
of an encoded message covers the contents of the message and the corresponding encoding
vector. This allows forwarders to calculate the signatures of their encoded messages without
contacting the source. Hence, CJL’s scheme does not need any secure channels and can even
provide source authentication. The main disadvantage of CJL’s scheme is that its underlying
pairing operations are extremely time-consuming. So, it is too slow to be used in wireless
sensor networks.
Zhao et al. [93] studied the content distribution applications adopting network coding
and proposed a signature scheme (called Zhao’s scheme) that allows the forwarders to filter
pollution attacks. They divided a source file into multiple vectors that span a subspace. In
their scheme, the source calculates a signature of the spanned subspace, then broadcasts it to
all the forwarders for them to verify if a received encoded vector is in that subspace or not.
To verify one vector, a forwarder should calculate m + n modular exponentiations, which is
the same as GR’s scheme, where m is the length of each vector and n is the total number of
source vectors. The authors claimed that their approach does not need extra secure channels.
However, the public keys and the signature used in Zhao’s scheme are both related to the
downloaded file. In the case that a lot of files should be downloaded continuously from the
source, this scheme still requires secure channels to update the public keys or signature to all
forwarders.
2.3.3.2 Filtering Pollution Attacks by Sinks
Ho et al. [35] studied Byzantine modification attacks in multicast networks and illustrated
how randomized network coding can be utilized to detect these attacks without the use of
cryptographic functions. In Ho’s scheme, the source attaches each packet with a hash calculated
from a polynomial hash function. If Byzantine modification attacks (i.e., pollution attacks)
exist, a sink can detect inconsistency between the packets and corresponding hashes with a high
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probability, as long as the sink receives some unmodified packet whose content is unknown to
the adversaries. The detection probability can be traded off against communication overhead
and the number of unmodified packets. Ho’s scheme is computationally efficient for the use of a
simple polynomial hash function. However, it only allows the sinks, instead of the forwarders,
to detect modification attacks. Hence, it cannot reduce the amount of energy consumed by the
forwarders for transmitting the useless polluted packets. In addition, it can only detect (but
not filter) polluted packets. So, it cannot help the sinks recover the source packets correctly,
given that some polluted packets are detected.
Jaggi et al. [39] discussed how to build resilient network coding in the presence of Byzantine
adversaries. Their idea is to append the source messages with extra parity information that
can be used by the sinks to correctly recover the source messages even suffering Byzantine
attacks. The tradeoff is the sacrifice of data transmission rate. They analyzed the optimal rate
that network coding can achieve under different threat models and proposed some polynomial
time algorithms to attain these optimal rates. Suppose the network capacity is C. When the
adversaries can eavesdrop on all links and jam zo links, their algorithm can achieve a rate of
C − 2zo. However, when the adversaries have limited snooping capabilities, their algorithm
can achieve a higher rate of C − zo. Similar to Ho’s scheme, Jaggi’s algorithms filter pollution
attacks only by the sinks, so they cannot reduce the energy consumption of the forwarders for
forwarding polluted information and are not efficient for wireless sensor networks.
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CHAPTER 3 ENHANCING CONFIDENTIALITY: Providing Key
Management for Wireless Sensor Networks
3.1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks may consist of a large number of battery-powered sensor nodes,
which are equipped with short-range radio, and only have constrained computation capability
as well as limited memory space. These sensor networks pose security and privacy challenges
when deployed in a hostile environment. For example, an adversary can easily gain access to
mission critical or private information by eavesdropping on wireless communications among
sensor nodes. Therefore, it is important to encrypt the wireless communication. However, as
Chan et al. stated in [17], the challenge is how to bootstrap secure communications among
sensor nodes, that is, how to set up secret keys among sensor nodes to allow them to establish
secure links between each other.
Some general key distribution and management approaches are not suitable for wireless
sensor networks. Firstly, trivially storing in each node a pairwise key for every other node poses
a high memory requirement unaffordable for sensor nodes. Secondly, online key distribution
and management offered by the base station is inefficient for wireless sensor networks due to
high communication overhead. Thirdly, public-key algorithms such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman and
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are too expensive to current sensor nodes for high energy
consumption and computation overhead. Experiment results of existing research [32, 76] show
that the execution time of public-key based operations such as encryption and decryption is
of the order of seconds or even ten seconds. Moreover, wireless sensor networks may not be
able to provide the desired Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for key distribution. We have
to either distribute public keys into nodes through the base station online, which may cause
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high communication overhead, or pre-distribute public keys into nodes oﬄine, which may need
some scheme like what we propose in this work to improve its efficiency.
Fortunately, the bootstrapping problem can be solved by key pre-distribution schemes
that pre-distribute secret information in nodes to help them establish secure links after de-
ployment. Eschenauer and Gligor [25] proposed basic scheme by utilizing probabilistic key
pre-distribution, which was improved by Chan et al. [17] and Du et al. [22]. Recently, Du et
al. [23] and Liu and Ning [52, 53] independently proposed to make use of deployment knowl-
edge for further improvement of the performance of key establishment. Different from all these
schemes, LEAP [96] proposed by Zhu et al. assumes a weaker model, that is, there exists a
short time interval within nodes can establish pairwise keys safely after deployment.
We propose a novel key management scheme by using deployment knowledge. In our
scheme, a target field is divided into hexagon grids and sensor nodes are divided into the same
number of groups as that of grids, where each group is deployed into a unique grid. Benefited
from deployment knowledge, we can drastically reduce the number of potential groups from
which a node’s neighbors may come. Built on top of Blom’s scheme [8], our scheme distributes
secret information among nodes for them to generate pairwise keys. We first force each group
of nodes to share the same secret matrix, hence, each pair of nodes from the same group are
guaranteed to establish a pairwise key. Then, we assign some extra secret matrices to help the
nodes from neighbor groups establish pairwise keys. By carefully arranging secret matrices for
sensor groups, we achieve a probability approaching one for almost all the nodes to establish
secure links with their neighbors, while the probability offered by other schemes is much less
than one.
We study connectivity of sensor networks utilizing geometric random graph model [31, 60,
68] and derive the transmission range for achieving the desired connectivity based on sensor
distribution. Compared with existing schemes, our scheme requires a shorter transmission
range and achieves a higher connectivity even with a lower memory requirement. In addition,
it has an interesting property: When the number of compromised nodes of a group is less than
a threshold value, wireless communication between all the other nodes belonging to the same
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group is still secure. Simulation results also show that our scheme outperforms others in terms
of resilience against node capture.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 3.2, we discuss deployment model
and define the key pre-distribution problem for wireless sensor networks. Then, we present
our scheme in section 3.3. In section 3.4, we analyze connectivity of wireless sensor networks
and study how to determine the transmission range for achieving the desired connectivity. In
section 3.5, we evaluate security performance in term of resilience against node capture, while
in section 3.6, we compare our scheme with others by simulation. Finally, we conclude in
section 3.7.
3.2 Problem Statement
3.2.1 Deployment Model
In the work, we assume that sensor nodes are stationary after deployment. The distribution
of nodes can be determined from deployment model which shows how sensor nodes are deployed.
A general deployment model states that N nodes are deployed into an arbitrary target field Sf
and the location of each node i (i = 1, . . . , N) follows some distribution of probability density
function (pdf) fi(x, y), where (x, y) ∈ Sf are the node’s coordinates.
Except for deploying all nodes at once, it is also possible to deploy sensor nodes in groups,
which leads to the following group-based deployment model :
• An arbitrary target field Sf is divided into (and covered by) t grids equally.
• N nodes are also divided into t groups equally (and hence each group contains n = Nt
nodes). Each group of nodes will be deployed into a unique grid such that group i will
deployed into grid i (i = 1, . . . , t), where i is called group (and grid) index.
• The center of each grid is called deployment point, which is the desired location of all
nodes of corresponding group. Because of randomness of deployment process, a group
of nodes may spread into a local area around the deployment point to which the group
of nodes should be deployed. Hence, we assume the real location of each group of nodes
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follows some distribution fi(x, y) = f(x, y, µx, µy), where (µx, µy) ∈ Sf is the coordinates
of deployment point for the group.
Figure 3.1 depicts how to partition a target field into square and hexagon grids.
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(b) Partition of hexagon grids
Figure 3.1 A target field is partitioned into square or hexagon grids. l is
the distance between two neighbor grids. σ denotes the variance
of normal distribution of sensor nodes. A and B are two de-
ployment points. C is the tangent point of two circles of radius
3σ and each circle is centered at a deployment point.
(Note: In the rest of chapter, we use terms grid and group interchangeably since they corre-
spond to each other.)
In this work, we consider two popular distributions of deployed nodes, that is, uniform
distribution and normal distribution.
For example, we can divide a target field into square grids and drop each group of nodes
randomly in their grid. Thus, we can obtain such a uniform distribution:
fi(x, y) =
1
l2
, (3.1)
where l is the distance between two neighbor deployment points, and x ∈ [µxi − l2 , µxi + l2 ],
y ∈ [µyi − l2 , µyi + l2 ].
Another example might be to drop nodes from a helicopter. Each time when the helicopter
is hanging above some deployment point, a group of nodes will be dropped. Due to randomness,
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each group of nodes may spread into a small circle area around their deployment point. The
closer to the deployment point, the more nodes reside in the location. So, we may acquire a
normal distribution as follows:
fi(x, y) =
1
2piσ2
e
−[(x−µxi )
2+(y−µyi )
2]
2σ2 , (3.2)
where σ2 is the variance of distribution. This variance may be affected by various factors such
as the height of helicopter and the weather when nodes are deployed. It can be measured by
experiment. Here, we simply assume that it is already known before sensor nodes are deployed.
3.2.2 Threat Model
When designing our key management scheme, we consider the following threats:
• The adversaries can eavesdrop on wireless communication in sensor networks irrespective
of whether it is encrypted or not.
• The adversaries can physically capture and compromise some sensor nodes in order to
obtain the secret keys (or secret information) stored in those nodes.
• Having obtained the secret keys from the compromised nodes, the adversaries can decrypt
or compromise all of the links secured with those keys. The compromised links include
not only those directly connected to the compromised nodes, but also the additional ones
that are established by non-compromised nodes using the same compromised keys.
3.2.3 Bootstrapping Problem
In this work, we define a link as a one-hop and bidirectional connection between a pair of
neighbor nodes, where a pair of neighbor nodes are any two nodes whose physical distance is
no more than their transmission range (suppose all nodes have the same transmission range).
The authors of [96] have defined various types of keys such as individual key, group key, and
cluster key1. However, in this work we focus on how to establish pairwise keys for neighbor
1In [96], individual key is defined as a unique pairwise key between each node and the base station; group
key is defined as a globally shared key used by the base station to encrypt broadcast messages for the whole
sensor network; and cluster key is defined as a key shared by a node and all its neighbors.
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nodes.
(Note: Cluster has different meanings in [96] and in our work. In [96], a cluster includes a
node and its neighbors. In our work, it is defined as one grid (or group) and its neighbor grids
(or groups).)
Our purpose is to enable neighbor nodes to share some common key(s) that can be used to
secure their communication. More precisely, we consider such a bootstrapping problem that
how to distribute secret key(s) among sensor nodes while achieving the following goals:
• Highly connected sensor network. When measuring how sensor networks are connected,
we only consider the secure links. That is, we do not allow any two neighbor nodes to
be connected if they cannot find any shared key. So, our key management scheme poses
a higher requirement for connectivity. (Note: We define connectivity as the probability
that a deployed sensor network is connected.)
• Strong resilience against node capture. Resilience against node capture is defined as the
fraction of links that the adversaries could compromise given that a certain number of
nodes are compromised. The lower the fraction, the stronger the resilience.
• Low memory requirement. Memory requirement is measured by the number of secret
keys stored in each node.
• Short transmission range. We assume that sensor nodes can adjust their transmission
range by choosing different power levels of radio and this adjustment is done before
deployment. After deployment, all the nodes use the same transmission range that is no
longer changed. Obviously, choosing a shorter transmission range can save more energy.
These goals may cause conflicts. For example, to make more nodes connected, we may
either store more secret keys in sensor nodes or increase their transmission range, hence, the
first goal contradicts the third or the fourth one. When designing our scheme, we have to make
tradeoffs among these goals.
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3.3 Our Scheme
3.3.1 Background: Blom’s Key Management Scheme
We briefly introduce Blom’s key management scheme [8] here, as our scheme is built on
top of it. (Interested reader may refer to [22] for more detailed explanation.)
Blom’s scheme guarantees that any two nodes out of a group of n ones can always establish
a pairwise key. It employs two basic components, a (λ + 1) × (λ + 1) symmetric matrix D
and a (λ + 1) × n public matrix G. We call (DG)T secret matrix and denote it as A or B,
where T means transpose. In this scheme, all pairwise keys are arranged in an n×n symmetric
matrix K, where K = AG (or BG) = (DG)TG = KT . Each node i stores the i-th row of
secret matrix and the i-th column of public matrix. To establish the pairwise key, two nodes,
e.g., i and j, first exchange their columns of public matrix, then, each one can individually
derive the key, e.g., kij = kji, that is the dot product of its own row and the column received
from the other. Since the secret matrix (or rows) is never transmitted, no adversaries can
get the key by eavesdropping on the communication between these two nodes. Moreover, no
additional links will be revealed given that some node is compromised, because all the rows
(or all the keys) are different. However, if the number of compromised nodes is greater than
λ, the whole secret matrix can be computed (or broken) by the adversaries. This property is
called λ-secure, where λ is called the security threshold.
3.3.2 Overview
Based on the group-based deployment model, we derive that each group of nodes reside
only within a small local area, which implies that most neighbors of each node come from its
own group and neighbor groups. Therefore, to achieve a highly connected network, the key
point is to maximize the probability with which the nodes from the same group and neighbor
groups can find some shared keys. For this purpose, we divide the links of sensor networks
into two types, in-group links and inter-group links, depending on whether the involved nodes
are from the same group or not. Accordingly, for these two types of links, we build two types
of secret matrices, A and B, respectively.
44
Our scheme consists of tow phases, key pre-distribution phase and key discovery phase.
3.3.2.1 Key pre-distribution phase
In this phase, we generate a global public matrix G and a number of secret matrices A
and B. All the groups share the global matrix G, that is, every node of a group picks a
corresponding column from G. Meanwhile, each group is assigned a unique secret matrix A,
that is, every node of a group picks a corresponding row from the unique matrix A assigned
to its group. This way, we guarantee that any two nodes from the same group can always find
a pairwise key.
Then, we assign each group some number of B matrices and guarantee each pair of neighbor
groups share at least one common B matrix. More precisely, we first select some groups and
assign each of them a distinct secret matrix B. These selected groups are called basic groups,
while others are called non-basic groups or normal groups. Then, for each group (including
basic and normal groups), we assign it all the B matrices that have been assigned to its neighbor
basic groups, which are the basic groups among its neighbor groups. After that, each node
picks the corresponding rows from some or all (depending on the different methods that we
will discuss late) of the B matrices assigned to its group. Finally, we set all nodes the same
transmission range and deploy them group by group.
3.3.2.2 Key discovery phase
After deployment, each node first probes its neighbors. Then, neighbor nodes exchange
their group indexes, indexes of B matrices and columns of matrix G. If two neighbor nodes
come from the same group, they can derive the pairwise key from the common matrix A and
G. If they are not from the same group, but share one or more common B matrices, they
can also find out the pairwise key from a shared matrix B and the common matrix G. Last,
the neighbors establishing pairwise keys build the secure link between each other and start
to transmit data securely. Those neighbors without pairwise keys will no longer communicate
with each other.
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(Note: The nodes without pairwise keys may still exploit other methods such as multi-hop
path reinforcement to establish pairwise keys indirectly. However, this discussion is out of the
scope of this work and we focus only on how to establish the pairwise keys using one-hop links.)
3.3.3 Detailed Procedures
We have different ways to assign B matrices to groups and allow nodes to pick their rows,
which leads to a series of variants of our scheme. Each variant is a method identified by two
parameters, b and w, where b is the maximum number of B matrices assigned to a group and
w is the maximum number of rows picked by a node. (Note: We use maximum here, because
our scheme does not guarantee every group (or node) has the same number of B matrices (or
rows).) We denote each method as (b =?, w =?), where “?” is some integer value. The value
of b is 2, 3 or 7 and w may take a value no greater than that of b. Hence, we have totally
2 + 3 + 7 = 12 slightly different methods. (Late on, we will discuss these methods in detail.)
For example, for method (b = 2, w = 2), b = 2 means each group will be assigned at most two
B matrices, and w = 2 means each node will store at most two rows with each picked from a
distinct matrix B. More precisely, if a group is assigned two B matrices, every node of this
group will store two rows with each from a B matrix. If the group has only one B matrix,
each of its nodes will store one row picked from the only matrix B.
In our scheme, each node stores one column of matrix G, one row of matrix A and at most
w rows of B matrices. Each row has (λ+ 1) elements. Du et al. demonstrated in [22] that if
the public matrix G is a Vandermonde matrix, each column can be derived from a single seed
integer and hence memory consumption for columns can be ignored. Given the memory size
of M for each node, the value of threshold λ of our scheme can be determined as follows:
M = (λ+ 1)(w + 1) =⇒ λ = M
w + 1
− 1 . (3.3)
In our scheme, not every node is able to pick w rows from B matrices. So, equation (3.3) gives
us a worst-case value of λ or a lower bound on λ.
Now, we present the procedures of our scheme in detail.
46
3.3.3.1 Key pre-distribution phase
• We generate a public matrix G to be shared by all the groups and a unique secret matrix
Ai for each group i, where i = 1, . . . , t and t is the total number of groups. Each node j
of group i picks the j-th row of Ai, where node index j = 1, . . . , n.
• The target field is divided into t = t1 × t2 grids. Hence, the coordinates of group i can
be represented by a pair of row and column indexes (ri, ci), where ri = 1, . . . , t1 and
ci = 1, . . . , t2.
• Now, we select some groups as basic groups and assign each basic group a distinct B
matrix. More precisely,
– For the methods of b = 2, if the coordinates of group i satisfy “ri mod 2 = 0 and
ci mod 2 = 0, but ri mod 4 6= 0” or “ri mod 4 = 0 and ci mod 2 = 1”, this group
is selected as a basic group and assigned a distinct matrix B, as shown in Figure
3.2(a), where the basic groups are labeled in Bold and italic font. We repeat this
step until all the basic groups are found.
– For the methods of b = 3, if the coordinates of group i satisfy “ri mod 2 = 1 and
ci mod 3 = 0” or “ri mod 2 = 0 and ci mod 3 = 2”, this group is selected as basic
group and assigned a distinct matrix B, as shown in Figure 3.2(b). We repeat this
step until all basic groups are found.
– For the methods of b = 7, every group is a basic group. We assign each group i a
distinct matrix Bi, as shown in Figure 3.2(c).
• Then, we assign B matrices to the normal groups for the methods of b = 2 or 3, and
assign more B matrices to the basic groups for the methods of b = 7.
– For the methods of b = 2 (or 3), we assign each normal group all the B matrices
that are already assigned to its neighbor basic groups. Except for those at the edge
of the target field, each normal group has two (or three) neighbor basic groups.
Thus, these normal groups is eventually assigned two (or three) B matrices.
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Figure 3.2 Different ways to assign B matrices, when the target field is
partitioned into hexagon grids. The basic groups are labeled
in bold and italic font. The compromised nodes are within
the groups marked with a small (blue) circle and the groups
affected by the compromised nodes are bounded by irregular
(red) lines. In sub-figure (c), each group is actually assigned
seven B matrices, where six matrices come from its neighbor
groups and one is shown in the corresponding grid for the group.
– For the methods of b = 7, all the groups are the basic groups and each group (except
for those at the edge of the target field) has six neighbors. We further assign each
group all the B matrices originally assigned to its neighbors. Thus, except for those
at the edge of target field, each group is eventually assigned seven B matrices.
• After all the groups have their B matrices assigned, each node tries to select w rows from
these matrices. Given a node of index i,
– If its group is assigned more than w matrices, the node first randomly selects w
matrices, then picks the i-th row from each selected matrix.
– Otherwise, if its group has exactly or less than w matrices assigned, then the node
directly picks the i-th row from each matrix. (That is why our scheme can not
guarantee each node has exactly w rows picked from B matrices.)
• Finally, we set an identical transmission range r for all the nodes and deploy them into
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the target field group by group.
Figures 3.2(a), 3.2(b) and 3.2(c) show the different ways to assign B matrices, when b = 2,
3 and 7 and the target field is partitioned into hexagon grids. In these figures, the basic groups
are labeled in bold and italic font. The common feature of these assignments is that any two
neighbor groups share at least one common B matrix.
3.3.3.2 Key discovery phase
• After deployment, each node broadcasts its group index, the indexes of B matrices and
the column of G, while receiving the same information from its neighbors.
• Then, each node checks if it has any index matches one of those received from its neigh-
bors:
– If two neighbor nodes have the same group index, then either of them can derive
the pairwise key by computing the dot product of its own row of matrix A and the
column received from the other.
– If two neighbors share exactly one B matrix, then either of them can derive the
pairwise key by computing the dot product of its row of that B matrix and the
column received from the other.
– If two neighbors share more than one B matrix, then they select the same matrix
from the shared ones and derive the pairwise key based on the selected matrix B.
To make agreement with the selected matrix, they can either negotiate with each
other or (for example) simply select the matrix that has the smallest index.
– If no matched index found, two neighbors will no longer communicate with each
other.
3.3.4 Variants of Our Scheme
We have presented twelve variants of our scheme, but it is still not clear why we need these
variants, what features they have, and whether there are other variants. In this sub-section,
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we try to answer these questions by studying three metrics, connectivity, memory usage, and
security (i.e., resilience against node capture) of these variants.
• We evaluate connectivity by measuring the probability that two nodes from the same
group and neighbor groups can establish a pairwise key, because the group-based deploy-
ment model indicates that most neighbor nodes are from the same group or neighbor
groups.
• Memory usage is measured by the number of rows of B matrices stored in sensor nodes.
• To compare security of different variants, we introduce a new term, the affected groups.
Since one matrix B may be shared by multiple groups, if the adversaries compromise
some nodes of one group and obtain certain rows of the matrix B that is assigned to
the group, they can compromise the additional links established by the nodes of other
groups that share the same matrix B. We define the affected groups as, given a group
with some nodes compromised, all other groups that share the same B matrices as the
group. Hence, security of a variant can be roughly measured by the number of affected
groups.
In our scheme, a group’s B matrices come from its neighbor basic groups. We define a cluster
as one (central) group along with its neighbor groups, and we study the variants of our scheme
based on clusters, because we found that the different ways we assign basic groups in clusters
directly form different variants. (Note: When nodes are deployed in hexagon, square or triangle
grids, each cluster contains seven, nine or thirteen groups.)
The variants of our scheme can be categories into three classes depending on the value of
b, which can only be 2, 3 or 7. Each class corresponds to a different assignment of B matrices,
as shown in Figures 3.2(a), 3.2(b) and 3.2(c). We use methods (b = 2, w = 2), (b = 3, w = 3)
and (b = 7, w = 7) to represent these assignments respectively. They have almost the same
performance in terms of connectivity, because they can all guarantee that any two nodes from
the same group or neighbor groups establish a pairwise key. Thus, we only need to study these
assignments in terms of memory usage and security.
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When b = 2, we assign two basic groups in each cluster whose central group is a normal
one. The two basic groups are located symmetrically with respect to the central one. In this
assignment, each group is assigned at most two B matrices. Considering method (b = 2, w = 2)
of this assignment, each node stores at most two rows of B matrices and compromising nodes
of one group can affect at most 13 groups. In Figure 3.2(a), 13 affected groups are bounded
by irregular (red) lines, given that the compromised nodes are within group B5B6, which is
marked with a small (blue) circle.
Similarly, when b = 3, we assign at most three basic groups in each cluster and each
(normal) group is assigned at most three B matrices. This assignment is depicted in Figure
3.2(b). Considering method (b = 3, w = 3), each node stores at most 3 rows of B matrices. As
shown in Figure 3.2(b), given the compromised nodes within group B5B8B9 that is marked
with a small (blue) circle, there are 16 affected groups that are bounded by irregular (red) lines.
Clearly, method (b = 3, w = 3) is worse than method (b = 2, w = 2), because it consumes
more memory of sensor nodes and produces more affected groups given that one group is
compromised.
When b = 4, 5 and 6, we find that no explicit assignments can be constructed, because if we
assign four, five or six basic groups in one cluster, the pattern of cluster cannot be repeated over
the whole target field. However, it is possible to build an assignment when b = 7. As shown
in Figure 3.2(c), each group is a basic one and hence a cluster contains seven basic groups.
Considering method (b = 7, w = 7), each node (except for those at the edge of field) has to
store seven B matrices. This method produces 19 affected groups, given that some number
of nodes within a group are compromised. Obviously, this methods is worse than methods
(b = 2, w = 2) and (b = 3, w = 3) that are the representatives of other two assignments when
b = 2 and 3, respectively.
When b = 1, we find that it is impossible to construct an assignment following the same
rule as building other assignments. Otherwise, we have to assign exact one basic group in each
cluster, which provides no guarantee to connectivity, that is, it is possible that two neighbor
groups share no common matrix B. Hence, we have to modify the rule and build a new
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assignment, as shown in Figure 3.2(d). In this assignment, we have to assign each normal
group (except for those at the edge of the field) three different B matrices, so each node should
store at most three rows. When some nodes within a group are compromised, up to 43 groups
might be affected. (Due to space limit, we do not show all the affected groups in Figure 3.2(d).)
Compared with other assignments, this one is the worst in terms of memory usage and security
and is eventually not selected as a possible solution to our bootstrapping problem.
So far, we have explained why there are only three possible assignments. For each assign-
ment, we have multiple choices for sensor nodes to pick rows from B matrices. Let w denote
the number of rows of B matrices picked by a node. w can take any value no more than that
of b. Generally, given a fixed value of b, the smaller the value of w, the lower the connectivity,
because it is less likely for neighbor nodes to find shared B matrices. Meanwhile, taking a
smaller value of w leads to a higher resilience against node capture, since each matrix B is
shared by less number of groups (or nodes). Similarly, if we fix the value of w, then the bigger
the value of b, the lower the connectivity and the stronger the resilience, because the nodes
have more choices to select B matrices and are less likely to find shared B matrices.
3.3.5 Shape of Grids
Only certain shapes of grids can be repeated to cover a continuous field. They are triangle,
square (or rectangle) and regular hexagon. Figure 3.3 depicts the clusters of different shapes
of grids (or groups). It shows that a triangle, square and hexagon grid have twelve, eight and
six neighbors, respectively.
Figure 3.3 A cluster of triangle, square or hexagon grids (or groups). A
triangle, square and hexagon grid have 12, 8 and 6 neighbors,
respectively.
Same as to assign B matrices in hexagon grids, we can construct an assignment for square
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grids. As shown in Figure 3.4, we assign three basic groups in each cluster. A possible
assignment for triangle grids is also to assign three basic group in each cluster, which has not
been shown.
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Figure 3.4 Assignment of B matrices when a target field is partitioned into
square grids. The basic groups are labeled in bold and italic
font. The compromised nodes are within the group marked
with a small (blue) circle and the affected groups are bounded
by (red) lines.
Table 3.1 compares the assignments of B matrices given different shapes of grids, where
a node picks the corresponding row from every matrix B assigned to its group. We list the
Table 3.1 Comparison among assignments given different shapes of grids
Triangle Square Hexagon
Neighbor groups 12 8 6
Affected groups 31 21 13
Rows stored 4 4 3
number of neighbor groups for each group, that of affected groups given that some nodes
are compromised with one group, and that of rows (from both A and B matrices) stored in
nodes. It is clear that partitioning a target field into hexagon grids has the least number of
affected groups and the least number of rows stored in nodes. This means that hexagon grid
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partitioning is the best in terms of security and memory usage, compared with square and
triangle grid partitioning. Simulation results presented late will also prove this. (Triangle grid
partitioning is apparently the worst and will no longer be studied.)
3.4 Connectivity Analysis
3.4.1 Grid Size Control
Let Pc denote connectivity, which is defined as the probability that a deployed sensor
network is connected as the total number of nodes approaches infinity. Let p denote the
probability that two neighbor nodes find at least one shared key. Obviously, connectivity
grows up as p increases. Unlike the existing schemes that has a p value much smaller than one,
most variants of our scheme can offer a much bigger p that approaches one. Four methods
(b = 2, w = 2), (b = 3, w = 3) and (b = 7, w = 6 or 7) can even guarantee p = 1 for the
neighbor nodes coming from the same group or neighbor groups. However, when the neighbor
nodes are from non-neighbor groups, our scheme can only provide a very small or even zero p.
Hence, to achieve a high connectivity, we need to control the size of grids to make the nodes
from non-neighbor groups impossible to become neighbors.
When each group of nodes are uniformly distributed into a small local area, grid size
control is easy, because we only need to make every grid cover the small area in which the
corresponding group of nodes reside. However, it is not so straightforward when the location of
nodes follows normal distribution. So, we focus on how to find a proper grid size under normal
distribution. As shown in equation (3.2), the normal distribution of each group is identified
by two parameters, the deployment point of the group and the variance σ. To measure grid
size, we define the metric l as the distance between two neighbor deployment points. Our
problem turns to: given some value of σ, how to set a proper value of l so that the nodes from
non-neighbor groups are unlikely to become neighbors.
The property of normal distribution tells us that 99.87% nodes of a group would reside
within a circle of radius 3σ that is centered at the group’s deployment point. Given σ, we
can use such a circle of radius 3σ to roughly represent a group of nodes. This representation
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can help us determine the value of l. First of all, l cannot be too big. Otherwise, when
the value of σ is fixed and the size of grid is much larger than that of circle, all groups are
separated from each other, which makes the deployed network completely partitioned. When
we reduce the value of l, the deployment points are getting closer, which means that the circles
(or groups) are moving to each other. Hence, the nodes should find more and more neighbors
coming from their neighbor groups, instead of coming from their own groups, and the deployed
network should be better connected. However, when the value of l becomes too small, e.g.,
the size of circle is even larger than that of a cluster of grids, the nodes of one group could
spread into the grids that correspond to the non-neighbor groups, which definitely lowers the
connectivity of deployed sensor network. Therefore, the value of l cannot be too big or too
small. Our purpose is to choose the value of l as small as possible, but not allow the nodes from
non-neighbor groups to become neighbors. In this way, we are able to maximize connectivity.
Let us consider the case that a target field is partitioned into hexagon grids as shown in
Figure 3.1(b). In the figure, two circles of radius 3σ represent two groups whose grids are
the nearest non-neighbor grid of each other. If the nodes from these two different groups are
not able to meet each other, we claim that almost all the neighbors of one node should come
from the node’s own group or neighbor groups. If we further reduce the size of grid, those two
circles become overlapping, which means that more and more nodes from non-neighbor groups
become neighbors. Hence, the smallest grid size that prevents the nodes from non-neighbor
groups from being neighbors, can be obtained when those two circles become tangent to each
other. Observing triangle 4ABC in Figure 3.1(b), we can easily find that AB = l, AC = 3σ
and ∠CAB = 30◦. Thus, we have AB = 2√
3
AC, or equivalently, l = 2
√
3σ. Similarly, we
can derive that AB = l = 3σ in Figure 3.1(a), when the target field is partitioned into square
grids. Given this setting of l, we conclude that each node has 99.87% probability to find the
pairwise key with any of its neighbors.
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3.4.2 Transmission Range Setup
Existing schemes [17, 22, 25] adopted random (Bernoulli) graph model [69] for connectivity
analysis. However, this model does not consider transmission range of sensor nodes [68] and
simply assumes any two nodes have the same probability p to establish a connection. In fact,
when two nodes are out of each other’s transmission range, p approaches zero.
To better model wireless sensor networks, we adopt geometric random graph [31, 68] for its
consideration of nodes’ transmission range. Given N nodes randomly placed in a unit target
field Sf , a geometric random graph G(N, r) is constructed in such a way that an edge between
any two nodes exists if and only if they are within a distance of r from each other. Penrose
[60] studied the longest edge of random Minimum Spanning Tree (MST). He proved that the
longest edge MN of an MST, whose N points are randomly and uniformly distributed in a unit
square, satisfies
lim
N→+∞
Pr(NpiM2N − lnN ≤ α) = e−e
−α
, (3.4)
for any real number α. Since a sensor network is always connected when r ≥ MN , if we set
Npir2 = lnN + α, then
lim
N→+∞
Pr(MN ≤ r) = lim
N→+∞
Pc = e−e
−α
. (3.5)
Equation (3.5) illustrates how to calculate the value of r by determining the value of α for
achieving some desired connectivity Pc as N approaching infinity. However, we should also note
that equation (3.5) has nothing to do with any finite value of N . We can only say that given
α, if we always set Npir2 = lnN + α, then connectivity of the deployed network approaches
e−e−α , when N is large enough. Hence, equation (3.5) can be used to determine the value of
r for achieving the desired connectivity, when N is large enough. Although this result looks
similar to that of Bernoulli graph [25], they are derived under different conditions, that is,
transmission range has been taken into consideration in geometric random graph.
For those variants (or methods) providing p = 1 for the nodes from the same or neighbor
groups, we can make use of the geometric random graph model to evaluate the required trans-
mission range for achieving the desired connectivity. For example, in our scheme if we deploy
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104 nodes uniformly into their grids over a 103 × 103m2 square field and require Pc = 0.9999,
from equation (3.5) we can derive α ' 9.21 and further obtain r ' 24.22m, which is the trans-
mission range required to achieve the desired connectivity. However, if we adopt the basic
scheme in the same condition, and set memory size M = 200 and key pool size |S| = 105 with
p = 0.33, then we have to set r ' 40m in each node to obtain a degree of 18 over 50 neighbors
for achieving the same connectivity. Hence, our scheme requires a shorter transmission range
than that of the basic scheme.
If nodes are not uniformly distributed, we cannot use equation (3.5) directly, because node
density over the entire target field is not identical. It is easy to know that the area around
a deployment point has higher node density than that around the intersection of every three
neighbor hexagon grids (or every four neighbor square grids). If we assume the lowest node
density over the entire target field, we can obtain an upper bound on transmission range in the
worst case, because the lower the node density over the target field, the larger the transmission
range required for achieving some desired connectivity. In practice, when we apply this larger
transmission range, the nodes within the areas other than those intersection areas must be
able to connect more neighbors. Hence, we can claim that the real connectivity over the entire
target field would not be lower than the desired one given this new (larger) transmission range.
Figure 3.5 illustrates how to measure the lowest node density within a small circle area,
when l = 2
√
3σ. This circle area has a radius of R and is centered at some intersection point.
In this figure, we only show three neighbor groups (or grids), because the nodes from other
groups do not reside in this circle area. For convenience, we represent normal distribution
using polar coordinates and define n′ as the number of nodes within the circle area. We have
n′ =
3n
2piσ2
∫ 2σ+R
2σ−R
h θ(h) e
−h2
2σ2 dh , (3.6)
where θ(h) = 2 cos−1(h
2+(2σ)2−R2
4σh ). Thus, the lowest node density is
n′
piR2
. Substituting n
′
piR2
for N in equation (3.5), we get
r =
√√√√ ln( n′piR2 )− ln(− ln(Pc))
n′
R2
. (3.7)
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Figure 3.5 Computing the lowest node density within a circle area in polar
coordinate system. The circle area has a radius of R and is
centered at the intersection of three hexagon grids. The arrowed
line is polar axis and h denotes the radial coordinate of some
point.
For instance, if we deploy 104 nodes under normal distribution into a 103× 103m2 square field
with R = 24.22m and σ = 50m, we get r ' 31.25m. That is, we only need to increase r
from 24.22m under uniform distribution to 31.25m under normal distribution for achieving
Pc = 0.9999. Compared with r = 40m of the basic scheme under uniform distribution, our
scheme requires a shorter transmission range for achieving the same connectivity even under
normal distribution.
To see why our scheme requires a shorter transmission range, we study the number of
links involved in the small circle area. In the basic scheme, when n = 104 nodes deployed in a
103×103m2 square field, each node needs around 50 neighbors for achieving Pc = 0.9999, when
r = 40m and p = 0.33. There are about n′ = piR2 N
103×103 ' 18.4 nodes in the circle. Hence,
the number of links connected to nodes within this circle area is p[(50− 1)n′− n′(n′−1)2 ] ' 247,
where n
′(n′−1)
2 is the number of links whose both end nodes reside within the circle area and
it is counted twice in (50− 1)n′. On the other hand, simulation results show that our scheme
generates 371 links in the same circle area, when r = 40m and the target field is partitioned
into hexagon grids. If we adopt square grids, there are even 483 links. Since our scheme
achieves p approaching one and the basic scheme has only p = 0.33, it is easy to see why our
scheme can generate more links with the same transmission range, which means our scheme
can always achieve a connectivity higher than that of the basic scheme. In other words, for
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achieving the same connectivity, our scheme requires a shorter transmission range.
3.5 Security Analysis
3.5.1 Evaluation Metrics
We evaluate security, i.e., resilience against node capture, in terms of two metrics, global
security and local security. The first one is measured as the fraction of links compromised,
when adversaries randomly compromise some nodes over the whole target field. However, it
might be easier for adversaries to capture nodes within a small local area. So, we also evaluate
local security, which is defined as the fraction of links compromised, when compromised nodes
are located within a grid. (For simplicity, we use a grid to simulate the small local area within
which adversaries compromise nodes.) Obviously, local security metric is more stringent than
global one, because breaking a secret matrix becomes easier for adversaries if compromised
nodes concentrate within a small area.
Given that some nodes are already compromised, adversaries can compromise not only the
links connected to these nodes directly, but also additional links between non-compromised
nodes secured by the keys obtained from the compromised nodes. In our evaluation, we count
all of the links that adversaries can compromise, but other schemes only consider the additional
links. Therefore, our metrics are stricter than those of other schemes. In this work, we conduct
theoretical analysis on local security, but study global security only by simulation because the
theoretical analysis on global security is too complicated.
3.5.2 Theoretical Analysis of Local Security
For simplicity, we consider uniform distribution in only two special cases: (1) exactly one
node compromised, and (2) more than λ nodes compromised.
3.5.2.1 Exactly One Node Compromised
To compute local security, i.e., the fraction of links compromised given that exactly one
node is compromised, we consider in-group links and inter-group links separately.
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We first compute the number of in-group links that adversaries can compromise. Under
uniform distribution, each node has about pir2q − 1 neighbors, where node density q = N|Sf | .
Regardless of those nodes deployed at the edge of grids, the number of neighbors of a node is
the same as that of in-group links this node has. For example, given N = 104 nodes uniformly
deployed into a square field of |Sf | = 103 × 103m2 and transmission range r = 24.22m, each
node has pir2q − 1 ' 17.4 neighbors, that is, about pir2q − 1 ' 17.4 in-group links will be
compromised given one compromised node.
Then, we estimate the number of inter-group links that adversaries can compromise. When
nodes are deployed into square grids shown in Figure 3.6(a), inter-group links can only be
formed in a common area along the shared edge between two grids. This common area consists
of two strip areas and the width of each strip area is r.
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(b) Partition of hexagon grids
Figure 3.6 Computing the number of inter-group links compromised when
a target field is partitioned into square or hexagon grids. A
and C denote compromised nodes. x is the distance between A
and B. The arrowed lines denote axes. Two arc areas and one
quarter area are bounded by thick (red) lines.
We define Lcomm as the average number of inter-group links compromised in a common area
and show how to calculate Lcomm that is twice of the number of inter-group links compromised
in each strip area.
Let L denote the average number of inter-group links connected to a compromised node
that happens to fall into a strip area. Equivalently, L is the average number of this node’s
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neighbors coming from neighbor groups. As shown in Figure 3.6(a), these neighbors must be
located in the arc area that is covered by the node’s transmission region and within a neighbor
grid. Hence, we have
L =
q
r
∫ r
0
(r2 cos−1
x
r
− x
√
r2 − x2) dx , (3.8)
where x is the distance between the node and the shared edge.
However, equation (3.8) counts twice the number of links formed with a diagonal neighbor
group and hence should be subtracted from L. Observing the square grids in Figure 3.6(a),
we find that only those nodes falling into the quarter area can form inter-group links with a
diagonal neighbor group, where this quarter area is covered by the node’s transmission region
and within a diagonal neighbor grid. Let L′ denote the average number of inter-group links
formed when the node resides in the quarter area. We have
L′ =
4q
pir2
∫ r
0
∫ √r2−x2
0
[
θpir2
2pi
− r
2 sin θ
2
+
(
√
r2 − x2 + y)(
√
r2 − y2 − x)
2
] dx dy , (3.9)
where θ = pi2 − sin−1 xr − sin−1 yr . Hence, for square grids, if one node is compromised and
resides in a strip area, (L − L′) inter-group links would be compromised. For hexagon grids,
calculating L′ is too complicated. So, we directly use L to estimate the number of inter-group
links compromised, as shown in Figure 3.6(b).
The probability that a node falls into a strip area is the ratio of this strip area over the area
of a grid. For hexagon grids, this probability is r
3
√
3l
2
, and for square grids, it is rl . Recalling
that a common area consists of two strip areas, we get
Lcomm =
4r
3
√
3l
L (for hexagon grids)
or
2r
l
(L− L′) (for square grids) . (3.10)
To estimate the number of inter-group links the adversaries can compromise, we should
further know how many common areas should be counted. Since a common area is only
formed between two affected groups, we only need to know the number of affected groups.
However, we should differentiate two cases p = 1 and p 6= 1 separately, when a compromised
inter-group link is formed by nodes from neighbor groups.
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Let us consider the case of p = 1 for nodes from neighbor groups. For example, for
method (b = 2, w = 2) with hexagon grid partitioning shown in Figure 3.2(a), compromising
a node of normal group B5B6 would affect 13 groups that form 26 common areas. Therefore,
26Lcomm inter-group links would be compromised. For method (b = 3, w = 3) with square
grid partitioning shown in Figure 3.4, there are totally 32 common areas formed among 21
affected groups. However, in some common areas, neighbor groups share two B matrices with
only one compromised and a pairwise key is computed from a randomly chosen matrix. For
instance, given that one node of group B5B6B9 is compromised, neighbor nodes from groups
B1B4B5 and B1B2B5 can establish a pairwise key (or a secure link) using either B1 or
B5. In this case, only the key (or the link) established based on B5 will be compromised,
which means in these areas only half of inter-group links would be compromised. Since there
are 16 such common areas, the number of inter-group links compromised in square grids is
(12 ×16+16)Lcomm = 24Lcomm. (Note: The value of Lcomm is different for hexagon and square
grids.)
Because each node has pir2q− 1 neighbors, there are totally N2 (pir2q− 1) links in the whole
network. Considering both in-group links and inter-group links, we compute local security
given that exactly one node compromised as follows:
(pir2q−1)+26Lcomm
N
2
(pir2q−1) (for hexagon grids)
or (pir
2q−1)+24Lcomm
N
2
(pir2q−1) (for square grids) . (3.11)
In the case of p < 1 for nodes from neighbor groups, compromising one node may not always
cause inter-group links of some common area compromised, because two nodes from neighbor
groups may not establish a secure link. For example, for method (b = 3, w = 2) with hexagon
grid partitioning shown in Figure 3.2(b), one node of group B5B8B9 is compromised. (For
simplicity, we assume each of three matrices B5, B8 and B9 has a row compromised.) Now, let
us consider two nodes such as node i from group B5B8B9 and node j from B5B7B9 become
neighbors. When node i picks rows from matrices B5B8 and node j picks rows from B7B9,
or node i from B8B9 and node j from B5B7, they cannot establish a secure link. Hence, in
this case we should not count this non-existing link. In fact, node i has probability 13 to select
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B5B8 or B8B9, and node j is similar. So, they have only probability 79 to establish a secure
link. In general, for each common area i, we define pi as probability that an inter-group link
can be established for nodes within the common area, and Lcomm,i is defined for this common
area similarly. Thus, for any method of hexagon grid partitioning, we compute local security
given one compromised node as follows:
(pir2q − 1) +∑26i=1 piLcomm,i
N
2 (pir
2q − 1) . (3.12)
Local security for methods of square grid partitioning can be calculated similarly.
3.5.2.2 More Than λ Nodes Compromised
If more than λ nodes of a group are compromised, the matrix A and some B matrices
will be broken, as if all n nodes of the group were compromised. However, we cannot simply
calculate the fraction of links compromised as n multiples of the value of (3.12), because in
that way we would count each compromised link twice due to its both end nodes compromised.
Because either end of each compromised link involves a compromised row, we count the number
of compromised links twice. Thus, the true value is n2 multiples of that of (3.12), which is
n(pir2q − 1) + n∑26i=1 piLcomm,i
N(pir2q − 1) . (3.13)
Similar result can be obtained when nodes are deployed into square grids.
Our theoretic calculation based on expressions (3.11) and (3.13) matches simulation result.
The error between theoretic calculation and simulation result is no more than 5% for hexagon
grids and 3% for square grids, which has not been shown here.
3.6 Simulation Study
3.6.1 Simulation Setup
In this section, we perform simulation study. We compare our scheme with others in terms
of security and connectivity, and study the impact of grid size and estimation error on the
performance of our scheme. Without specification, we use method (b = 2, w = 2) shown in
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Figure 3.2(a) and method (b = 3, w = 3) shown in Figure 3.4 to represent our scheme, when
nodes are deployed into hexagon and square grids.
We define connectivity as the probability that a deployed network is connected when the
total number of nodes approaches infinity. However, it is impossible to measure in simulation.
So, we adopt an alternative definition used in [23], which measures connectivity as the fraction
of the size of the largest component of the deployed network, where a component is a connected
subgraph.
We list our simulation setup in Table 3.2, where “Du’s scheme” means Du’s deployment
knowledge scheme. In simulation, we assume that 104 nodes are deployed into a 103 × 103m2
square field with the desired connectivity Pc = 0.9999. In our scheme, we set σ = 33.3m and
l = 3σ (or 2
√
3σ) for square (or hexagon) grids. For Du’s deployment knowledge scheme, we
choose σ = 50m and l = 2σ. Hence, both schemes have similar grid size. When testing normal
distribution in our scheme, we compute transmission range dynamically based on the lowest
node density that is measured online.
Table 3.2 Simulation Setup
Our Scheme Du’s Basic
Square Hexagon Scheme Scheme
N 104
Sf 103 × 103m2
Pc 0.9999
t 100 104 100 –
n 100 96 100 –
l 100m 115m 100m –
σ 33.3m 33.3m 50m –
r 24.22m (Uniform) 40m
dynamic (Normal)
M 100 100 & 140 100 & 200
λ 24 32 –
We set σ = 33.3m in our scheme, instead of σ = 50m as in Du’s deployment knowledge
scheme. Otherwise, the number of groups of our scheme is only about half of that of Du’s
scheme. Since our scheme guarantees that the nodes from the same group are always connected,
the smaller the number of groups, the higher the connectivity that our scheme can achieve. To
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be fair to Du’s scheme, we decide to set σ = 33.3m in our scheme in order to keep the number
of grids approximately the same in both schemes.
3.6.2 Simulation Study on Local Security
Figure 3.7 depicts the fraction of links compromised in our scheme as a function of the
number of nodes compromised, where these nodes are all located in the same group. In the
figure, “Our (Sqr-Uni, M=100)” denotes our scheme under uniform distribution with square
grids and memory of size 100. Other labels have similar meaning, for example, “Hex” denotes
hexagon grids.
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Figure 3.7 Local security: the fraction of links compromised as a function
of nodes compromised, when all of the compromised nodes are
located in the same group. “Our” is the short term of our
scheme. “Sqr”/“Hex” denotes Square/Hexagon grids. “Uni”
means Uniform distribution.
Observing the curves shown in Figure 3.7, we find that when the number of nodes compro-
mised exceeds some threshold value, the fraction of links compromised no long increases. For
example, for the curve labeled as “Ours (Sqr-Uni, M=100)”, i.e., nodes are uniformly deployed
in square grids with M = 100, when more than 25 nodes are compromised, the fraction of
links compromised goes up to its highest value 0.032. It is due to λ-secure property of Blom’s
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scheme we adopt. In this case, the number of nodes compromised is greater than the security
threshold, which is λ = 1004 − 1 = 24 (following equation (3.3)), so all secret matrices of the
compromised group are broken.
From Figure 3.7, we also find that the curves of M = 200 are lower than those of M = 100.
It demonstrates that our scheme performs better in local security given more memory space. It
can be explained using equation (3.3), which shows that the larger the value of M , the greater
the threshold λ and hence the better the performance of local security.
Further, we observe that the curves of “Hex” have better performance in local security than
those of “Sqr”, which means that partitioning a target field into hexagon grids is better than
into square ones. There are two reasons to explain why hexagon partition is better. First, the
length of each common area between hexagon grids is much shorter than that between square
ones (66m vs 100m). Meanwhile, both kinds of partitions generate almost the same number
of common areas (26 vs 24 shown in expression (3.11)). So, a node is less likely to fall into a
common area in hexagon deployment, which in turn provides stronger resilience against node
capture than square deployment. Second, a hexagon grid has less neighbors than a square
one does. Thus, a node in hexagon deployment needs to store less rows, or equivalently, each
row stored by a node in hexagon deployment is longer than that stored in square deployment.
Recalling the length of row is λ+1, we can see hexagon deployment offers a bigger λ and hence
performs better in local security.
3.6.3 Simulation Study on Global Security
Figure 3.8 shows the comparison among various schemes in terms of global security, where
“Du’s deployment” represents Du’s deployment knowledge scheme [23] and “Du’s pairwise”
stands for Du’s pairwise key scheme [22]. Here, we choose the curve (τ = 5, p = 0.42), Simulation
shown in Figure 3 of [22] as the representative of Du’s pairwise key scheme. It achieves a con-
nectivity approaching 0.9999 and requires M = 200.
Figure 3.8 illustrates that our scheme is always better than others (except for Du’s pairwise
scheme), for achieving the same connectivity with even a smaller memory space. For example,
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Figure 3.8 Global security: the fraction of links compromised as a func-
tion of nodes compromised, when the compromised nodes are
distributed over the whole network. “Du’s deployment” and
“Du’s pairwise” are the short term of Du’s deployment knowl-
edge scheme and Du’s pairwise key scheme. “Nor” means Nor-
mal distribution.
given 200 compromised nodes, our scheme reveals at most 12.69% of links, compared with
24.44% in Du’s deployment knowledge scheme and 32.99% in the basic scheme. At the same
time, our scheme only has M = 100, but Du’s deployment knowledge scheme requires M = 140
and the basic scheme M = 200. Firstly, we should thank Blom’s scheme, which benefits our
scheme in two aspects: (1) all in-group links are distinct, so in our scheme no additional in-
group links exist no matter how many nodes are compromised; and (2) given that the number
of compromised nodes is smaller than a threshold value, no additional inter-group links will
be revealed. Hence, our scheme outperforms others in terms of global security. Secondly, by
utilizing deployment knowledge, we drastically reduce the potential number of neighbors for
each node. Therefore, in our scheme nodes can use their memory more efficiently such as to
achieve high connectivity without storing too much secret information. Since the amount of
secret information stored in nodes is reduced, our scheme reveals less additional links given
that the same number of nodes are compromised.
Figure 3.8 also plots the curve of Du’s pairwise key scheme [22], which achieves perfect
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security when no more than 250 nodes are compromised. However, if more than 300 nodes are
compromised, almost all links are revealed. We did not plot the curve of Liu’s polynomial-based
key pre-distribution scheme [52, 53], because the authors did not provide data of their scheme
for achieving the same connectivity as in our simulation. However, we find that this scheme
has a threshold property similar to that of Du’s pairwise key scheme. Observing the curve of
L = 2.5 (we use the same cell-size/transmission range ratio in our simulation) shown in Figure
6(b) of [52], we see that all links are revealed when more than 500 nodes are compromised.
Compared with Du’s and Liu’s schemes, our scheme is also based on Blom’s scheme, (where
the bivariate polynomials used in Liu’s scheme is a special form of Blom’s scheme), but our
scheme has a smoother curve in terms of security, that is, it never allows the whole network to
be compromised.
Figure 3.8 also shows that our scheme under normal distribution is not as good as under
uniform distribution. Under normal distribution, more nodes spread into neighbor grids and
form more inter-group links, which increases the fraction of inter-group links compromised.
Although nodes under uniform distribution perform better in terms of security, they generate
less inter-group links. It is not good for routing data across groups, because less nodes are
used to forward inter-group communications and their energy will be consumed up very quickly.
More severely, adversaries are able to break the whole network more easily by compromising
all nodes responsible for inter-group communications. Thus, deploying nodes under normal
distribution is still useful.
3.6.4 Simulation Study on Connectivity
We list the connectivity of the variants of our scheme and others in Table 3.3. In our
scheme, we assume that sensor nodes are deployed in hexagon grids. In this table, the variants
are listed in the increasing order of connectivity. The general observation of these variants
is that the larger the value of w and the smaller the value of b, the higher the connectivity
provided by our scheme. Explanation to this observation can be found in section 3.3.4.
Table 3.3 also shows that our scheme outperforms others in terms of connectivity with even
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Table 3.3 Comparison of connectivity among various schemes
Scheme Connectivity (Pc)
q-composite scheme (q = 2,M = 200) 0.9358
Basic scheme (M = 100) 0.9867
Basic scheme (M = 200) 0.9999
Du’s deployment knowledge scheme (M = 100) 0.9988
Du’s deployment knowledge scheme (M = 140) 0.9999
Our scheme (b = 7, w = 1,M = 100) 0.9969
Our scheme (b = 3, w = 1,M = 100) 0.9977
Our scheme (b = 2, w = 1,M = 100) 0.9978
Our scheme (b = 7, w = 2,M = 100) 0.9993
Our scheme (b = 3, w = 2,M = 100) 0.9996
Our scheme (b = 2, w = 2,M = 100) 0.9999
Our scheme (b = 7, w = 3,M = 100) 0.9999
Our scheme (b = 3, w = 3,M = 100) 0.9999
Our scheme (b = 7, w = 4 ∼ 7,M = 100) 1
smaller memory space. For example, to achieve Pc = 0.9999, we only need to set M = 100
for variants of our scheme, whereas the basic scheme and Du’s deployment knowledge scheme
require M = 200 and M = 140. q-composite scheme produces the lowest connectivity even
with memory of size M = 200. (Note: Our simulation (which is not listed in the table) even
shows that when q = 2 and M = 100, q-composite scheme has a connectivity less than 0.01,
which means the deployed network is completely partitioned.)
3.6.5 Impact of Grid Size
In this section, we study impact of grid size on the variants of our scheme in terms of global
security. In this study, sensor nodes are also deployed in hexagon grids. We define l = a · σ,
that is, given σ, a determines the grid size in our deployment.
Figure 3.9 plots the fraction of links compromised as a function of a, given that 200 nodes
are compromised. In the legend of this figure, the variants are listed in the decreasing order
of the fraction. For example, method (b = 7, w = 7) is on the top of the list, so it has the
highest fraction and hence performs worst in terms of global security. We observe that the
order of variants listed in the legend of Figure 3.9 is reverse in Table 3.3, which implies that
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Figure 3.9 Global security: the fraction of links compromised as a function
of grid size, with 200 compromised nodes randomly distributed
over the whole network. In our scheme, we set M = 100. In the
legend, the variants of our scheme are listed in the decreasing
order of the fraction.
connectivity and global security conflict with each other.
Observing the variants in Figure 3.9, we can divide them into three categories:
1. Method (b = 3, w = 2) to (b = 7, w = 1), the last six variants on the name list of Figure
3.9. In the variants of this category, fraction of links compromised decreases gradually
as the value of a is getting bigger.
2. Methods (b = 3, w = 3), (b = 7, w = 4) and (b = 2, w = 2), the forth to sixth variant
on the name list of Figure 3.9. Their fraction first increases when a is not too big, then
goes down gradually with the increase of a.
3. Method (b = 7, w = 7), (b = 7, w = 6) and (b = 7, w = 5), the first three variants on the
name list of Figure 3.9. Their fraction grows up rapidly on both ends of curve, when the
value of a is too small or too big.
In the following paragraphs, we explain why these categories perform so differently.
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3.6.5.1 Why fraction decreases gradually
Typically, fraction of links compromised decreases with a increasing. It happens in all
variants, especially in those of the first category. Our explanation is as follows: Under nor-
mal distribution, most nodes of each group reside within a circle area of radius 3σ around
their deployment point. When σ is fixed and a becomes bigger, every grid is getting larger.
Especially, when a approaches 6, most nodes of a group are located in their own grid and
the deployed network becomes partitioned. In this process, more and more in-group links are
formed, while inter-group links become contrary. In our scheme, in-group links are distinct and
compromised links only come from inter-group ones, therefore, fraction of links compromised
decreases gradually.
3.6.5.2 Why fraction increases with a
In the second and third categories, fraction of variants grows up when the value of a
increases, as long as it is not too big. This is due to more and more B matrices broken.
Let us choose method (b = 7, w = 7) as example for demonstration. In Figure 3.10, we
plot the number of B matrices broken as well as that in total, with various values of a and
200 nodes compromised. It shows that when a is not too big, i.e., less than 3, more and
more B matrices are broken with the increase of a. First, let us see why some B matrices
are broken. For example, when a = 2, we have 126 groups in total. Given that 200 nodes
are compromised, each group will have 200126 ' 1.5 nodes compromised in average. Since each
matrix B may be shared by up to 7 groups, it will have 1.5 × 7 ' 10.5 rows compromised in
average. Meanwhile, we calculate security threshold from equation (3.3) as λ = 1007+1 − 1 ' 11.
This value of λ (i.e., 11) is quite close to the average number (i.e., 10.5) of rows compromised
in each matrix B, thus, a matrix is very possible to be broken. As a result, some B matrices
get broken. Then, if a becomes bigger, we will have less groups and hence each group will have
more nodes compromised. Equivalently, each matrix B will have more rows compromised and
more B matrices will be broken. That is why fraction of links compromised grows up with a.
Further increasing the value of a has two results: (1) almost all B matrices will be broken; and
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total number of matrices B for our method (b = 7, w = 7) as
grid size increases. Sensor nodes (including 200 compromised
nodes) are deployed into hexagon grids, and the compromised
nodes are randomly distributed over the whole network.
(2) the total number of B matrices will decrease. Consequently, inter-group links are less and
less, which keeps on decreasing fraction of links compromised.
Carefully observing the curves of the second and third categories in Figure 3.9, we can see
impact of w on the fraction. Given a fixe value of b (i.e., 7), when w becomes bigger, the
fraction increases earlier (i.e., when a is smaller) and more rapidly. From equation (3.3), we
know that the bigger the value of w, the smaller the value of λ. Hence, a matrix B is more
likely to be broken. In other words, more matrices B will be broken. So, the fraction of the
variants of a smaller w increases earlier and more rapidly.
3.6.5.3 Why fraction grows up again with a
In the variants of the third category, when a is large enough (i.e., greater than 4.5), fraction
grows up again. This is because more and more matrices A will be broken.
In this scenario, almost all matrices B have been broken, but we can carry out similar
analysis to matrices A. Let us still consider method (b = 7, w = 7). For example, we have
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22 groups in total when a = 5. So, each group will have 20022 ' 9 nodes compromised in
average. Since each node contains only one row from matrix A, the average number of rows
compromised of each matrix A is also 9, which is close to λ = 11 of this variant. Therefore,
some matrices A are likely to be broken. when a is getting bigger, more and more matrices
A will be broken. This is why fraction of the variants of the third category grows up with a
rapidly, when a is sufficiently big. For those variants of other categories, threshold λ is too big
for some matrix A to be broken, given that only 200 nodes are compromised. So, we cannot
observe fraction in those categories increase twice, even when a becomes very big.
3.6.6 Impact of Estimation Error
We assume that nodes’ location satisfies a normal distribution, for example, when the nodes
are deployed from a helicopter. It may be very hard to obtain an accurate estimation to the
distribution. Here, we study the impact of error in the estimation of distribution parameter
such as variance. Let σ denote the true value of variance and σ′ denote the estimated value. We
define σ′ = eσ, where e determines the amount of estimation error. We consider e ∈ [0.5, 1.5],
which implies there exists up to 50% of error in estimation.
First, we study the impact on global security. Assume sensor nodes are deployed into
hexagon grids. As we already discussed, the grid size in this case should be set as l = 2
√
3σ.
However, due to the estimation error, we get l = 2
√
3σ′ = 2
√
3e · σ. Meanwhile, we already
define l = a · σ, so we derive that a = 2√3e. Thus, studying the impact of estimation error
with e ∈ [0.5, 1.5] is equivalent to studying the impact of grid size with a = 2√3e ∈ [1.7, 5.2],
which has been shown in Figure 3.9. We find that even in the worst case (e = 0.5), our scheme
(method (b = 2, w = 2)) allows only 18% of links compromised, which is better than 24% of
Du’s deployment knowledge scheme and 32% of the basic scheme.
Figure 3.11 depicts the connectivity of our scheme as a function of estimation error. We
only show the results of three variants that include methods (b = 7, w = 1), the worst one to
achieve some desired connectivity. Figure 3.11 shows that even when we under-estimate the
distribution variance by 50%, method (b = 7, w = 1) only causes a decrease in connectivity by
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Figure 3.11 Connectivity of some variants of our scheme as a function of
estimation error, when sensor nodes are deployed into hexagon
grids. In our scheme, we set M = 100.
at most 1.4%. Meanwhile, other variants perform much better. So, we conclude that estimation
error has little impact on our scheme in terms of connectivity. Moreover, we observe that the
connectivity does not go down as quickly as we thought, even when we over-estimate the
distribution variance by 50%. It is because we ignore the impact of transmission range when
deriving l = 2
√
3σ. In fact, the value of transmission range is close to that of σ. Thus, when
we have a large grid size due to over-estimating the variance, the nodes of each group can still
establish secure links with a lot of others from neighbor groups.
3.7 Conclusion
We propose a key management scheme using deployment knowledge for establishing pair-
wise keys between sensor nodes. We study network connectivity based on geometric random
graph model and show how to compute the required transmission range for achieving some
desired connectivity. Simulation results show that our scheme outperforms others in terms of
resilience against node capture. Meanwhile, it achieves a higher connectivity with a shorter
transmission range and a lower memory requirement.
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CHAPTER 4 ENHANCING AUTHENTICITY AND AVAILABILITY:
Filtering False Data Injection and DOS Attacks in Wireless Sensor
Networks
4.1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks consist of a large number of small sensor nodes equipped with
limited computation capacity, restricted memory space, limited power resource and short-
range radio communication device. In military applications, sensor nodes may be deployed in
a hostile environment such as battlefield to report the activities of enemy forces to the base
station. However, they suffer various malicious attacks. One is false report injection attack
[98], in which an adversary can inject false data reports containing non-existent events or faked
readings via compromised nodes. It not only causes false alarms at the base station, but also
drains out the limited energy of forwarding nodes. On the other hand, the adversary may also
launch various DoS attacks to legitimate reports. In selective forwarding attacks [66], they
selectively drop the reports. In report disruption attacks [85], they intentionally contaminate
the authentication information (e.g., MACs) in the reports to make them filtered out by other
nodes. Therefore, it is important to design a dynamic quarantine scheme to detect and filter
these attacks or mitigate their impact to the functionalities of wireless sensor networks.
Recently, several schemes such as SEF [86], IHA [98], CCEF [84], LBRS [85] and LEDS [66]
have been proposed to combat false report injection attacks and/or DoS attacks. However, they
have different limitations. SEF is independent of network topology, but it has limited filtering
capacity and cannot prevent compromised nodes from impersonating others. IHA requires
that sensing nodes periodically establish multi-hop pairwise keys with others. Moreover, it
needs a fixed path between the base station and any cluster head for transmitting messages
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in both directions, which cannot be guaranteed by some routing protocol such as GPSR [43]
or the dynamic network topology. CCEF requires the fixed paths as IHA does, and even
expensive public-key operations. Most severely, it does not support en-route filtering. LBRS
and LEDS both utilize location-based keys for filtering false reports. LBRS introduces report
disruption attacks, but does not give any concrete solution. LEDS tries to address selective
forwarding attacks by allowing a whole cell of nodes to forward one report, which incurs high
communication overhead. In addition, both schemes require that sensor nodes determine their
locations in a short secure time slot. However, this assumption is not practical, because many
localization approaches [12, 33, 58] take quite long and are not secure [14, 48, 49].
In this work, we propose a dynamic en-route scheme for filtering false report injection at-
tacks and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks. In our scheme, sensor nodes are organized
into clusters and a legitimate report is validated by multiple message authentication codes
(MACs) that are produced by sensing nodes using their own authentication keys. The authen-
tication keys of each node form a hash chain. Before sending reports, nodes disseminate their
keys to forwarding nodes using Hill Climbing approach. Then, they send the reports in rounds.
In each round, every sensing node endorses the reports using a new key, and then disclose the
key to forwarding nodes. Using the disseminated and disclosed keys, the forwarding nodes can
verify the validity of reports. Our scheme allows each node to monitor its downstream nodes
by overhearing their broadcast, which prevent the reports from being modified. Report for-
warding and key disclosure are repeated by the forwarding node at each hop, until the reports
are dropped or delivered to the base station.
Compared with existing ones, our scheme has the following advantages:
• Each node has its own authentication keys, which makes the uncompromised node not
to be impersonated. The compromised nodes can only report fake or non-existent events
occurring in the clusters that they belong to. Once they are detected, the base station
can easily quarantine the infected clusters.
• We design Hill Climbing approach for key dissemination, which achieves that the nodes
closer to clusters hold more authentication keys than those closer to the base station do.
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This approach not only balances the memory requirement among nodes, but also makes
false reports dropped as early as possible.
• Keys are disseminated to the forwarding nodes along multiple paths from a cluster to the
base station, which not only reduces the cost to maintain key information in forwarding
nodes in highly dynamic networks, but also mitigates the impact of selective forwarding
attacks.
• We exploit the broadcast nature of wireless communication and let each node monitor
its downstream nodes or neighbors. This prevents compromised nodes from launching
DoS attacks by intentionally contaminating the reports or other control messages.
Simulation results show that, when compared with existing ones, our scheme drops false reports
earlier even with a lower memory requirement, and can better deal with the dynamic sensor
networks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: We introduce some routing protocols de-
signed for sensor networks in section 4.2 and define system model and goals in section 4.3.
Then, we present our scheme in section 4.4, analyze its performance in section 4.5, and discuss
simulation results in section 4.6. Finally, we summarize the advantages and the limitations of
our scheme in section 4.7.
4.2 Routing Protocols for Sensor Networks
Before discussing our scheme, we first introduce some routing protocols designed for wireless
sensor networks, because these protocols determine how sensor nodes exchange and distribute
information and greatly affect the design of our scheme for filtering false reports.
Several distributed distance-vector based routing protocols [79] have been designed and
implemented within TinyOS [73]. In these protocols, each node periodically broadcasts its
routing cost to the sink, e.g., the base station, and builds a routing table according to the
information received from its neighbors. Route is selected based on the routing metrics such
as hop count or link quality.
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GPSR [43] and GEAR [87] are location-aware routing algorithms, which assume each node
knows its location. Route is determined as the neighbor with the shortest distance to the sink.
If all neighbors are farther than itself, the forwarding node would use a right-hand rule to
select the route. In GEAR, the energy level of each neighbor is also taken into consideration
for route selection. (Note: in GPSR/GEAR, the path between two nodes is not bidirectional,
i.e., the reports from node i to j may choose a different path from that used by the reports
from node j to i.)
Braginsky et al. proposed Rumor [10] routing protocol, in which when a sensing node
detects some event, it may create and send out an agent that is a message containing routing
information about the event. The agent follows a straight path leaving the sensing node and is
associated with a maximum TTL. Each node passed by the agent learns the route to the event.
When the reports about some interested event are needed, the base station sends out a query
message. The movement pattern of a query message is similar to that of an agent. When the
query message is delivered to a node who knows the route to the event, a path between the
base station and the sensing node (the event) can be established.
Note: Our scheme is not limited to these routing protocols and can take advantage of others
for wireless sensor networks.
4.3 Problem Statement
4.3.1 System Model
We model the communication region of wireless sensor nodes as a circle of radius r that
is called transmission range. We also assume that the links between neighbor nodes are bi-
directional. (Note: If some links are not bi-directional, sensor nodes just ignore them.) That
is, if the distance between two nodes is no more than r, they are the neighbor of each other
and can communicate with each other.
Wireless sensor nodes may be deployed into some target field to detect the events occurring
within the field. For example, in a military application, they are deployed to a battle field to
detect the activities of enemy forces. We assume that sensor nodes form a number of clusters
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after deployment, each containing at least n nodes. In each cluster, one node is randomly
selected as cluster head. To balance energy consumption, all nodes within a cluster take turns
to serve as the cluster head. (Note: there is no difference between a cluster head and a normal
node physically. A cluster head also senses events as a normal node.)
Given that an event occurs, e.g., tank movement, we assume that at least t nodes can detect
it simultaneously, where t is a pre-defined system parameter. These nodes detecting the event
are called sensing nodes. They generate sensing reports and broadcast to the cluster head.
Then, the cluster head aggregates these sensing reports into aggregated reports, and forward
through some forwarding nodes to the base station.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the organization of sensing nodes in wireless sensor networks. In
the figure, CH and BS denote Cluster Head and Base Station respectively. u1 ∼ u5 are
forwarding nodes, and v1 ∼ v8 are sensing nodes (they can also serve as forwarding nodes for
other clusters). The black dots represent compromised nodes, which are located either in the
clusters or en-route. 
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Figure 4.1 Sensor nodes are organized into clusters. The big dashed cir-
cles outline the regions of clusters. CH and BS denote Cluster
Head and Base Station respectively. u1 ∼ u5 are forwarding
nodes, and v1 ∼ v8 are sensing nodes (they can also serve as
forwarding nodes for other clusters). The black dots represent
the compromised nodes, which is located either within the clus-
ters or en-route.
Note: we regard data reporting as a high layer application and ignore the impact of link
quality to the delivery of reports. We assume that there exist some lower layer protocols such
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as routing or MAC layer protocols, which are able to handle the failures or collisions in wireless
communication by utilizing the mechanisms of acknowledgement and retransmission.
We consider the case that the topology of wireless sensor networks is highly dynamic,
because the sensor nodes are prone to failures and need to switch their state between active
mode and sleeping mode for saving energy. Thus, two messages generated by the same cluster
may be delivered along different paths to the base station. Moreover, we assume the messages
transmitted from a cluster head to the base station and those from the base station to the
cluster head do not necessarily follow the same path, because the underlying routing protocols
such as GPSR [43], GEAR [87] or Rumor[10] that are designed for sensor networks cannot
make this guarantee.
4.3.2 Threat Model
Typically, sensor nodes are not tamper-resistant and can be compromised by adversaries.
We assume that each cluster contains at most t−1 compromised nodes, which may collaborate
with each other to generate false reports by sharing their secret key information. Here, t is a
pre-determined system parameter, which implies the extent of security that a filtering scheme
can provide.
In this work, we consider the following attacks that the adversaries can launch through the
compromised nodes.
• False report injection attacks: The compromised nodes can send false reports to the
base station by pretending to observe some forged or non-existent events within the
clusters that they belong to. Moreover, given sufficient secret information, they may
even impersonate some uncompromised nodes of other clusters and report the forged
events “occurring” within those clusters. These false reports not only cause false alarm
at the base station, but also drain out the limited energy of forwarding nodes.
• DoS attacks: The compromised nodes can prevent the legitimate reports from being
delivered to the base station, by either selectively dropping some reports (called selective
forwarding attacks [66]), or intentionally inserting invalid authentication information into
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the reports to make them filtered by other forwarding nodes (called report disruption
attacks [85]).
4.3.3 Goals
We require that each report be attached with t message authentication codes (MACs)
produced by different sensing nodes with their authentication keys. A false report is defined
as one that contains less than t valid MACs. Here, the selection of t determines a tradeoff
between security and overhead. To tolerate more compromised nodes, we have to increase the
length of reports.
As we discussed, the adversaries can launch either false report injection attacks or DoS
attacks. Our objective is to design a scheme to detect these attacks and/or mitigate their
impact to wireless sensor networks. Compared to existing schemes, we expect our scheme to
achieve the following goals:
1. It can offer a higher filtering capacity and drop false reports earlier with acceptable
memory requirement, where the filtering capacity of our scheme is defined as the average
number of hops that a false report is allowed to travel.
2. It can address the report disruption attacks or mitigate the impact of the selective for-
warding attacks.
3. It can accommodate highly dynamic sensor networks and does not require frequent path
establishment or reparation.
4. It should not rely on any fixed paths between the base station and cluster heads for
transmitting messages in both directions.
5. It should prevent the uncompromised nodes from being impersonated. So, when the
compromised nodes are detected, the infected clusters can be easily quarantined by the
base station.
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4.4 Our Scheme
4.4.1 Overview
When some event occurs with some cluster, the cluster head collects sensing reports from
the sensing nodes and aggregates them into aggregated reports. Then, it and forwards the
aggregated reports to the base station through forwarding nodes. In our scheme, each sensing
report contains one MAC that is produced by a sensing node using its authentication key
(called auth-key for short), while each aggregated report contains t distinct MACs, where t is
the maximum number of compromised nodes existing in each cluster.
In our scheme, each node possesses a sequence of auth-keys that form a hash chain. Be-
fore sending the reports, the cluster head disseminates the first auth-key of all nodes to the
forwarding nodes along multiple paths to the base station. The reports are organized into
rounds, each containing a fixed number of reports. In every round, each sensing node chooses
a new auth-key to authenticate its reports. To allow forwarding nodes to verify the reports, the
sensing nodes discloses their auth-keys in each round. Meanwhile, to prevent the forwarding
nodes from abusing the disclosed keys, a forwarding node can receive the disclosed auth-keys,
only after its upstream node overhears its broadcast of the reports. Receiving the disclosed
keys, each forwarding node verifies the validity of the reports, and informs its next-hop node to
forward or drop the reports based on the verification result. If the reports are valid, it discloses
the keys to its next-hop node after overhearing. The process of verification, overhearing and
key disclosure is repeated by the forwarding node at every hop, until the reports are dropped
or delivered to the base station.
Specifically, our scheme can be divided into three phases, key pre-distribution phase, key
dissemination phase and report forwarding phase. In the key pre-distribution phase, each node
is preloaded with a distinct seed key from which it can generate a hash chain of its auth-keys.
In the key dissemination phase, the cluster head disseminates each node’s first auth-key to
the forwarding nodes, which allows them to be able to filter false reports later. In the report
forwarding phase, each forwarding node verifies the reports using the disclosed auth-keys and
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disseminated ones. If the reports are valid, the forwarding node discloses the auth-keys to its
next-hop node after overhearing that node’s broadcast. Otherwise, it informs the next-hop
node to drop the invalid reports. This process is repeated by every forwarding node until the
reports are dropped or delivered to the base station.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the relationship between the three phases of our scheme. Key
pre-distribution is performed before the nodes are deployed, e.g., it can be done oﬄine. Key
dissemination happens before the sensing nodes begin to send the reports. It may be executed
periodically depending on how dynamically the topology is changed, and each time the latest
(unused) auth-key of sensing nodes will be disseminated. Report forwarding occurs at each
forwarding node and in each round.
 
For clusters 
For forwarding nodes 
Key 
Pre-Distribution 
Key 
Dissemination 
Report 
Forwarding 
Figure 4.2 The relationship between three phases of our scheme. Key
pre-distribution is preformed only once. Key dissemination is
executed by clusters periodically. Report forwarding happens
at each forwarding node in every round.
4.4.2 Detailed Procedures
In the section, we discuss the procedure of each phase in detail.
4.4.2.1 Key Pre-Distribution Phase
Key pre-distribution needs to be performed only once. It consists of two steps:
Step1: Each node is preloaded with a distinct seed key. From the seed key, it can generate
a sequence of auth-keys using a common hash function h. Thus, each node’s auth-keys form
a hash chain. Let m denote the length of hash chain. Given node vi and seed key kvim, its
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auth-keys are calculated as follows:
kvim−1 = h(k
vi
m),
kvim−2 = h(k
vi
m−1) = h
2(kvim),
... (4.1)
kvi1 = h
m−1(kvim),
where vi is the node’s index, and h2(kvim) means hashing k
vi
m twice. The first key of the chain
is kvi1 , which should also be used the first, although it is the last one generated from the seed
key. We assume that the base station is aware of each node’s seed key, so that the adversaries
cannot impersonate the uncompromised nodes.
Step2: Besides the seed key, each node is also equipped with l + 1 secret keys, where l
keys (called y-keys) are randomly picked from a global key pool (called y-key pool) of size v,
and the rest one (called z-key) is randomly chosen from another global key pool (z-key pool)
of size w. Among n nodes of a cluster, we assume that there are at least t nodes each having
a distinct z-key.
Figure 4.3 shows the auth-keys and secret keys possessed by sensor nodes. For example,
node vi’s auth-keys are kvi1 , · · · , kvim, and its secret keys are yvi1 , · · · , yvil and zvi . If vi has
sufficient memory, it can store all of its auth-keys in memory. Otherwise, it only stores the
seed key and generates an auth-key every time when necessary.
4.4.2.2 Key Dissemination Phase
In our scheme, the cluster head discloses the sensing nodes’ auth-keys after sending the
reports of each round. However, it is vulnerable to such an attack that a malicious node can
pretend to be a cluster head and inject arbitrary reports followed by falsified auth-keys. To
prevent this attack, we enforce key dissemination, that is, the cluster head should disseminate
the first auth-keys of all nodes to the forwarding nodes before sending the reports in the first
round. By using the disseminated keys, the forwarding nodes can verify the authenticity of the
disclosed auth-keys, which is further used to check the validity and integrity of the reports.
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Figure 4.3 The detailed procedure of each phase. In the key pre-distri-
bution phase, each node is preloaded with l + 1 secret keys
y1, · · · , yl, and z, and generates a hash chain of auth-keys
k1, · · · , km from the seed key km. In the key dissemination
phase, the cluster head disseminates the auth-keys of all nodes
through message K(n) to q downstream neighbor nodes. Every
downstream node may decrypt and obtain some auth-keys from
K(n), then, it forwards K(n) to q more downstream neighbor
nodes, which repeat the same decrypting and forwarding op-
erations. In the report forwarding phase, each forwarding node
en-route performs the following steps: (1) It receives the reports
from its upstream node. (2) If it receives confirmation message
OK, then forwards the reports to its next-hop node. Otherwise,
it discards the reports. (3) It receives the disclosed auth-keys
within message K(t) and verifies the reports using the disclosed
keys. (4) It informs its next-hop node the verification result.
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Key dissemination should be performed periodically in case that some forwarding nodes
aware of the disseminated keys become failed, especially when the network topology is highly
dynamic. In this case (of re-dissemination), the first unused, instead of the first, auth-keys will
be disseminated. The first unused auth-key of a node is called the current auth-key of that
node. When none of a node’s auth-keys has ever been used, the current auth-key is just the
first auth-key of its hash chain.
The detailed procedure of the key dissemination phase is as follows:
Step1: Each node constructs an Auth message, which contains l + 1 copies of its current
auth-key, each encrypted using one of its secret keys. For example, given node vi, its Auth
message is:
Auth(vi) = { vi, ji, id(yvi1 ), {id(yvi1 ), kviji }yvi1 ,
· · · , id(yvil ), {id(yvil ), kviji }yvil , (4.2)
id(zvi), {id(zvi), kviji }zvi },
where ji is the index of its current auth-key. (Note: in the first dissemination, ji = 1.) id(yvi1 )
denotes the index of yvi1 within the y-key pool, and {·}yvi1 means an encryption operation using
key yvi1 . In equation (4.2), the purpose of encrypting the index of a secret key along with an
auth-key is to guarantee the correct decryption.
Step2: The cluster head collects the Auth messages from all nodes and aggregates them
into message K(n):
K(n) = { Auth(v1), · · · , Auth(vn) }, (4.3)
where v1, · · · , vn are all nodes of the cluster.
Step3: The cluster head chooses q (q > 1) forwarding nodes from its neighbors and
forwards them message K(n). These q nodes may be selected based on different metrics such
as the distance to the base station, the link quality, the amount of energy available, the speed
of energy consumption, or a combination of all. How to select the metric is application specific
and out of the scope of this work. Anyway, the purpose is to find those nodes that can best
forward the reports to the base station. Thus, when some downstream neighbor node dies, the
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reports can be easily switched to another node without re-disseminating K(n).
Step4: When a forwarding node receives K(n), it performs the following operations:
1. It verifies the validity of K(n) to see if K(n) contains at least t distinct indexes of z-keys.
If not, this K(n) is assumed to be forged and should be dropped.
2. It checks the indexes of secret keys in K(n) to see if it has any shared key. If finding a
shared secret key, it decrypts the corresponding auth-key using that key and stores the
auth-key in memory. Obviously, it must assure that the decryption key is the correct one
by checking the index encrypted along with the auth-key. Otherwise, it discards K(n).
Note: we have difference concerns to the use of y-keys and z-keys, although forwarding
nodes can use both of them to decrypt auth-keys from K(n). In our scheme, y-keys are
mainly used to control how many auth-keys a forwarding node can obtain. Meanwhile,
each node can use the only z-key it possesses to verify the validity of K(n). Since each
node has multiple y-keys, the number of y-keys shared by several compromised nodes
can easily overwhelm that of distinct y-keys each report may have. Hence, y-keys cannot
be used for verification.
3. K(n) does not need to be disseminated to the base station. We define hmax as the
maximum number of hops that K(n) needs to be disseminated. (Note: we will study
how to determine hmax in section VI.) If the forwarding node finds that K(n) has already
been disseminated by hmax hops, it discards K(n). Otherwise, it forwards K(n) to other
q downstream neighbor nodes, which are selected using the same metric as the cluster
head uses.
Each node receiving K(n) repeats these operations, until K(n) gets to the base station or has
been disseminated hmax hops. Figure 4.3 illustrates the dissemination of K(n) from the cluster
head to forwarding nodes.
When the sensing reports are generated continuously and the network topology is highly
dynamic, key dissemination should be performed periodically in case that all of q selected
downstream nodes of some node die or fail. This period is determined based on the frequency
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of topology changing. The more frequently the topology changes, the more often the cluster
head should disseminate auth-keys. We do not discuss how to determine the period here,
because it is out of scope of this work.
4.4.2.3 Hill Climbing
We propose two important observations. First, when multiple clusters disseminate keys at
the same time, some forwarding nodes may need to store the auth-keys for different clusters.
The nodes closer to the base station need to store more auth-keys than others (typically those
closer to clusters) do, because they are usually the hot spots and have to serve more clusters.
For example, in Figure 4.1, u3 serves two clusters and u1 serves only one, so u3 has to store
more auth-keys. Second, the false reports are mainly filtered by the nodes closer to clusters,
while most nodes closer to the base station have no chance to use the auth-keys they stored
for filtering. If we could let the nodes closer to clusters hold more auth-keys, the false reports
can be dropped earlier. Therefore, to balance the memory requirement of nodes and provide
a higher filtering capacity, we propose Hill Climbing approach, which achieves that the nodes
closer to clusters hold more auth-keys than those closer to the base station do.
Hill Climbing contains two variants, one for the key pre-distribution phase and the other
for the key dissemination phase.
The first variant is: In Step2 of the key pre-distribution phase, instead of picking y-keys
from a global key pool, each node selects each of its y-keys randomly from an independent hash
chain. Specifically, the original y-key pool is partitioned into l equal-sized hash chains, each
containing vl keys that are generated from a distinct seed key. As shown in Figure 4.4, the first
hash chain contains keys y11, · · · , y1u, where u = vl and y1u is the seed key. Similarly, yl1, · · · , ylu
belong to the last chain. Node vi chooses each of its y-keys yvi1 , · · · , yvil from a corresponding
chain, and so does node uj .
It is easy to know that a forwarding node holding a larger index y-key can always decrypt
a sensing node’s auth-key from K(n), as long as the sensing node’s y-key has a smaller index.
Inspired by this, we propose the second variant: In Step4 of the key dissemination phase,
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Figure 4.4 Key pre-distribution of Hill Climbing. Every node picks each of
its y-keys randomly from a distinct hash chain whose length is
u = vl , while the z-key is still selected from the global key pool,
instead of from a hash chain.
after a forwarding node decrypts an auth-key from K(n), it updates K(n) by encrypting the
auth-key using its own y-key and then forwards the updated K(n) to its downstream neighbor
nodes. For example, if K(n) contains { id(yvi1 ), kviji }yvi1 (as shown in equation (4.2)) and
id(yuj1 ) > id(y
vi
1 ), uj substitutes { id(yuj1 ), kviji }yuj1 for { id(y
vi
1 ), k
vi
ji
}yvi1 and then forwards the
new K(n) to q downstream neighbor nodes. By enforcing this substitution at every forwarding
node, the indexes of y-keys contained in K(n) will be increased gradually, just like climbing
hill. It becomes harder and harder for the nodes closer to the base station to decrypt the
auth-keys from K(n). Consequently, the nodes closer to clusters store more auth-keys, which
makes the false reports dropped earlier.
A simpler way to make downstream nodes obtain fewer auth-keys is to discard the auth-
keys obtained by forwarding nodes with a gradually increasing probability as they approach
to the base station. However, Hill Climbing has two advantages: (1) It makes upstream
nodes get more auth-keys than no only downstream nodes but also the upstream nodes at
the same positions without using Hill Climbing. (2) It eliminates redundant decryptions and
verifications, because when an auth-key has been decrypted by a upstream node, it is not
necessary for a downstream node to decrypt that auth-key (or use that auth-key to verify a
report) again.
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4.4.2.4 Report Forwarding Phase
In this phase, sensing nodes generate sensing reports in rounds. Each round contains a
fixed number of reports, e.g., 10 reports, where this number is pre-determined before nodes are
deployed. In each round, every sensing node chooses a new auth-key, i.e., the node’s current
auth-key, to authenticate its reports.
Given node vi, its sensing report r(vi) is:
r(vi) = { E, vi, ji,MAC(E, kviji ) }, (4.4)
where E denotes the event information, ji is the index of vi’s current auth-key, andMAC(E, kviji )
is the MAC generated from E using key kviji .
In each round, the cluster head generates the aggregated reports and forwards them to
next hop, i.e., one of its q selected downstream forwarding nodes. Then, it discloses the
sensing nodes’ auth-keys after overhearing the broadcast from the next-hop node. The reports
are forwarded hop-by-hop to the base station. At every hop, a forwarding node verifies the
validity of reports using the disclosed keys and informs its own next-hop node the verification
result. The same procedure is repeated at each forwarding node until the reports is dropped
or delivered to the base station.
Figure 4.3 depicts the detailed procedure, which consists of the following steps:
Step1: In each round, the cluster head collects the sensing reports from all sensing nodes
and generates a number of aggregated reports such as R1, R2, · · · . It sends these aggregated
reports and an OK message to next hop, uj . Each aggregated report should contain t MACs,
each from a sensing nodes that has a distinct z-key. For example, an aggregated report R looks
as follows:
R = { r(vi1), · · · , r(vit) }, (4.5)
where vi1 , · · · , vit denote t sensing nodes whose z-keys are different. Since every sensing node
reports the same event information E, only one copy of E is kept in the aggregated report R.
Step2: Receiving the aggregated reports and the OK message, uj forwards the aggregated
reports to next hop, uj+1. The cluster head overhears the broadcast of aggregated reports
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from uj .
Step3: Overhearing the broadcast from uj , the cluster head discloses the auth-keys to uj
by message K(t),
K(t) = { Auth(vi1), · · · , Auth(vit) }. (4.6)
K(t) contains the auth-keys of vi1 , · · · , vit . It has the same format as K(n), but only t auth-
keys.)
Step4: Receiving K(t), uj first checks the authenticity of the disclosed keys using the
disseminated ones that it decrypted from K(n) before. Then, it verifies the integrity and va-
lidity of the reports by checking the MACs of reports using the disclosed keys. The verification
process is as follows:
1. To verify the validity of K(t), uj checks if K(t) is in correct format and contains t distinct
indexes of z-keys. If not, it drops K(t).
2. To verify the authenticity of the auth-keys in K(t), uj checks if each auth-key it stored
can be generated by hashing a corresponding key in K(t) with certain number of times.
For example, suppose uj has already stored node vi’s auth-key kviα , and vi discloses a new
key kviβ in K(t). uj checks if β > α and k
vi
β = h
β−α(kviα ). If not, k
vi
β is either replayed or
forged, and K(t) should be dropped. If K(t) is valid, uj stores kviβ , instead of k
vi
α , in its
memory.
3. To verify the integrity and validity of reports R1, R2, · · · , uj checks the MACs in these
reports using the disclosed auth-keys that it decrypts from K(t).
Step5: If the reports are valid, uj sends an OK message to uj+1. Otherwise, it informs
uj+1 to drop invalid reports. (The negative message is not shown in Figure 4.3).)
Step6: Similar to Step2, uj+1 forwards the reports to next hop.
Step7: Similar to Step3, after overhearing the broadcast from uj+1, uj discloses K(t) to
uj+1.
Every forwarding node repeats Step4 to Step7 until the reports are dropped or delivered
to the base station.
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We exploit the broadcast nature of wireless communication. In our scheme, each node
monitors its next-hop node to assure no message is forged or changed intentionally.
4.5 Performance Analysis
4.5.1 Filtering capacity
Filtering capacity of our scheme is defined as the average number of hops that a false
report can travel. It is determined by the probability that a false report can be detected by
the forwarding node at every hop. For simplicity, we consider the worst case in which each
false report contains exactly one forged MAC. We define detecting probability as the probability
that a forwarding node has the valid auth-key to detect the forged MAC. Since a forwarding
node should decrypt the auth-key from K(n) or K(t), the detecting probability is equivalent
to the probability that a forwarding node has at least one shared secret key to decrypt the
auth-key.
Without using Hill Climbing in our scheme, each node randomly picks l y-key from a pool
of size v and one z-key from a pool of size w. The probability that two nodes share at least one
common y-key is 1 − (
v−l
l )
(vl )
and that of sharing the same z-key is 1w . Therefore, the detecting
probability is
p = 1− (
v−l
l )
(vl )
+
1
w
− (1− (
v−l
l )
(vl )
)
1
w
' 1− (
v−l
l )
(vl )
, (4.7)
when 1w is much smaller than 1−
(v−ll )
(vl )
. For example, if l = 2 and v = w = 20, then p ' 0.275.
Meanwhile, we also know that a forwarding node can decrypt and store np auth-keys for each
cluster in average.
When using Hill Climbing, each node picks l y-key from different hash chains. To decrypt
an auth-key of some sensing node, a forwarding node should have a shared z-key or at least one
y-key whose index is larger than that of the sensing node’s y-key. The probability of having
a y-key of larger index is 12 . However, if the forwarding node is i hops away from a cluster,
to decrypt an auth-key of some sensing node, it should have a y-key with its index greater
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than that of no only the sensing node, but also other i − 1 upstream forwarding nodes. This
happens with probability 1 − (1 − (12)i)l. Therefore, when using Hill Climbing, the detecting
probability of a forwarding node i hops away from the cluster is
pi = 1− (1− (12)
i)l +
1
w
− (1− (1− (1
2
)i)l
1
w
' 1− (1− (1
2
)i)l, (4.8)
when 1w is small. Averagely, the forwarding node stores npi auth-keys for the cluster. If l = 2,
v = w = 20 and i = 1, then pi = p1 ' 0.775, which is much larger than that without using
Hill Climbing.
Let P (h) denote the probability of filtering a false report within h hops, which is also the
fraction of false reports that can be filtered within h hops. When using Hill Climbing, we have
P (h) = 1−
h∏
i=1
(1− pi). (4.9)
Without using Hill Climbing, P (h) = 1− (1− p)h because pi is always equal to p.
Let Havg denote the average number of hops that a false report can travel. When using
Hill Climbing, we derive that
Havg =
∞∑
i=1
ipi
i−1∏
j=1
(1− pj), (4.10)
where pi
∏i−1
j=1(1−pj) denotes the probability that a false report is dropped at exactly the i-th
hop. Without using Hill Climbing, the forwarding node at every hop has the same detecting
probability p. In this case, we have
Havg =
∞∑
i=1
ip(1− p)i−1 = 1
p
. (4.11)
It indicates that a false report can travel averagely 1p hops.
4.5.2 Energy Savings
To compare energy savings of various schemes, we adopt the same energy consumption
model used in SEF [86]. Let Lr denote the length of a normal report without using any
filtering scheme and L′r denote the length of an authenticated report attached with MACs.
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The amount of legitimate reports and false reports is 1 and β. Assume each report travels
H hops without using any filtering scheme and each node has a detecting probability p when
using a filtering scheme. As shown in SEF, the energy consumption for transmitting a normal
report is
e = LrH(1 + β), (4.12)
where a normal report is 24-byte long, that is,
Lr = 24× 8 = 192 bits. (4.13)
The energy consumption for transmitting an authenticated report is
E = L′r[H + β
H∑
h=1
hp(1− p)h−1]
' L′r(H + β
1
p
). (4.14)
In SEF, a key index is 10-bit long and the Bloom filter is 64-bit long. So,
L′r = 306 bits. (4.15)
In our scheme, each forwarding node forwards not only the report R, but also control
messages K(n), K(t) and OK. We have
L′r = LR + γ(LK(t) + LOK) + δLK(n), (4.16)
where LR, LK(n), LK(t) and LOK are the length of aggregated reports and that of the corre-
sponding control messages. γ denotes the ratio of the number of messages K(t) (or OK) over
that of reports, and and δ is the ratio for K(n). Assume each sensing node generates 10 reports
in each round and key dissemination is carried out every 10 rounds, then γ = 110 and δ =
1
100 .
let us further assume that each MAC and secret key are 64-bit long, and OK message, node
index and key index are 8-bit long. If l = 2, t = 5, v = w = 20 and n = 10, then LR = 592
bits, LK(t) = 1160 bits, LK(n) = 2320 bits, and LOK = 8 bits. Following equation (4.16), we
get
L′r ' 732 bits. (4.17)
94
We set when not using Hill Climbing.
Let β = 10, p = 0.05 for SEF and p ' 0.275 for our scheme. From equations (4.12) to
(4.17), we derive that
e = 2112H, (4.18)
EOur ' 732(H + 36), (4.19)
ESEF = 306(H + 200), (4.20)
where EOur and ESEF denote the energy consumption in our scheme and SEF.
When compared with SEF, our scheme saves 1 − EOurESEF ' 50% of energy when H = 10,
and 40% when H = 20. As compared with the case of not using any filtering scheme, our
scheme consumes more energy, about EOurEe − 1 ' 50% when H = 10. It starts to save energy
after 20 hops. However, 20 hops may seem to be too large for real sensor networks. To make
our filtering scheme more practical, we turn to Hill Climbing, which can save more energy by
dropping the false reports earlier.
When using Hill Climbing, the forwarding nodes have a higher detecting probability. For
example, the fist forwarding node of a cluster has a detecting probability of 0.775, which is much
larger than 0.275 when not using Hill Climbing. Assume the average detecting probability at
each hop is 0.5. Then, the energy consumption of our scheme becomes EOur ' 732(H + 20),
which means that our scheme starts to save energy after 10 hops and hence becomes more
practical. In addition, this comparison is based on a static network. When the network is
highly dynamic, our scheme can drop the false reports much earlier than other schemes do
(see our simulation results), which indicates that our scheme is more efficient and practical for
dynamic environments.
However, we also notice that this comparison is not quite fair for other schemes, because
our scheme involves extra overhead caused by control message K(n), which is 4 times longer
than an authenticated report and has to be disseminated at most hmax hops with q nodes
each hop. Although we try to reduce the frequency for disseminating K(n) and choose a small
value of hmax and q (see our simulation results), this overhead may be still high. In addition,
K(n) has more than 2000 bits and needs to be transmitted in multiple messages (the payload
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of each message in TinyOS is 29 bytes.), which increases the overhead of our scheme. We do
not measure the extra overhead caused by extra control messages, but we do agree that it is a
main drawback of our scheme.
4.5.3 Filtering DoS Attacks
Except for false reports injection attacks, adversaries may launching DoS attacks such as
report disruption attacks and selective forwarding attacks to prevent legitimate reports from
being delivered to the base station.
In report disruption attacks, compromised sensing nodes intentionally insert invalid MACs
into the reports to make them dropped by others. Most existing schemes are vulnerable to
these attacks. LEDS [66] mitigates the impact of these attacks by allowing a few invalid MACs
in the reports, but it does not solve the problem completely. On the contrary, our scheme can
easily combat these attacks. In our scheme, each sensing node discloses its auth-key following
the reports. Its neighbors can overhear the node’s reports and disclosed auth-key, and verify
the validity of its MACs. Since the node is monitored by its neighbors, it is deterred from
launching the attacks.
In selective forwarding attacks, compromised forwarding nodes selectively drop the legiti-
mate reports. These attacks are very hard to detect. In our scheme, each forwarding node
disseminates K(n) to q downstream neighbor nodes that are awarded the filtering capacity.
To deal with the attacks, we can require the forwarding node send the reports to all of these q
nodes. Unless all of them are compromised, the legitimate reports can always be delivered to
the base station. However, this solution incurs high communication overhead. An alternative
way is that in each round the forwarding node sends the reports to a randomly chosen node out
of those q ones. Given that only x nodes are compromised, the impact of selective forwarding
attacks will be mitigated into xq .
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4.5.4 Filtering Other Attacks
Our scheme introduces new control messages and is a little bit complicated. It may suffer
some attacks that are specific for itself. Here, we discuss how to deal with these attacks.
Attack1: A cluster head is compromised. In our scheme, normal nodes take turns to act as
cluster head, so there is no difference between a cluster head and a norma node. It means that
a cluster head may be easily compromised or any compromised node can claim to be a cluster
head.
A compromised cluster head can disseminate a forged K(n) and then inject false reports
arbitrarily. Our scheme offers two countermeasures to prevent this attack. First, any node
including the compromised node is monitored by other nodes of the same cluster. When any
node overhears a forged K(n), it can easily detect it by checking its auth-key that is supposed
to be contained in the K(n). Thus, it knows that the cluster head is compromised and can
report to the base station to revoke that node. (Note: how to revoke a node is out of the
scope of our work.) Second, each K(n) must contain t distinct z-key. Since we assume that
each cluster has at most t− 1 compromised nodes, there must be at least one invalid z-key in
the forged K(n). The size of global z-key pool is w, thus, each forwarding node can filter the
forged K(n) with a probability p = 1w , or equivalently, the forged K(n) can travel
1
p = w hops
following equation (4.11).
Similarly, when a compromised cluster head generates forged K(t) or false reports, these
two countermeasures are still useful. The forged message and reports are not only monitored
by other sensing nodes, but also filtered by forwarding nodes.
Attack2: Consecutive compromised nodes collaborate. If two or more consecutive nodes are
compromised and collaborate with each other, they can share the auth-keys they decrypt from
K(t) to generate false reports without being monitored.
Assume x consecutive nodes are compromised, where x ≤ (t − 1). They can decrypt xpt
auth-keys from a valid K(t), where p (as computed in equation (4.7)) is the probability that
one can decrypt an auth-key from K(n). So, they can generate a false report containing only
(t− xpt) forge MACs. Since p is also the probability that a forged MAC can be detected, the
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false report can be detected by an uncompromised node with the probability (1−xp)tp and travel
p
(t−xpt) hops. Obviously, this analysis makes sense only when t − xpt > 0. Given x = (t − 1)
and t = 5, we have p < 1t−1 = 0.25. It means when p < 0.25, t − 1 consecutive compromised
nodes cannot gain sufficient auth-keys to produce a false report without being filtered. We can
achieve this by adjusting the values of l, v and w. For example, when l = 2 and v = w = 20,
we can easily get p = 0.23 following equation (4.7).
Attack3: Compromised forwarding nodes abuses OK message. The OK message can be
abused in either negative or positive ways. First, a compromised forwarding node can always
or selectively send negative messages to make the reports dropped by its next-hop node. This
is actually a selectively forwarding attack caused by the abuse of OK message. It can be
addressed with the solutions we discussed above. Second, using OK message, a compromised
forwarding node can cheat its next-hop node to forward false reports one more hop. Given at
most t− 1 compromised nodes en-route, the worst case is that every two compromised nodes
are separated by a uncompromised one. Therefore, in the worst case, these t− 1 compromised
nodes can make false reports forwarded at most 2t− 2 hops.
Attack4: The compromised nodes use invalid node index. A false report containing unknown
node indexes can escape the detection from forwarding nodes, because they thought that they
do not have the corresponding auth-keys for those unknown nodes.
It is not possible to make the forwarding nodes be aware of the indexes of all nodes in
a cluster, because nodes are randomly deployed. Our solution is to re-assign each node a
continuous index from [1, n]. One way is to let nodes finish this job by themselves. In neighbor
discovery phase, each node can overhear the indexes of others within the same cluster. So, it
can sort these indexes in some order and re-assign itself a new index. Another way is to let each
forwarding node hash the nodes indexes into [1, n]. However, different indexes may be hashed
into the same value, which causes false positive errors. We can deploy more than n nodes
into each cluster and only allow one node to send reports when hash collision happens among
several nodes. The benefit is that we always have enough working nodes for each cluster, even
when some node dies.
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Attack5: In Hill Climbing, a large index y-key is compromised. In Hill Climbing, y-keys of
nodes are picked from hash chains. When a node having a large index y-key is compromised,
all y-keys of smaller indexes can be derived. In fact, the compromise of those y-keys of smaller
indexes is not an attack to our scheme. In Hill Climbing, y-keys are only used by forwarding
nodes to decrypt auth-keys from K(n). When an adversary compromises a large index y-key,
he could not get more auth-keys by deriving other y-keys of smaller indexes within the same
hash chain.
However, when a forwarding node containing a large index y-key is compromised, other
downstream nodes having y-keys of smaller indexes can no long decrypt the corresponding
auth-key, so they cannot detect a false report which happens to contain a forged MAC using
the corresponding auth-key. The filtering of this false report has to be delayed until it is
received by another forwarding node whose has a y-key of an even larger index. This is an
attack caused by compromising a large index y-key at early hop, which may allow a false report
to travel more hops. However, our simulation results show that Hill Climbing is much better
than other schemes even facing the impact of this attack.
4.6 Simulation Study
We study the performance of our scheme by simulation and also compare our scheme with
others such as SEF, IHA, and CCEF in terms of filtering capacity, fraction of false reports
filtered, and memory requirement in different environments.
4.6.1 Simulation Setup
• 103 nodes are randomly deployed to a 103 × 103 m2 square field with the base station
located at the center. The transmission range of each node is 50 m. These nodes are
divided into 100 clusters, where each cluster contains exactly n = 10 nodes.
• Each node picks l = 2 y-keys and one z-key, where the size of y-key pool and z-key pool
is v = w = 20.
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• The size of memory used by each node is denoted as mem, and measured by the number
of keys that each node stores. Typically, mem = 50. In our simulations, each cluster head
disseminates auth-keys to forwarding nodes. One node may need to store the auth-keys
from different clusters. When the memory is full, each node equally assigns its memory
to each cluster that it serves.
• Each node forwards K(n) to q = 2 selected downstream neighbor nodes, until K(n)
reaches the base station or has been forwarded hmax hops. Typically, hmax = 10.
• Each aggregated report contains t = 5 MACs, and there are at most t − 1 = 4 compro-
mised nodes in each cluster. The compromised nodes from the same cluster collaborate
with each other to share the compromised secret keys.
• To simulate the dynamic topology, we apply a simple ON/OFF operation model in which
each node switches its state between ON and OFF periodically. The duration of ON and
OFF states satisfies an exponential distribution. We define the percentage of OFF time
as network churn rate, which indicates the extend of topology changing.
• The routing protocol adopted in our simulations is GPSR. However, IHA and CCEF
are not suitable for GPSR, because they both require the existence of a fixed path
between each cluster head and the base station for transmitting control messages in both
directions. To make them work on top of GPSR, we revise them accordingly and define a
revised IHA and a revised CCEF. Moreover, in the revised CCEF, we let each forwarding
node always keep on forwarding the reports for which it has no witness key. This is
different from the original CCEF in which those reports are always discarded.
4.6.2 Simulation Results
Comparing our scheme with others by simulation, we obtain the following results:
1. Our scheme drops false reports earlier even with a lower memory requirement. In some
scenario, it drops the false reports within 6 hops with only 25 keys stored in each node,
but other scheme requires 12 hops even with 50 keys stored.
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2. Our scheme can better deal with the dynamic topology of sensor networks. It achieves a
higher filtering capacity and filters out more fraction of false reports than others do in a
dynamic network.
3. Hill Climbing increases the filtering capacity of our scheme greatly and balances the
memory requirement among sensor nodes.
4.6.2.1 Fraction of False Reports Filtered vs Number of Hops Traveled
We first consider the case that t − 1 compromised nodes are within the same cluster. We
assume a static environment in which all nodes are in ON state.
Figure 4.5 illustrates how the fraction of false reports that are filtered increases as the
number of hops that they travel grows. In our scheme, K(n) is disseminated at most hmax = 10
hops and each node stores at most mem = 50 keys. In SEF, each node picks k = 50 keys from
one of n = 10 partitions and each partition contains m = 100 keys. Hence, our scheme and
SEF are subject to the same memory constraint.
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Figure 4.5 Fraction of false reports being filtered as a function of the num-
ber of hops that they traveled (In our scheme q = 2)
The simulation results in Figure 4.5 show that our scheme can drop 90% of false reports
within 5 hops (when using Hill Climbing) or 10 hops (without Hill Climbing), while SEF needs
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about 25 hops to achieve the same performance. The reason is that our scheme offers a higher
detecting probability than SEF does. For example, when not using Hill Climbing, our scheme
achieves p ' 0.275 that is much larger than p = 0.05 in SEF. If using Hill Climbing, the
detecting probability of the first forwarding node is up to p1 = 0.775, about 15 times larger
than that in SEF. This also proves that Hill Climbing can greatly improve the filtering capacity
of our scheme.
We also plot the analytical results of our scheme in Figure 4.5. We observe that the
simulation result is a little worse than the analytical one in the case of using Hill Climbing.
This is due to the limit of memory size (mem = 50) that we set in the simulation.
4.6.2.2 Filtering Capacity vs Memory Size
Figure 4.6 depicts how the filtering capacity varies with the different memory size, where
the filtering capacity is measured as the average number of hops that a false report can travel.
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The smaller the number of hops, the higher the filtering capacity. In SEF, when each node
picks all of 100 keys from a partition, a false report can still travel more than 8 hops. On the
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contrary, in our scheme a false report can travel no more than 6 hops even when each node
stores at most mem = 25 keys. So, our scheme outperforms SEF even with a much lower
memory requirement. Intuitively, a larger memory size can increase the filtering capacity.
However, we do not observe too much improvement in our scheme when mem > 25, which
implies that storing 25 keys in each node is sufficient for our scheme to filter most false reports.
4.6.2.3 Filtering Capacity vs Maximum Number of Hops for Key Dissem-
ination
Figure 4.7 shows the impact of hmax to the filter capacity of our scheme. Typically, dis-
seminating auth-keys farther gives more nodes the auth-keys and enables them to filter false
reports. On the contrary, the limited memory size forces each node discard more auth-keys for
each cluster in order to accommodate more clusters. Hence, it is not always helpful to increase
the value of hmax. Figure 4.7 indicates that the best value of hmax is between 5 to 10, because
90% of false reports have been dropped within 10 hops, as shown in Figure 4.5.
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4.6.2.4 Filtering Capacity in Dynamic Environments
Sensor nodes are prone to failures and may also turn off their radio and CPU to save energy,
which makes the topology of sensor networks highly dynamic. We simulate this by applying an
ON/OFF model and use network churn rate to measure the extend of the topology changing.
We still assume t− 1 compromised nodes are within the same cluster.
In Figure 4.8, we compare the filtering capacity of different schemes in dynamic environ-
ments of various network churn rate.
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Figure 4.8 The average number of hops traveled by false reports as a
function of the network churn rate. (In our scheme, we set
hmax = 10 and mem = 50.)
We distinguish the following two cases:
• The network churn rate is greater than 0.4 : In this case, the deployed network is severely
partitioned, and a lot of repots are dropped for path broken. Our experiments (not
plotted in Figure 4.8) show that around 10% of reports are dropped for path broken
when the network churn rate is 0.4, while more than 60% are dropped when the rate is
0.9. It implies that when the rate is bigger than 0.4, more and more false reports are
dropped due to network partition.
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• The network churn rate is smaller than 0.4 : In this case, partition is not a big problem,
and the filtering capacity is mainly determined by the detecting probability of nodes and
the length of paths from cluster heads to the base station. When the network churn rate
increases, the paths become longer and hence the false reports can travel more hops. We
focus on this case in the following discussion.
Figure 4.8 shows that our scheme has a higher filtering capacity than most of other schemes
have in dynamic environments. The only exception is the original CCEF, which seems to
outperform our scheme. However, it has a severe drawback, that is, a lot of legitimate reports
are dropped, because the forwarding nodes lack the corresponding witness keys in dynamic
environments. In addition, the original CCEF is not as good as our scheme in a static situation,
because it cannot filter the false reports en-route that are generated by compromised cluster
heads. Let us check it by simple calculations. When the network churn rate is zero, the average
length of a path is 27. Each cluster head has a probability t−1n = 40% to be compromised, in
which case a false report can travel 27 hops. When the cluster head is not compromised, a false
report can go only one hop. Hence, the filtering capacity of CCEF is 27×40%+1×60% = 11.4
hops, which is consistent with our simulation results and much greater than that of our scheme.
In Figure 4.8, we observe that the curves of SEF and our scheme are relatively flat, which
means these two schemes are more independent of the topology changes than others. SEF
achieves this from the use of probabilistic key pre-distribution, however, it has to make a
tradeoff for a low filtering capacity. Our scheme achieves this by choosing q downstream
neighbor nodes for each forwarding node in key dissemination. We studied the impact of q
when choosing different values from 1 to 6. Intuitively, a larger value of q makes more nodes
receive the necessary key information for filtering false reports, and hence is more suitable for
dynamic networks. However, the limited size of memory forces the nodes to reduce the stored
auth-keys and lowers the filtering capacity. So, the value of q should be properly selected and
not be too large or small. Our experiments show that the curves for q = 2 to 6 are close
to each other, although q = 4 is slightly better than others. Considering the high overhead
incurred by choosing a large value of q, we decide to set q = 2 in our scheme. To make the
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figure clear, we only plot the curves for q = 1 and 2. For example, let us observe the curves of
our scheme with Hill Climbing. The average number of hops traveled by false reports is 3.4618
when q = 1 and 2.9469 when q = 2 in the case that the network churn rate is 0.1, and that
number is 11.3745 when q = 1 and 8.0412 when q = 2 in the case that the rate is 0.4. So,
choosing q = 2 can improve the filtering capacity by 1 − 2.94693.4618 ' 15% when the rate is 0.1,
and 1 − 8.041211.3745 ' 29% when the rate is 0.4. This means that our scheme is more adaptive to
dynamic environments when choosing q > 1 (e.g., q = 2), and it earns more benefit when the
topology is highly dynamic.
Figure 4.9 depicts the fraction of that false reports that reach the base station as a function
of the network churn rate. When the network churn rate is greater than 0.4, the fraction goes
down quickly because the network is severely partitioned. When the network churn rate is
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Figure 4.9 The fraction of the false reports that reach the base station as
a function of the network churn rate. (In our scheme, we set
hmax = 10, mem = 50 and q = 2.)
smaller than 0.4, the fraction is mainly determined by the detecting probability of nodes. The
simulation results in Figure 4.9 show that our scheme can drop more fractions of false reports
than others, except for the original CCEF (which drops even lots of legitimate report when
lacking a witness key.). As the network churn rate becomes larger (from 0 to 0.4): (1) The
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fractions of our scheme and IHA go up gradually, because more false reports are forwarded
by the nodes that have no corresponding auth-keys. (2) The fractions of SEF and the revised
CCEF decrease quickly, because the paths become longer, which makes the false reports subject
to the verification of more nodes and hence more likely to be filtered.
4.6.2.5 Filtering Capacity when Forwarding Nodes are Compromised
Besides sensing nodes, forwarding nodes may also be compromised. We assume that a
forwarding node does not directly collaborate with compromised sensing nodes by sharing
their keys. However, they may collaborate indirectly. That is, when a forwarding node is
compromised, it never filters out the false reports. Moreover, once it detects a forged MAC
within a false report, it may even replace the forged MAC by a correct MAC generated using its
own key. In these simulations, we assume there are exactly t− 1 compromised nodes including
one compromised cluster head. We further differentiate two scenarios: (1) The compromised
nodes are randomly distributed over the whole network. (2) They are located along the same
path from the compromised cluster head to the base station.
Table 4.1 shows the comparison of filtering capacity among various schemes in these two
scenarios. We set hmax = 10 and mem = 25 in our scheme, and do not test CCEF because it
cannot filter the false reports generated by the compromised cluster head.
Table 4.1 The average number of hops traveled by false reports.
Compromised nodes
in network along path
Our (Hill Climbing) 1.0294 1.6976
Our (No Hill Climbing) 1.3702 2.9176
SEF 3.2918 6.664
IHA (Revised) 2.5451 7.5769
IHA (Original) 9.1472 13.773
The results in Table 4.1 demonstrates that our scheme outperforms others and can drop
false reports earlier in both scenarios. The advantage of our scheme comes from two reasons:
(1) Our scheme offers a higher detecting probability to nodes. (2) Our scheme allows each
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node to monitor its downstream nodes, which prevents the compromised forwarding nodes
from replacing forged MACs.
4.7 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a dynamic en-route quarantine scheme for filtering false data
injection attacks in wireless sensor networks. In our scheme, each node uses its own auth-keys
to authenticate the reports, while a legitimate report should be endorsed by t nodes. The
auth-keys of each node form a hash chain, and are updated in each round. The cluster head
disseminates the first auth-keys of all nodes to forwarding nodes and then sends the reports
followed by disclosed auth-keys. The forwarding nodes verify the authenticity of the disclosed
keys by hashing the disseminated ones, and further check the integrity and validity of the
reports with the disclosed keys. Then, they inform the next-hop nodes to drop or keep on
forwarding the reports according to the verification results. This process is repeated at the
forwarding node at every hop.
Our scheme has several advantages: (1) Compared with others, our scheme can drop false
report much faster even with a smaller size of memory. (2) The nodes that are not compromised
would not be impersonated because of the distinct auth-keys that they own. So, if compromised
nodes could be detected, the infected clusters can be easily quarantined. (3) The Hill Climbing
key dissemination approach greatly improves the filtering capacity of our scheme and keeps
a balance of memory requirement among nodes. (4) Each node has multiple downstream
nodes that possess the necessary key information and are capable of filtering false reports.
This not only makes our scheme adaptive to highly dynamic networks, but also mitigates
the impact of attacks in which compromised nodes selectively drop legitimate reports. (5)
Each node monitors the broadcast of its downstream nodes or neighbors, which prevents the
compromised nodes from contaminating the legitimate reports intentionally or generating false
control messages.
However, our scheme achieves these advantages with some tradeoffs: (1) Compared with
SEF, our scheme is quite complicated. It introduces extra control messages such as K(n), K(t)
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and OK, which not only increases the complexity of operations, but also incurs extra overhead,
as we discussed in section 4.5.2. (2) Like any normal reports, the control messages can also
be abused, e.g., they also suffer forgery and DoS attacks. (Note: We have already discussed
how to prevent the abuse of control messages in section 4.5.4. For example, a forged K(n)
can be filtered within w hops.) (3) The introducing of extra control messages increases the
delay in delivering reports. (4) Our scheme requires sensor nodes to monitor their downstream
nodes or neighbors, which can be achieved by using only bidirectional links. So, sensor nodes
have to discard all directed links. (5) In our scheme, each node uses the same auth-key to
authenticate all of its reports of the same round. So, this auth-key can only be disclosed
after each forwarding node forwards all the reports to next hop, which poses a high memory
requirement to forwarding nodes due to the storing of all the reports of each round. (6) It
is hard to make our scheme cooperate with other energy saving protocols, because each node
has to be awake until it overhears the broadcast from its next-hop node. We leave this as our
future work.
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CHAPTER 5 ENHANCING INTEGRITY: Securing Network Coding
against Pollution Attacks
5.1 Introduction
Network coding is a new forwarding technique which receives various applications in tradi-
tional computer networks, wireless sensor networks [62] and peer-to-peer systems [29]. It was
first proposed by Ahlswede et al. [1] in order to maximize the throughput of multicast net-
works, in which a source intends to send its messages to multiple sinks simultaneously. Using
network coding, a node (including the source and forwarders) can encode its input messages
to generate an output one. This technique is different from the traditional approach which
requires duplicating every input message. In 2003, Li et al. [50] further proved that linear
network coding is sufficient to achieve the optimal throughput in multicast networks, which is
the minimum of all max-flows from the source to every sink.
However, network coding poses new challenges for security. For example, the applications
built on top of network coding are vulnerable to pollution attacks, in which the compromised
forwarders can intentionally pollute the transmitted messages or inject the forged messages
into networks. These attacks prevent the sinks from recovering the source messages correctly.
A more severe problem is pollution propagation That is, even a small number of polluted
messages can quickly propagate into the networks and infect a large proportion of nodes,
because each polluted message can be used by all downstream nodes. Therefore, the polluted
messages should be detected and filtered as early as possible.
Traditional signature approaches based on hash functions such as SHA or MD5 are not
suitable for network coding, because the encoding process carried out by each forwarder can
destroy the source’s signatures. Recently, several novel hashing or signature schemes have been
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proposed to address the pollution attacks against networks coding applications. Gkantsidis
and Rodriguez proposed a homomorphic hashing scheme [30] (called GR’s scheme) based
on Krohn’s work [47], and Charles, Jain and Lauter designed a new homomorphic signature
scheme [19] (called CJL’s scheme. However, GR’s scheme relies on extra secure channels to
transmit message hashes from the source to each node, while CJL’s scheme is built on top of
expensive Weil pairing operations [54, 56] over elliptic curves. Ho et al. [35] proposed to use
a simple polynomial hash function to detect polluted messages, and Jaggi et al. [39] discussed
the optimal rate that network codes can achieve under different threat models. Unfortunately,
Ho’s and Jaggi’s approaches can only detect or filter polluted messages at the sinks, rather
than at the forwarders.
In this work, we propose an efficient signature-based scheme against pollution attacks
on linear network coding systems. In our scheme, the source signs its messages using its
private key, while other nodes verify the received messages using the source’s public key. Our
scheme utilizes a novel homomorphic signature function, which allows forwarders to compose
the signatures for their output messages from those of input messages using the similar way
that the output messages are composed from the input messages. Since each node appends
the signatures to its output messages, its downstream nodes can verify the received messages
effectively and discard the polluted or forged ones. We prove that finding a hash-collision
message in our scheme is equivalent to solving a hard discrete logarithm problem. Experimental
results show that our scheme is ten times faster than some existing one. In addition, we present
an alternate lightweight scheme based on a much simpler linear signature function. This
alternate scheme further improves computation efficiency and is more suitable for resource-
constrained networks such as wireless sensor networks. However, it introduces a trade-off
between efficiency and security.
Our contribution is to propose an efficient signature-based scheme for addressing pollution
attacks. Our scheme allows the source to delegate its signing authority to the forwarders. That
is, the forwarders can generate the signatures for their output messages without contacting the
source, but they cannot create the valid signatures for polluted or forged messages. Our
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scheme does not need any extra secure channels, and can provide source authentication and
batch verification. Most importantly, it is much more efficient than existing ones.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 5.2, we define system model,
threat model, and our goal. Then, we present our scheme in section 5.3 and provide security
analysis in section 5.4. We further introduce an alternate lightweight scheme in section 5.5 and
explain experimental results in section 5.6. In section 5.7, we present an example application
of our schemes in wireless sensor networks. Finally, we conclude in section 5.8.
5.2 Problem Statement
5.2.1 System Model
Network coding has been used in many networking systems such as wireless sensor networks
where some sensing nodes intend to send data to multiple sinks, or peer-to-peer file sharing
systems where multiple users want to download a file from a server.
In this work, we consider a general multicast network as shown in Figure 5.1. It consists of
a source s, multiple sinks t1, t2, · · · , tk and a number of forwarders. In this network, s wants to
send n source messages M1, · · · ,Mn to all the sinks, while the forwarders use linear network
coding to generate their output (or encoded) messages, which are typically denoted as E. (In
this work, we use the terms output message and encoded message interchangeably. They are
essentially the messages generated and transmitted by the forwarders.)
We follow the same settings adopted in [19] and [30]. That is, each message is divided into
m codewords each randomly picked from a finite field Zq, where prime q is a pre-determined
security parameter. So, each source message Mi for i = 1, · · · , n can be regarded as a row
vector such as
Mi = (mi,1,mi,2, · · · ,mi,m) , (5.1)
where mi,j ∈ Zq for j = 1, · · · ,m denote the codewords. Similarly, an encoded message E can
be represented as
E = (e1, e2, · · · , em) , (5.2)
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Figure 5.1 A general multicast network that adopts network coding. In this
network, a singe source s simultaneously transmits n messages
M1, · · · ,Mn to k sinks t1, · · · , tk through forwarders, which are
represented by nodes 1 to 7. The encoded messages are denoted
as E.
where ej ∈ Zq denote the codewords of E.
In linear network coding, each forwarder encodes its input messages into output message
E, which is a linear combination of input messages and can be eventually regarded as a linear
combination of source messages. Because of this, we can write E as
E = (α1 · · · αn)×

M1
...
Mn
 mod q
=
n∑
i=1
αiMi mod q
=
(
n∑
i=1
αimi,1, · · · ,
n∑
i=1
αimi,m
)
mod q , (5.3)
where (α1 · · · αn) is called encoding vector and used by the sinks to recover the source
messages.
Encoding vectors can be either randomly generated as described in [34] or pre-determined
based on the topology of networks. We assume that each message is appended with its encoding
vector in order to facilitate the decoding at the sinks. (This approach was described in [20].)
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Here, we augment each source message Mi and encoded message E respectively and obtain
M˜i = (mi,1,mi,2, · · · ,mi,m, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i
)
= (m˜i,1, m˜i,2, · · · , m˜i,m, m˜i,m+1, · · · , m˜i,m+n) (5.4)
and
E˜ = (e1, e2, · · · , em, α1, · · · , αn)
= (e˜1, e˜2, · · · , e˜m, e˜m+1, · · · , e˜m+n) . (5.5)
M˜i or E˜ is called the augmented messages, which consists of the contents of original message
and corresponding encoding vector. It is easy to verify that E˜ =
∑n
i=1 αiM˜i mod q, while
each codeword of E˜ can be expressed as the same linear combination of the corresponding
codewords of augmented source messages. (Note: In the rest of the chapter, when we mention
a message (including the source message and encoded one), we always mean the augmented
version of the message.)
We further assume that the source (not only the forwarders) can also encode its messages,
i.e., the output messages from the source are also the encoded ones. This prevents the adver-
saries from recovering the source messages without collecting the sufficient number of encoded
messages.
5.2.2 Threat Model
We assume that the source is always secured, but the forwarders are not trustable. The
adversaries can fully control the compromised forwarders and launch the pollution attacks
from them. In such attacks, the adversaries may intentionally pollute the output messages
(augmented ones) of the compromised nodes, or directly inject the forged messages into the
networks through these nodes. Formally speaking, we identify message E˜ as polluted or forged
if and only if it looses the consistency between the contents of original one and the appended
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encoding vector. In that case,
E˜ 6= (e˜m+1 · · · e˜m+n)×

M˜1
...
M˜n
 , (5.6)
where (e˜m+1 · · · e˜m+n) is the encoding vector embedded into E˜. Suffering from such attacks,
the sinks may not be able to recover the source messages correctly.
More severely, the applications built on top of network coding may suffer pollution propaga-
tion, which means that a small number of polluted messages can easily infect a large proportion
of the networks. Once a forwarder received a polluted message, all its output messages become
polluted. When these polluted messages are further used by downstream nodes, more and
more messages are polluted. In this way, a small number of polluted messages can quickly
propagate into a large proportion of the networks.
5.2.3 Goal
In this work, we address the problem of securing network coding systems against the
pollution attacks. Our goal is to design an efficient scheme for filtering pollution attacks in
network coding systems, especially in those resource-constrained networks such as wireless
sensor networks that adopt network coding. The scheme should enable the forwarders to
detect and filter polluted messages as early as possible and must be highly efficient for the use
in resource-constrained networks in terms of computation. In addition, it does not require any
extra secure channels.
5.3 Our Scheme
5.3.1 The Framework of Hashing or Signature Schemes
Before introducing our scheme, we first propose a framework of the hashing or signature
schemes include our scheme and existing ones [19, 30] that address the pollution attacks for
linear network coding systems. In this framework, we roughly divide the schemes into three
phases:
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• Parameter setup phase: In this phase, the source chooses security parameters, calculates
its private and public keys, and determines the hash or signature function.
• Hash or signature calculation phase: In this phase, the source calculates the hashes or
signatures for its messages. These hashes or signatures may be securely transmitted to
forwarders and sinks, or directly attached to the messages.
• Message verification phase: In this phase, the forwarders and the sinks verify the received
messages. Verification is based on the encoding vectors embedded into the messages, the
hashes or signatures of the messages, and the source’s public keys. If verification suc-
ceeds, the received messages will be accepted and used for further encoding or decoding.
Otherwise, they are discarded.
The first phase can be done oﬄine, but the other two must be executed online. So, the efficiency
of schemes is mainly determined by the computation overhead occurring in the second and third
phases.
Note: when a forwarder detected some polluted messages, it can either stop generating
its output messages, or only encode those unpolluted messages using new encoding vectors.
However, how to process after the pollution attacks are detected is out of the scope of our
work and will not be discussed here.
5.3.2 Overview and Detailed Procedures
In our scheme, the source generates the signature for each message using RSA private
key and appends the signature to the corresponding message. Other nodes (including both
forwarders and sinks) verify the received messages using the source’s public key. Our scheme
is based on a homomorphic signature function, which guarantees that any encoded message’s
signature can be composed from those of input messages (that are used to generate the encoded
message). Thus, a forwarder can generate the valid signatures for its output messages even
without knowing the source’s private key, as long as every node appends the signatures to its
output messages. The nice property of our scheme is that the forwarders have no ability to
create the valid signature for any polluted or forged message.
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The details of three phases of our scheme are as follows:
Parameter setup phase: In this phase, the source chooses the following security parameters
and keys.
• Two primes p and q satisfying q|(p − 1). Typically, q is 257-bit long and p is 1024-bit
long.
• (m+ n) different elements g1, · · · , gm+n. Each element is randomly picked from Zp and
has order q.
That is, for j = 1, · · · , (m + n), each gj has the form as s(p−1)/q mod p, where some
arbitrary s ∈ Zp and s 6= 1. Thus, we have
gtqj mod p = 1 for any integer t . (5.7)
• RSA public key (r, e) and private key d. We have r = uv, where u and v are two primes
that are only of the half length of r. Typically, r is 1024-bit long.
Let φ = (u− 1)(v − 1), then e and d are chosen such that gcd(e, φ) = 1 and ed ≡ 1 mod
φ. Thus, we have
ted ≡ t mod r for any integer t ∈ Zr . (5.8)
We assume all nodes know security parameters p, q and g1, · · · , gm+n as well as the source’s
public key (r, e).
Signature calculation phase: In this phase, the source calculates the signatures for its
messages M˜1, · · · , M˜n, where n is the total number of messages that the source can transmit
at the optimal rate in each unit of time.
Let h denote the signature function. For each message M˜i, the source calculates the signa-
ture
h(M˜i) =
m+n∏
j=1
g
m˜i,j
j mod p
d mod r (5.9)
and append h(M˜i) to M˜i.
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Similarly, the signature of encoded message E˜ can be calculated as
h(E˜) =
m+n∏
j=1
g
e˜j
j mod p
d mod r . (5.10)
In our scheme, each forwarder is required to append h(E˜) to its output message E˜. But it
does not need to calculate h(E˜) as shown in equation (5.10), because the signature function is
homomorphic. That is, given an output message E˜ =
∑n
i=1 αiM˜i mod q, its signature can be
calculated as
h(E˜) =
n∏
i=1
h(M˜i)αi mod r . (5.11)
This is because
h(E˜) = h
(
n∑
i=1
αiM˜i mod q
)
= h
((
n∑
i=1
αim˜i,1, · · · ,
n∑
i=1
αim˜i,m+n
)
mod q
)
=
m+n∏
j=1
g
∑n
i=1 αim˜i,j mod q
j mod p
d mod r
=
m+n∏
j=1
g
∑n
i=1 αim˜i,j
j mod p
d mod r (∵ (5.7))
=
m+n∏
j=1
n∏
i=1
g
αim˜i,j
j mod p
d mod r
=
n∏
i=1

m+n∏
j=1
g
m˜i,j
j mod p
d mod r

αi
mod r
=
n∏
i=1
h(M˜i)αi mod r . (5.12)
Equation (5.12) shows that the signature of an output message can be easily composed
by raising the signature of each input message to the power of corresponding coefficient. So,
each forwarder can generate the valid signatures for its output messages from the signatures
of input ones, without knowing the source’s private key. That why our scheme does not need
any extra secure channels to broadcast the source messages’ signatures into the whole network.
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Moreover, in our scheme, the forwarders have no ability to generate the valid signatures for
any polluted or forged messages (we will prove this later).
Message verification phase: In this phase, the forwarders or sinks verify the received mes-
sages based on the source’s public keys and the messages’ signatures. To verify message E˜, a
forwarder (or a sink) simply checks whether
h(E˜)e mod r =
m+n∏
j=1
g
e˜j
j mod p
 mod r , (5.13)
which can be derived from equations(5.8) and (5.10). If equation (5.13) is satisfied, the message
is accepted. Otherwise, it is assumed to be polluted.
5.3.3 Batch Verification
Our scheme supports batch verification [5], which can further reduce computation overhead
and speed up message verification. For instance, suppose a forwarder receives three messages
E˜a, E˜b and E˜c. It can randomly select three coefficients βa, βb and βc and generate a new
message E˜ = βaE˜a+βbE˜b+βcE˜c. Benefiting from the homomorphic signature function, it can
obtain the signature of this new message as
h(E˜) = h(E˜a)βa × h(E˜b)βb × h(E˜c)βc , (5.14)
and then verify E˜ using h(E˜) as normal.
If the new message passes verification, all three input messages are accepted. Otherwise,
one or more messages must be polluted. In this case, further verification should be carried
out to find the malicious one(s). The node needs to re-check each input message individually
or use batch verification repeatedly on subsets of input messages. For example, we can use
binary-checking that is similar to binary-searching algorithm, to speed up re-checking. Binary-
checking rules out a half of input messages at each step. That is, we encode and check each
half of input messages separately. If pass, that half of messages will be accepted. Otherwise,
two sub-halves of the suspected half will be re-checked. This binary-checking process can be
iteratively carried out until all polluted messages are found.
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5.4 Security Analysis
We define a message as polluted using inequality (5.6), that is, the message’s contents are
inconsistent with the encoding vector transmitted along with the message. To prevent the
adversaries from polluting the encoding vector, we require that each signature be calculated
based on the augmented message that includes both the contents of original message and
the appended encoding vector. If signature calculation does not cover the encoding vector,
the adversaries can easily transmit a message (original one) along with a valid signature, but
append it with an incorrect encoding vector.
The purpose of an adversary is to generate a polluted message that can pass verification.
He has two choices. First, he may try to generate a valid signature for a polluted or forged
message. However, this requires he obtain the source’s private key. Second, he may try to
find a hash-collision message E˜′, which is different from a valid message E˜, but has the same
signature as that of E˜. That is, E˜′ 6= E˜, but h(E˜′) = h(E˜).
In our scheme, determining the source’s private key from its public key is equivalent to
solving an integer factorization problem, which is a well known hard problem and its hardness
is determined by the length of r, typically 1024 bits.
The adversary may brute force search for a hash-collision message. In our scheme, each
signature is a random element of finite field Zr, so the probability to find a hash-collision
message with brute force is as low as 1r ' 121024 . However, a smart adversary may try to find
a hash-collision message E˜′ by exploiting a valid message E˜ and its signature h(E˜). We prove
that this is equivalent to solving a discrete logarithm problem.
Proposition: Given a valid message E˜ along with its signature h(E˜), generating a hash-
collision message E˜′ from E˜, where E˜′ 6= E˜, is equivalent to solving a discrete logarithm
problem.
Proof: (Because of page limit, we only give the basic idea of proof here.)
First, we consider a special case when (m+ n) = 2. Thus, the signature of E˜ is
h(E˜) = (ge˜11 × ge˜22 mod p)d mod r . (5.15)
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The purpose of the adversary is to generate a hash-collision message E˜′ = (e˜′1, e˜′2) such that
(ge˜
′
1
1 × ge˜
′
2
2 mod p) mod r = (g
e˜1
1 × ge˜22 mod p) mod r , (5.16)
where e˜′1 6= e˜1 and e˜′2 6= e˜2. Let us fix e˜′1 and define x = e˜′2. The problem becomes to determine
x such that
g
e˜′1
1 × gx2 = ge˜11 × ge˜22
=⇒ gx2 = ge˜1−e˜
′
1
1 × ge˜22 . (5.17)
This is a discrete logarithm problem, that is, determining x given (g2, gx2 ) over some group Zp
(or Zr).
Similarly, this idea can be extended to the case when (m+n) > 2, which we do not discuss
in detail. In conclusion, we proved that finding a hash-collision message in our scheme is
equivalent to solving a hard discrete logarithm problem. 
We emphasize that a message whose contents are consistent with appended encoding vector
can always pass verification and will never be considered as polluted or forged, although the
message may not be as exactly as what we designed. For example, some forwarder is supposed
to transmit message E˜, but it actually outputs another message E˜′ = αE˜ and appends a new
signature h(E˜)′ = h(E˜)α, where α is an arbitrary integer. In our scheme, although E˜′ is a
new message, it is still consistent and will be considered as a valid one, because in this new
message, the contents (i.e., codewords) of original message and coefficients of encoding vector
are both multiplied by α and it would not cause any problem for decoding at the sinks.
5.5 An Alternate Lightweight Scheme
5.5.1 Detailed Procedures
In some scenarios such as resource-constrained wireless sensor networks, computation ef-
ficiency is even more important than security. To be adaptive to these special scenarios, we
propose an alternate lightweight scheme based on a simpler linear signature function. Com-
pared with our homomorphic signature scheme, this alternate scheme improves signature cal-
culation efficiency up to a hundred times. However, it has to sacrifice desired security level to
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such a extent that, adversaries may be able to derive the source’s private keys or find some
hash-collision message if they cab capture sufficient number (i.e., (m+n) or logq) of linearly
independent messages.
The details of this alternate scheme are as follows:
Parameter setup phase: In this phase, the source chooses
• two primes p and q such that (q|p− 1). Typically, q is 257-bit long and p 1024-bit.
• an order-q element g randomly picked from Zp, where gtq mod p ≡ 1 for any integer t.
• (m+ n) distinct private keys x1, x2 · · · , xm+n, where xj ∈ Zq for j = 1, · · · , (m+ n).
• and corresponding public keys y1, y2 · · · , ym+n, where yj = gxj mod p for j = 1, · · · , (m+
n).
We assume all nodes know the security parameters p, q and g as well as the source’s public
keys.
Signature calculation phase: In this phase, the source calculates the signatures for its
messages M˜1, · · · , M˜n, and appends the signatures to corresponding messages.
Let h denote the signature function. For each message M˜i where i = 1, · · · , n, the source
calculates its signature
h(M˜i) =
m+n∑
j=1
xjm˜i,j mod q . (5.18)
Similarly, the signature of encoded message E˜ is
h(E˜) =
m+n∑
j=1
xj e˜j mod q . (5.19)
However, a forwarder does not need to calculate the signature for its output message E˜ this
way. Since the signature function is linear, an encoded message’s signature can be composed
from those of input messages with the same linear relationship that the encoded message itself
is composed from those input ones. That is, given E˜ =
∑n
i=1 αiM˜i mod q, we have
h(E˜) =
n∑
i=1
αih(M˜i) mod q . (5.20)
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Thus, a forwarder can generate valid signatures for its output messages by simply encoding
those of its input ones. So, this scheme does not require any extra secure channel.
Message verification phase: In this phase, the forwarders or sinks verify received messages
based on the source’s public keys and the messages’ signatures. Assume a forwarder receives
message E˜ along with its signature h(E˜). It simply checks whether
gh(E˜)mod p =
m+n∏
j=1
y
e˜j
j mod p . (5.21)
This verification should work, because for a valid message E˜,
gh(E˜)mod p = g
∑m+n
j=1 xj e˜j mod q mod p
=
m+n∏
j=1
y
e˜j
j mod p . (5.22)
If equation (5.21) is satisfied, the message will be accepted. Otherwise, it is discarded.
5.5.2 Security Analysis
In this scheme, calculating the source’s private key xj from corresponding public key gxj
is equivalent to solving a discrete logarithm problem [70]. However, an adversary may try to
learn the private keys from transmitted messages, because each message E˜ represents a linear
equation with (m+ n) unknown private keys x1, x2, · · · , xm+n. That is,
h(E˜) = (x1e˜1 + x2e˜2 + · · ·+ xm+ne˜m+n) mod q . (5.23)
If the adversary has collected (m+ n) linearly independent messages, it can derive the private
keys by solving the corresponding linear equations. Thus, this scheme poses a upper bound of
the number of messages that the source can transmit.
The probability that the adversary brute force a hash-collision message is 1q ' 12256 , since
each signature is a random element picked from finite field Zq. However, a smart adversary
may exploit the linear property of our signature function to find a hash-collision message. In
this scheme, each message can be regarded as a vector of length (m + n) and each signature
can be represented by a vector of log q bits, where typically log q = 256. Hence, the linear
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signature function establishes a map from (m+n)-dimension message space to log q-dimension
signature spaces. Ideally, log q linearly independent messages will be mapped to the same
number linearly independent signatures without collision. However, if the adversary picks one
more message which is linearly independent of all previous ones, this new message will be
mapped to a signature which is linearly dependent on previous signatures, since we already
have log q linearly independent signatures and any new signature must be linearly dependent
on these log q ones. Thus, the adversary successfully finds out two messages mapped to the
same signature. To prevent this attack, the source should generate no more than log q = 256
linearly independent messages. If the source wants to send more messages, it has to either
choose a larger q or update its private keys after producing log q − 1 linearly independent
messages. Certainly, the second method will increase communication overhead.
5.6 Experimental Results
5.6.1 Experiment Setup
We compare CJL’s scheme [19], GR’s scheme [30] and our schemes in experiments. (We
do not study Ho’s scheme [35], since it can only detect polluted messages at sinks, instead of
filtering them at forwarders.) The implementation of these schemes is built on top of software
package MIRACL [57] and tested on a Pentium-4 3.00 GHz Linux machine.
For CJL’s scheme, we choose a supersingular elliptic curve
E(Fp) : y2 = x3 + 1 (5.24)
with p ≡ 2 mod 3 and p ≡ 3 mod 4, where p is a 1024-bit prime. We test this scheme based
on the Tate pairing with q-torsion points, where q is a 160-bit prime. (We select Tate pairing
instead of Weil pairing [41], because it is more computationally efficient for cryptographic
operations, as shown in [28].) For GR’s scheme and our schemes, we set p a 1024-bit long
prime and q a 256-bit long prime. Typically, we choose the total number of messages n = 128
and each message containing m = 256 codewords. In our experiments, we always let n = m/2.
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5.6.2 Computation Overhead
We study computation overhead of these schemes in term of running time of each phase
with m = 256 and n = 128. Table 5.1 shows that, CJL’s scheme is the slowest and the
alternate scheme is the fastest, especially in terms of signature calculation. Our scheme has
similar performance in computation efficiency to GR’s scheme.
Table 5.1 Computation overhead of different schemes on Pentium-4 com-
puter (m: 256-bit and n: 128-bit)
CJL’s GR’s Our Alternate
Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme
Parameter Setup 10.65 s 2.85 s 2.87 s 1.55 s
(n messages)
Sig/Hash Calculation 5.37 s 0.96 s 1.42 s 0.01 s
(per message)
Message Verification 16.54 s 1.43 s 1.44 s 1.43 s
(per message)
In parameter setup phase, CJL’s scheme must generate (m+n+ 1) q-torsion points. GR’s
scheme should choose m order-q elements. Our scheme has to select m + n order-q elements
and a RSA private key, while the alternate scheme needs to generate (m+ n) pairs of private
key and corresponding public key. Table 5.1 shows that choosing q-torsion is the most time-
consuming, which takes 4× the time for choosing (m+n) order-q elements for our scheme and
7× the time for choosing (m+ n) private and public keys for the alternate scheme.
To calculate the signature for a message, our scheme (or GR’s scheme) spends 1.42s (or
0.96s) on (m + n) (or m) modular exponentiations, while the alternate scheme spends only
0.01s on (m+n) linear operations. Signature calculation of CJL’s scheme is based on (m+n)
q-torsion points and extremely time-consuming, which takes 5.37s. (Note: Time values of
signature or hash calculations shown in the table are based only on one message. To send n
messages, the source should spend much more time to calculate signatures or hashes, which
may cause a large transmission delay at the source.)
The main task of forwarders is to verify messages. Verification should be done as fast as
possible. Otherwise, it becomes the bottleneck of whole network and prevents the source from
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sending messages at the optimal rate. Hence, verification speed is the most important metric
for evaluating performance of schemes. Table 5.1 shows that our scheme and the alternate one
have similar verification efficiency to GR’s scheme and are much faster than CJL’s scheme. In
addition, Figure 5.2 depicts how verification overhead of different schemes increases linearly as
m grows from 16 to 1024. Clearly, our scheme, the alternate one and GR’s scheme are much
faster than CJL’s scheme in message verification.
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Figure 5.2 Comparison of computation efficiency among different schemes
in terms of verification time (per message). It shows that GR’s
scheme, our scheme and alternate scheme preform similarly in
message verification.
From equations (5.13) and (5.21), we can see that our scheme and the alternate one require
(1 +m+ n) modular exponentiations on the signature of received message, m codewords and
n encoding vector elements. GR’s scheme needs (m + n) ones, where m operations are used
for calculating the hash of received message and n ones for the hashes of source messages.
Compared to other operations such as modular additions and modular reductions, modular
exponentiations dominant the message verification phase. So, the ratio of verification overhead
of our scheme (or the alternate one) over that of GR’s scheme is 1+m+nm+n ' 1. That is why
Figure 5.2 shows these schemes have almost the same performance on verification efficiency.
Although GR’s scheme has comparable efficiency to our scheme in terms of verification, it
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requires an extra secure channel. In addition, our scheme can provide source authentication,
since it is based on a signature function, instead of a hash function as in GR’s scheme.
The verification process of CJL’s scheme is similar to that of our scheme and the alter-
nate one. The only difference is that CJL’s scheme is based on pairing operations, while our
scheme and the alternate one are based on modular exponentiations. Hence, the difference of
verification efficiency between our scheme (or the alternate one) and CJL’s scheme is mainly
determined by efficiency of pairing operations and modular exponentiations. Figure 5.2 shows
that CJL’s scheme is ten times slower in message verification than our scheme (or the alter-
nate one), because the pairing computation is extremely time-consuming. So, our scheme is
much more efficient than CJL’s scheme, although they both base their security on the discrete
logarithm problem.
5.7 Application to Wireless Sensor Networks
Wireless sensor networks consist of a number of resource-constrained nodes with limited
power resource, memory space, computation and communication capacity. Maximizing net-
work throughput with network coding is very important for wireless sensor networks, because
it can reduce communication overhead and hence save energy for sensor node. Moreover, since
sensor nodes are prone to failure, applying network coding technique in wireless sensor net-
works can make wireless communications between sensor nodes more robust by reducing the
need of frequent retransmission (as long as sinks can receive sufficient number of messages for
decoding).
Let us consider an example data-centric storage application [65] for wireless sensor networks.
In this application, sensing data are organized by keys, and each sensing node wants to store
their data into multiple storage nodes responsible for some particular key. In this scenario,
network coding technique can be used for maximizing data rate of sensing nodes and providing
robust communications. However, sensor nodes can be easily compromised and adversaries
could launch pollution attacks from these compromised nodes. Hence, we need an efficient
and effective scheme for addressing such pollution attacks. In wireless sensor networks, there
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is no secure channel between an arbitrary sensing node and storage nodes. (Someone may
claim to use a trusted based station to forward secure information between the sensing node
and storage nodes. However, it incurs high communication overhead and in some cases the
trusted base station may even not exist when needed.) Thus, GR’s scheme is not applicable in
this scenario. Since wireless sensor nodes are extremely constrained in terms of computation
capacity and power resource, computation efficiency is the main consideration for choosing a
proper scheme to address pollution attacks. Compared with CJL’s scheme, our scheme and
the alternate one take much less time in signature calculation and message verification, so
they significantly reduces energy consumption in computation and hence is more suitable for
wireless sensor networks.
We have implemented GR’s scheme, our scheme and the alternate one on MicaZ mote.
(The implementation of CJL’s scheme on MicaZ mote is still in progress.) MicaZ mote is only
equipped with an 8-bit microprocessor ATmega128, 4K bytes memory (RAM) and 128K bytes
program flash memory (ROM). Since it is extremely resource-constrained, we have to relax our
security requirement by choosing some smaller security parameters. In our implementation,
we set p as 256-bit prime, q as 128-bit prime, the number of codewords m=16 and the number
of source messages n=8. Our implementation is based on the software package provided by
Wang and Li [76] and experimental results are shown in Table 5.2. From the table, we can see
that all schemes have to spend around 150s to verify one message, which implies that modular
exponentiation is still time-consuming for wireless sensor nodes. Table 5.2 also shows that the
alternate scheme is much more efficient in signature calculation than other two, where it takes
only 0.12s to generate a signature, compared to almost 100s for GR’s scheme and around 147s
for our scheme. If we emphasize verification speed, we should choose the alternate scheme. If
we value high security as well as efficiency, our scheme is the best, instead of GR’s scheme.
(Note: Although our scheme and the alternate one still need long time for message veri-
fication, we hope technical advance in electronics and better software implementation would
make them more practical for resource-constraint networks. We are glad to see that more
and more researches [32, 72, 76] are being conducted on efficient implementation of public key
128
Table 5.2 Computation overhead of different schemes on wireless sensor
nodes (p: 512-bit, q: 128-bit, m=16 and n=8)
GR’s Our Alternate
Scheme Scheme Scheme
Parameter Setup 1.56 s 1.61 s 1.39 s
(n messages)
Sig/Hash Calculation 99.79 s 147.36 s 0.12 s
(per message)
Message Verification 149.70 s 155.14 s 151.28 s
(per message)
crypto-systems on sensor nodes.)
5.8 Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an efficient signature-based scheme against pollution attacks
for securing linear network coding. Our scheme utilizes a novel homomorphic signature func-
tion and allows a source to delegate its signing authority to forwarders, which means that
the forwarders can generate the signatures for their output messages without contacting the
source. This property allows the forwarders to verify received messages, but prevent them
from creating the valid signatures for polluted or forged ones. Thus, the pollution attacks
can be efficiently and effectively filtered out at the forwarders. Our scheme does not need
any extra secure channels, and can support source authentication and batch verification. Ex-
perimental results show that our scheme can improve verification efficiency up to 10 times
compared to some existing one. In addition, we presented an alternate lightweight scheme
which utilizes a simpler signature function. This scheme is much faster and more suitable
for resource-constrained networks such as wireless sensor networks. However, it introduces a
trade-off between computation efficiency and security.
In this work, we assume that the source is always benign, but only the forwarders can be
compromised. In future, we will study how to detect and filter forged messages injected by
adversaries via the compromised sources. In addition, we will implement CJL’s pairing-based
signature scheme on sensor nodes and conduct experimental evaluation.
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CHAPTER 6 ENHANCING INTEGRITY: Securing XOR Network
Coding against Pollution Attacks
6.1 Introduction
Unlike the traditional message forwarding approaches that always duplicate the forwarding
messages, network coding [1, 50] allows forwarders to combine multiple input messages into
one or more output (or encoded) ones. This technique is promising to maximize network
throughput and to reduce the number of retransmissions in both wired networks [20, 29] and
wireless ones [44, 62]. In these applications, network coding is normally operated over large
finite fields, so we term it normal network coding. Recently, a special network coding based only
on XOR operations (i.e., over a field of size 2), has gained an increasing number of applications
[45, 81, 92], especially in wireless networks, due to its simplicity. We call this special network
coding XOR network coding, which is the focus of our research.
Both normal and XOR network coding systems are vulnerable to pollution attacks. In such
attacks, adversaries inject polluted messages into the systems via the compromised forwarders.
These attacks not only prevent the sinks from recovering the source messages, but also drain
out the energy of the forwarders. Clearly, they are a big threat to resource-constrained wireless
networks such as wireless sensor networks. Therefore, it is crucial to filter the polluted messages
in network coding systems as early as possible.
So far, a number of schemes [19, 30, 35, 39, 47, 91, 93] have been proposed for addressing
pollution attacks against network coding systems. These schemes can be categorized into two
classes: (1) filtering the polluted messages only at the sinks, such as [35, 39]; and (2) filtering
the polluted messages at the forwarders (including the sinks), such as[19, 30, 47, 91]. However,
these schemes all base their security on the size of underlying fields, so none of them could be
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used to secure XOR network coding systems.
In this work, we propose the first scheme (to the best of our knowledge) for securing XOR
network coding systems against pollution attacks. Our scheme allows the polluted messages
to be filtered at the forwarders, and it works not only for XOR network coding, but also for
for normal network coding.
Our scheme exploits probabilistic key pre-distribution and message authentication codes
(MACs). In our scheme, the source generates multiple MACs for each message using its secret
keys, where each MAC can authenticate only a part of the message and the parts authenticated
by different MACs are overlapped. Every encoded message is attached with the MACs of the
source messages from which it is constructed. Therefore, multiple downstream forwarders
can collaboratively verify different parts of the encoded message using the MACs and their
own shared keys. By carefully controlling the overlapping between the parts authenticate by
different MACs, our scheme can filter polluted messages in a few hops with a high probability.
Experimental results show that it is 200 to 1000 times faster than existing ones, hence, it is
particularly suitable for resource-constrained wireless networks.
The rest of chapter is organized as follows: In section 6.2, we discuss system model and
threat model, and define the problem. Then, we explain in section 6.3 the symbols we use in
the work. We propose our scheme in section 6.4 and analyze its performance in section 6.5.
We further explain experimental results in section 6.6. Finally, we conclude in section 6.7.
6.2 Problem Statement
6.2.1 System Model
In this work, we consider a general multicast network in which there are one source, multiple
sinks and a number of forwarders. The source sends its messages to all of the sinks at the
optimal rate that the network can support, while the forwarders use XOR network coding
technique to generate and forward the output (or encoded) messages. (Note: we use terms
output message and encoded message interchangeably in this work.)
Let s denote the source, and M1, · · · ,Mn denote the source messages, where n is the
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number of messages that s can transmit per unit of time in its optimal rate. Here, we assume
that the source can generate messages continuously. That is, in every unit of time, s generates
n messages and the forwarders transmit them using the same network code. We claim that
our model is more generalized compared with some commonly used file-distribution models,
which consider distributing a single file mainly. In those models, the security parameters are
calculated from the content of the distributed file. So, once a new file is to be downloaded, the
source has to re-broadcast the security parameters. We believe this design is very cumbersome
so we consider a more generalized model.
We denote the encoded messages as E. In XOR coding, an encoded message can be
represented as
E = α1M1 ⊕ α2M2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αnMn , (6.1)
where αi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, · · · , n. The bit string (α1 · · · αn) is called the encoding vector
of E. For example, if α1 = α2 = 1 and other coefficients are 0, we have E = M1 ⊕M2. We
assume a randomized network code, which generates encoding vectors randomly and transmits
them along with the corresponding encoded messages. So, the forwarders (and the sinks) can
use the encoding vectors to verify the received messages.
We adopt the model used in [30] and divide each message into m codewords of the same
length. Typically, each codeword is 256-bit long. Most of existing schemes regard each code-
word as a random element over a finite field of size q and encode the messages over the same
field, so in those scheme q is a 256-bit prime. However, our scheme partitions codewords only
for constructing message authentication codes (MACs), so the field used for partitioning the
codewords is different from that over which the codewords are operated. For XOR coding, our
scheme encodes the codewords over a field of size 2, although it still divides the codewords into
256-bit long.
From the perspective of codewords, each source message Mi for i = 1, · · · , n can be ex-
pressed as a row vector
Mi = (mi,1,mi,2, · · · ,mi,m) , (6.2)
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where mi,j for j = 1, · · · ,m denote codewords. Similarly, an encoded message E can also be
regarded as
E = (e1, e2, · · · , em) , (6.3)
where ej are the codewords for j = 1, · · · ,m.
We further assume that all of the nodes have been assigned some random secret keys using
the probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes such as [25, 90]. In particular, we assume that
each node picks a fixed number of keys randomly from a large global key pool. By carefully
controlling the key pool size and the number of keys that each node picks, we assure that
any two nodes have certain probability to find some shared keys. The source uses its keys to
generate message authentication codes (MACs) for its messages, while the forwarders verify
the MACs of received messages using their shared keys with the source.
6.2.2 Threat Model and Goal
We assume that the source is always trusted, but the forwarders can be compromised. The
adversaries can fully control the compromised forwarders and launch pollution attacks. In such
attacks, they may either pollute the output messages of the compromised nodes, or inject the
forged messages into systems. Formally speaking, we identify that an encoded message E has
been polluted or forged, if and only if its content is not consistent with its encoding vector,
that is,
E 6= α1M1 ⊕ α2M2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ αnMn . (6.4)
The pollution attacks not only prevent the sinks from recovering the source messages, but
also drain out the limited energy of the forwarders, especially in resource-constrained wireless
networks.
More severely, network coding systems (including XOR and normal coding) suffer from
pollution propagation, i.e., a small number of polluted messages can quickly propagate in the
systems and infect a large proportion of nodes and their messages. When a forwarder receives
a polluted message, all of its output messages will be polluted. Then, these polluted messages
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are further used by downstream forwarders for encoding, thus, more and more messages will
be polluted. So, it is necessary to filter the polluted messages as early as possible.
Our goal is to design an efficient scheme that can filter pollution attacks for the systems
adopting XOR network coding. We are particularly interested in the resource-constrained
wireless networks such as wireless sensor networks, which can be greatly benefited from the
use of XOR network coding. We expect that our scheme can make the forwarders to detect
and filter the polluted messages as early as possible, while it is still highly efficient in terms of
computation overhead. In addition, the scheme should not rely on any extra secure channels.
6.3 Notation
In Table 6.1, we explains the symbols used in the paper.
6.4 Our Scheme
6.4.1 The Framework for Securing Network Coding against Pollution Attacks
Before introducing our scheme, we first propose a framework that generalizes all of the
schemes for securing network coding systems against pollution attacks. Within this framework,
we roughly divide these schemes into three phases:
• Parameter setup phase: The source determines security parameters, chooses its keys
including secret keys or public and private keys, and selects its hash or signature function.
• MAC (hash or signature) calculation phase: The source calculates the authentication
information such as the hashes, MACs or signatures of its messages. This information
is either securely transmitted to the forwarders and sinks, or directly attached to the
original messages.
• Message verification phase: The forwarders and sinks verify received messages. Verifica-
tion is based on encoding vectors, authentication information, shared secret keys or the
source’s public keys. If verification succeeds, the received messages are accepted and will
be used for further encoding or decoding. Otherwise, they are discarded.
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Table 6.1 Notation
Symbol Explanation
Mi,mi,j i-th source message and its j-th codeword
E, ej encoded message and its j-th codeword
n the number of source messages transmitted
m the number of codewords of each message
t the number of random keys each node has
u the number of codewords hashed in each MAC
wi,j message Mi’s hash embedded in its j-th MAC
K, |K| global key pool and its size
ks,i i-th key of the source
id(ks,i) ks,i’s index in key pool
{x}ks,i encrypting x with random key ks,i
ri random seed used to generate hash chain for i-th MAC
ri,j j-th element of hash chain computed from ri
The first phase can be done oﬄine, but the other two must be executed online. Hence, the
second and third phases mainly determine the efficiency of schemes.
Note: Once a forwarder detects a polluted message, it may either encode other unpolluted
messages by selecting a new encoding vector, or ask its upstream node to send the message
again, because the pollution may be due to transmission error. Of course, the number of
retransmissions should be pre-defined. We do not discuss this issue here, because it is out of
the scope of our work.
6.4.2 The Detailed Procedure of Our Scheme
We assume that each node can randomly pick up a number of secret keys from a global
key pool, utilizing some probabilistic key pre-distribution approaches such as [25, 90]. Thus,
any two nodes have certain probability to share a common secret key. The source generates
the same number of MACs for each message using its random keys. Each MAC is calculated
based on some codewords randomly selected from the message, hence, it can authenticate those
codewords of the message. In this way, each forwarder sharing some secret key(s) with the
source can verify the corresponding codewords of an input message by checking the MACs
using the shared key(s).
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However, this shared-key based verification has a vulnerability. That is, a compromised
forwarder who has a shared key is aware that which codewords have been used to generate an
MAC. Then, it can pollute the corresponding codewords of messages without being detected,
although it is unable to pollute the codewords authenticated by other MACs for which it has no
shared keys. To address this vulnerability, we choose to overlap the codewords authenticated
by any two MACs for the same message. By carefully controlling the overlapping ratio, we
assure that a polluted message can be detected within certain hops with a high probability.
We describe the detailed procedure of each phase of our scheme in the rest of this section.
Parameter setup phase: In this phase, the source first chooses the following security
parameters, functions and secret keys:
• Two parameters t and u, where t is the number of MACs attached to each source message,
and u is the number of codewords used to generate a MAC. These two parameters are
public.
• t random integers r1, · · · , rt, where each rj ∈ [1,m] for j = 1, · · · , t. Each integer will
be embedded into an MAC for identifying the indexes of codewords based on which the
MAC is generated.
• A pseudo-random permutation function f : [1,m] → [1,m], where f is public and any
node can compute a hash chain from a given seed rj using this function.
• A hash function h : Zuq → Zq, where Zq constrains the range of codewords and h is
public. Using h any node can generate a hash from u codewords, where the length of the
hash is the same as that of codewords.
• t random keys ks,1, · · · , ks,t from a global key pool K, where s is the index of the source.
The index of each key ks,i in the key pool for i = 1, · · · , t is denoted as id(ks,i).
Note: We suppose that each node picks t random keys from K. The keys of node j are denoted
as kj,1, · · · , kj,t.
MAC calculation phase: In this phase, the source attaches t MACs to each message Mi
for i = 1, · · · , n, where n is the total number of source messages. Each MAC is calculated by
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encrypting the hash of u randomly selected codewords using a random key. For XOR network
coding, a hash is simply an XOR of the selected codewords, whereas for normal network coding,
the hash is a random linear combination of the selected codewords.
More precisely, message Mi is attached with t MACs MACi,1, · · · ,MACi,t as well as the
corresponding indexes of the random keys that are used to generate MACs. Thus, in our
scheme, the source actually generates and transmits
Mi, id(ks,1), MACi,1, · · · , id(ks,t), MACi,t . (6.5)
For j = 1, · · · , t, we define
MACi,j = {id(ks,j), rj , hi,j}ks,j , (6.6)
where {·}ks,j denotes encryption using key ks,j , and hi,j is the hash of u randomly selected
codewords of message Mi. The indexes of these codewords are determined by a hash chain that
is computed from a seed rj using function f . For v = 1, · · · , u, let rj,v denote each element of
the hash chain. Then, we have
rj,v = f(rj,v−1) , (6.7)
where rj,0 = rj . Here, rj,1, · · · , rj,u are the indexes of selected codewords.
Once u codewords are selected, the source can generate the hash from these codewords
using function h. For XOR network coding, the hash is
hi,j = mi,rj,1 ⊕ · · · ⊕mi,rj,u . (6.8)
Note: we also take the consideration of normal network coding. In this case, the hash
becomes
hi,j = β1mi,rj,1 + · · ·+ βumi,rj,u mod q
=
u∑
v=1
βvmi,rj,v mod q , (6.9)
where the coefficients βv ∈ Zq for v = 1, · · · , u are randomly generated to combine these
codewords. A simple way to generate these coefficients is to let them form a hash chain, which
is generated from the seed rj using another pseudo-random permutation function f ′. (We do
not discuss f ′ here.)
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Finally, each source message is attached with t MACs, and each MAC is computed from u
codewords. Or equivalently, each MAC authenticates u codewords of a message. We emphasize
that the codewords authenticated by different MACs may overlap, that is, the same codeword
may be used to generate different MACs. Averagely, each codeword is authenticated by t×um
MACs.
In our scheme, when each forwarder generates its output message, it always attaches the
MACs of all source messages from which this output message is produced. For example, when a
forwarder generates E = Mi⊕Mj , it will attach MACi,1, · · · ,MACi,t and MACj,1, · · · ,MACj,t
to its output message E. We observe that the source generates the MACs for different messages
using the same set of random keys, so the indexes of keys such as id(ks,j) in equation (6.6) do
not need to be transmitted multiple times.
Message verification phase: In this phase, each forwarder or sink verifies its input
messages based on the MACs for which it has the shared key(s) with the source. When
receiving a message along with the MACs of all source messages from which this message is
encoded, the node processes as follows:
1. It first checks the indexes prefixed to each MAC to see if it has any shared key with the
source.
2. Once finding a shared key, it decrypts the corresponding MACs of source messages and
generates the indexes of u codewords from the seed embedded into the MACs.
3. For normal network coding, it also needs to generate the coefficients used to combine the
codewords.
4. After identifying the indexes of codewords, it takes the corresponding codewords out of
the received message and calculates the hash of these codewords following equation (6.8)
for XOR coding (or equation (6.9) for normal linear coding).
5. It further takes out the hashes embedded into the decrypted MACs of source messages
and encodes them using the encoding vector transmitted along with the received message.
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6. Finally, it checks if the hash of the received message (calculated in step 4) equals the
combination of the hashes embedded in corresponding MACs (obtained in step 5). If
equals, the verification succeeds. Otherwise, the received message is assumed to be
polluted and will be discarded.
For example, if a node receives E = Mi ⊕Mj , and finds that it can decrypt MACi,l and
MACj,l of messages Mi and Mi. From the decrypted MACs, it further knows that the MACs
are calculated from the codewords of indexes x, y and z, then it checks if
ex ⊕ ey ⊕ ez = hi,l ⊕ hj,l , (6.10)
where ex, ey and ez are the corresponding codewords of message E, and hi,l and hj,l are the
hashes encrypted in MACi,l and MACj,l. When equation (6.10) is satisfied, the node accepts
message E. Otherwise, it discards E.
6.4.3 Batch Verification
Our scheme supports batch verification, which can further reduce computation overhead
and speed up message verification. Suppose a node receives three messages Ea, Eb and Ec.
For XOR network coding, it generates a new message E = Ea ⊕Eb ⊕Ec. For normal network
coding, it first chooses three random coefficients γa, γb, and γc, then, generates a new message
E = γaEa+γbEb+γcEc. The node further calculates E’s encoding vector as an XOR or linear
combination (with coefficients γa, γb, and γc) of those of messages Ea, Eb and Ec. And it also
attaches to E all unique MACs appended to Ea, Eb and Ec. Finally, it verifies E as normal.
If the new message passes verification, all the input messages are accepted. Otherwise, one
or more messages must have been polluted. In this case, further verification should be carried
out to find the malicious one(s). The node needs to re-check each input message individually or
use batch verification repeatedly on the subsets of input messages. For example, we can speed
up re-checking by using binary-checking, that is similar to binary-search algorithm. Binary-
checking rules out a half of input messages at each step. That is, we encode and check each
half of input messages separately. If pass, that half of messages will be accepted. Otherwise,
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two sub-halves of the suspected half will be re-checked. This binary-checking process can be
iteratively carried out until all polluted messages are found.
6.5 Performance Analysis
6.5.1 Threat Analysis
A polluted message defined in inequality (6.4) is one whose contents are not consistent with
its encoding vector. It can be generated by an adversary in different ways. We analyze these
ways and discuss possible countermeasures as follows:
• If the adversary has no shared keys with the source, it may randomly pollute a message
(or the MACs attached to the message). This pollution can be easily detected, since the
adversary does not know how to generate valid MACs without any shared keys.
• If the adversary has one shared key, it knows what codewords are authenticated by the
corresponding MAC. Then, it may pollute those codewords of a message and generate a
false MAC matching the polluted codewords. For XOR coding, a smarter adversary can
even simply pollute a message by exchanging the positions of two codewords without the
need of generating a false MAC. Since our scheme allows one codeword to be authenti-
cated by multiple MACs, this pollution can be detected from another unpolluted MAC
that happens to authenticate only one exchanged (or polluted) codeword. One exception
is that if the unpolluted MAC happens to authenticate both (exchanged) codewords,
it cannot detect the pollution. But the possibility of this exception can be reduced by
carefully controlling the codewords in each MAC. In addition, this exception does not
exist in the case of normal network coding, because the same codewords are combined
with different coefficients in different MACs.
• An adversary may try to replace all the MACs of a polluted message with those MACs
generated using its own keys. However, this pollution can be detected by comparing
the key indexes contained in the polluted message with those in a unpolluted message,
because all messages should contain the same key indexes.
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• A more severe attack is collusion. Colluded adversaries have more knowledge of the
shared keys. Once they find all of the source keys, no polluted message can be detected.
The only way for addressing collusion attacks is to increase the number of MACs attached
to each message. Following the assumption adopted in [90], we assume that there exists
a upper bound of the number of source keys known by colluding nodes and it is never
greater than the total number of source keys.
6.5.2 Security Analysis
In the section, we study the performance of our scheme in terms of the probability that a
polluted message can be detected and the average number of hops that the polluted message
can travel. For convenience of analysis, we simply assume that each message is attached with
only t MACs. This makes sense, because all the MACs attached to a message are encrypted
using only t keys, irrespective of how many MACs that the message really has. From the
perspective of encryption/decryption, all MACs encrypted with the same key are actually as
one MAC.
To simplify our analysis, we further assume that the adversary generates a polluted message
by exchanging only the positions of exactly two codewords of a normal encoded message.
We call those two codewords polluted codewords. More specifically, given a normal message
with t MACs, the adversary first checks out how many shared keys he has and identifies the
corresponding MACs that he can decrypt. We call these MACs revealed MACs and others
unrevealed MACs. Then, the adversary chooses two codewords in such a way that no revealed
MACs need to be modified, when the positions of these two codewords are exchanged. For
example, he can choose two codewords that both occur in some revealed MACs, but neither
of them occurs in other revealed ones. In a word, to analyze the security performance of our
scheme, we consider such an extreme case that the adversary makes the least modification to
the normal message in order to generate the polluted one.
In the extreme case, the polluted message can only be detected by using the unrevealed
MACs. In fact, only those unrevealed MACs that contain exactly one polluted codeword are
141
useful for detection. We call those useful unrevealed MACs effective MACs. Our purpose is
to calculate the number of hops that the polluted message can travel based on the number of
effective MACs it has and the probability that it has that number of effective MACs.
Suppose that the adversary compromises one forwarder. He can obtain t keys from the
compromised forwarder, where these keys are randomly picked from a global key pool of size
|K|. Given a certain source key, let pk denote the probability that any forwarder (including
the compromised one) shares this key with the source, where subscript k implies shared keys.
We have
pk =
t
|K| . (6.11)
Equivalently, pk is also the probability that the adversary can decrypt exactly one MAC of
the normal message, or the probability that one MAC of the message becomes a revealed one.
Considering totally t MACs of the message, the probability that the message has exactly x
revealed MACs is
Prev(x) =
 t
x
 pxk(1− pk)t−x , (6.12)
where subscript rev implies revealed MACs,
 t
x
 denotes the combination of choosing x
MACs from t MACs and x ∈ [0, t].
Given x revealed MACs (or (t− x) unrevealed MACs equivalently), we can calculate how
many effective MACs that the message can have and what the probability is for the message
to have that number of effective MACs. In our scheme, each MAC authenticates u codewords
out of m ones of the message. That is, each codeword can occur in an MAC with probability
u
m . Given two polluted codewords, the probability that an MAC contains exactly one polluted
codeword is
pe = 2
u
m
(1− u
m
) . (6.13)
pe is also the probability that one unrevealed MAC can become an effective one, where subscript
e implies effective MACs.
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Now, let Peff |rev(x, y) denote the probability that the message has exactly y effective
MACs, given that it already has x revealed MACs, where subscript eff |rev implies effective
MACs given revealed MACs and y ∈ [0, t− x]. Peff |rev(x, y) can be calculated as
Peff |rev(x, y) =
 t− x
y
 pye(1− pe)t−x−y . (6.14)
If the polluted message has one effective MAC, it can be detected by a receiving node
with probability pk, which is the probability that the receiving node can decrypt the effective
MAC. Let Pdet|eff (y) denote the probability that the polluted message can be detected, given
that it has exactly y effective MACs, where subscript det|eff implies detection probability given
effective MACs. We can easily find that
Pdet|eff (y) = 1− (1− pk)y . (6.15)
Now, we are able to calculate the average number of hops that the polluted message can
travel. We define Hmax as the length of the longest path from the source to a sink, and simply
assume that the polluted message can always travel Hmax hops, when it is not detected. Let
Havg|eff (y) denote the average number of hops that the polluted message can travel, given
that it has exactly y effective MACs, where subscript avg|eff implies average number of hops
given effective MACs. We derive that
Havg|eff (y) =
Hmax∑
z=1
z Pdet|eff (y)
(
1− Pdet|eff (y)
)z−1
+
(
1− Pdet|eff (y)
)Hmax Hmax . (6.16)
In this equality, Pdet|eff (y)
(
1− Pdet|eff (y)
)z−1 denotes the probability that the polluted mes-
sage can travel exactly z hops, and
(
1− Pdet|eff (y)
)Hmax denotes the probability that none of
Hmax nodes can detect the polluted message.
Then, we define Havg|rev(x) as the average number of hops that the polluted message can
travel, given that it has exactly x revealed MACs, where subscript avg|rev implies average
number of hops given revealed MACs. It is easy to know that
Havg|rev(x) =
t−x∑
y=0
Peff |rev(x, y)Havg|eff (y) . (6.17)
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Hence, when x takes all values from 0 to t, we can derive Havg, the average number of hops
that the polluted message can travel, as follows
Havg =
t∑
x=0
Prev(x)Havg|rev(x) . (6.18)
When the adversary compromises more nodes, he can obtain more keys, instead of only
t keys. We can perform security analysis almost the same way, as long as we change (i.e.,
increase) probability pk in equation (6.11) according to the actual number of keys that the
adversary obtains.
6.5.3 Analysis of Communication Overhead
As shown in equation (6.5), our scheme attaches t MACs and indexes of encryption keys
to an original message, which increases communication overhead, especially for some resource-
constrained networks such as wireless sensor networks. To study the communication overhead,
we compare the bit-length of the attached MACs with that of the original message.
Let us first consider a source message, which has m codewords with each of log2 q bits.
So, the bit-length of a source message is m log2 q. With our scheme, the source message is
attached with t MACs. Each MAC contains: (1) one index of random key, which is of log2 |K|
bits; (2) one random seed used to identify the indexes of codewords, which is of log2m bits;
and (3) the hash which has the same length as a codeword, that is, log2 q bits. Our scheme
also attaches the indexes of t keys to each source message and each index is of log2 |K| bits.
To further reduce the length of a message, we can attach only one index of key, instead of t
indexes to the message, where other (t − 1) indexes form a hash chain that can be generated
from the attached index. Hence, our scheme attaches t(log2 |K| + log2m + log2 q) + log2 |K|
bits to each source message and introduces communication overhead
t(log2 |K|+ log2m+ log2 q) + log2 |K|
m log2 q
. (6.19)
Typically, t = 5 ∼ 10, where |K| and m are both less than 256 and q is 256-bit long. log2 |K|
and log2m are negative when compared to log2 q. Hence, the communication overhead for
source messages can be reduced to tm ' 2% ∼ 4%.
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However, the communication overhead for an encoded message may be much higher than
that for a source message. If an encoded message is computed from x source messages, it will
be attached with all MACs of those source messages. Hence, the communication overhead is
x times higher. When x = 10, the overhead is xtm ' 20% ∼ 40%. This is a drawback of our
scheme.
6.6 Experimental Results
6.6.1 Experiment Setup
We evaluate the performance of our scheme in experiments that consist of two parts. First,
we study the impact of different parameters such as t, u and K on filtering capacity of our
scheme. Second, we compare our scheme with others in terms of computation overhead. We
test various schemes on both PC and MicaZ sensor node, where the implementation of these
schemes is built on top of software package MIRACL [57] (on PC) and Wang’s software package
[76] (on MicaZ). For CJL’s scheme, we implement the Tate pairing [28] over a super-singular
elliptic curve E(Fp) : y2 = x3 +1. For our scheme, we choose SHA-1 for hash chain generation,
and AES (on PC) and SkipJack (on MicaZ) for encryption/decryption.
6.6.2 Detection Capability
We measure the detection capability of our scheme by Havg, the number of hops a polluted
message travels. In our experiments, the polluted message is generated by exchanging the
positions of two codewords. Given Hmax = 20 (i.e., the polluted message can travel at most
20 hops), m = 256 (i.e., each message contains 256 codewords), Havg can be affected by
parameters t, u and |K|. We study the impact of these parameters separately.
Figure 6.1 illustrates Havg as a function of various u. The best detection capability is
achieved when u ' 128 = m2 , which means the polluted message can be detected the most
rapidly as each MAC authenticates about half number of codewords of the message. For
example, given t = 10, the polluted message can travel around 3 hops when u = 128. However,
when u is either 16 or 240, the message will not be detected within 11 hops. This makes
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Figure 6.1 Impact of u to Havg, where Hmax = 20, m = 256 and |K| = 100.
sense, because: (1) when u is too small, a unrevealed MAC is less likely to authenticate a
polluted codeword and the message can travel longer; and (2) when u is too big, both polluted
codewords are more likely to be authenticated in the same unrevealed MACs and hence prevent
the message from being detected.
In Figure 6.1, we can observe that the bigger the value of t, the faster the polluted message
can be dropped, while this trend is more clearly shown in Figure 6.2. For example, when
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Figure 6.2 Impact of t to Havg, where Hmax = 20, m = 256 and |K| = 100.
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u = 128, the polluted message can travel more than 8 hops in the case of t = 5, however, it will
be dropped after traveling 3 hops when t = 10. It is obviously that the detection capability
can be improved by attaching more MACs to the transmitted messages.
The size of key pool |K| also affects the detection capability deeply. Basically, the smaller
the size of key pool, the easier a forwarder to find out some shared keys with the source, hence,
the sooner the polluted message to be detected. Figure 6.3 illustrates the impact of |K| to
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Figure 6.3 Impact of |K| to Havg, where Hmax = 20, m = 256 and u = 128.
detection capability, where we always set u = 128. As shown in Figure 6.3, when t = 5, the
polluted message can travel around 4.3 hops in the case of |K| = 25. However, when |K| = 200,
the message can travel more than 12 hops. Generally, a smaller key pool performs better in
terms of detection capability. However, we do not prefer a key pool which is too small, because
the adversary otherwise is able to obtain all the keys from the pool by compromising a few
nodes, which makes a polluted message undetectable.
Moreover, it is not always true that a smaller key pool is better. Obviously, when the key
pool size is close to t, almost all keys are revealed to the adversary. Hence, no node can detect
the polluted message. Figure 6.4 shows this trend. We can see that when the key pool size is
smaller than 15, the detection capability becomes worse as the size decreases. Combining the
resultsof Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4, we find that the optimal key pool size (for achieving the
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Figure 6.4 Impact of |K| to Havg, where Hmax = 20, m = 256 and u = 128.
best detection capability) is between 15 and 20. However, as we already discuss, we cannot
choose such a small key pool. So, in the rest experiments, we set |K| = 100.
In our scheme, the indexes of codewords authenticated by each MAC are calculated from a
hash chain in order to reduce communication overhead. We also test a variant of our scheme,
that is, we generate each index randomly and embed the whole sequence of indexes into each
MAC. In this variant, we do not consider communication overhead and only study if a hash
chain is as random as a normal random sequence. We find that the variant has similar perfor-
mance to our original scheme in terms of detection capability. For space limit, we do not show
experimental results here.
6.6.3 Computation Overhead
We compare the computation overhead of CJL’s scheme, Yu’s scheme, GR’s scheme, and
our scheme. The overhead is measured by running time of each phase of these schemes. First,
we run our test on a Pentium-4 3.0 GHz Linux PC, and set m = 256, n = u = 128 and t = 5
for the schemes. Experimental results are shown in Table 6.2. For our scheme, we test two
variants depending on whether the indexes of codewords in MACs are a random sequence or
a hash chain, where these two variants are denoted denoted as Random Sequence and Hash
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Chain in Table 6.2. Since CJL’s scheme, Yu’s scheme, and GR’s scheme can only deal with
normal linear coding, rather than XOR coding, we test our scheme in both scenarios.
Experimental results in Table 6.2 show that, CJL’s scheme is 5 to 10 times slower than
Yu’s scheme and GR’s scheme, while our scheme is 200 to 1000 times faster than others.
Generally speaking, the reason is that CJL’s scheme, Yu’s scheme and GR’s scheme are based
on expensive public-key operations, but our scheme only adopts symmetric-key operations.
In parameter setup phase, CJL’s scheme must generate (m+ n+ 1) q-torsion points, GR’s
scheme should choose m order-q elements, and our scheme only need to generate t random
sequences or hash chains, where each sequence or chain has u elements. (To see the time
difference between random sequences and hash chains generation, we move them from the
second phase to the first one.) Table 6.2 shows that choosing q-torsion is the most time-
consuming. We can also see that in our scheme, generating t hash chains takes 20× the time
for creating t random sequences. Since adopting hash chain is useful for reducing the length of
messages, it provide us a tradeoff between computation efficiency and communication overhead.
In the second phase, to calculate signature or hash or MAC of one message, CJL’s scheme
takes 5.37s on linear combinations of (m+ n) q-torsion points. Yu’s scheme and GR’s scheme
spend 1.42s and 0.96s on m+n+ 1 and m modular exponentiations, respectively. Meanwhile,
our scheme only needs 5.56ms for t · u modular multiplications as well as t AES encryptions.
Compared to that of other schemes, the computation time of our scheme is negative.
In the third phase, to verify one message, CJL’s scheme needs 16.54s on (m + n) paring
operations. Yu’s scheme and GR’s scheme require 1.44s and 1.43s for (m + n + 1) and (m +
n) modular exponentiations, respectively. In our scheme, we assume an encoded message is
computed from n2 source messages and the receiving node has only one shared key. So, our
scheme must conduct (u+ n2 ) modular multiplications,
n
2 AES decryptions, and one hash chain
generation, which takes only 2.74ms in total. These results prove that pairing operation is
extremely time-consuming.
We test Yu’s scheme, GR’s scheme and our scheme on MicaZ mote. (The implementation
of CJL’s scheme on MicaZ mote is still in progress.) MicaZ mote is only equipped with an
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8-bit microprocessor ATmega128, 4K bytes memory (RAM) and 128K bytes program flash
memory (ROM). Since it is extremely resource-constrained, we have to relax our security
requirement. In our implementation, we set p as 256-bit prime, q as 128-bit prime, m=16 and
n=8. Experimental results in Table 6.3 show that Yu’s scheme and GR’s scheme need around
100s to generate a hash for a message and 150s to verify one message. It indicates that the
public-key based approaches are not affordable for resource-constrained wireless networks. On
the contrary, our scheme takes at most 32ms to generate MACs for a source message and
less than 20ms to verify a message, which means our scheme is quite suitable for wireless
sensor networks. Moreover, Table 6.3 shows that XOR coding is more efficient than normal
linear coding, so it is promising for using in wireless sensor networks. Since only our scheme
can address pollution attacks to XOR coding, it further proves that our scheme is especially
suitable for resource-constrained networks such as wireless sensor networks.
Note: the verification phase of Zhao’s scheme requires the same number of modular ex-
ponentiations as GR’s scheme does. So, although we do not test Zhao’s scheme on PC and
MicaZ, we can conclude that our scheme is much more efficient than Zhao’s scheme.
6.7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we propose an efficient scheme against pollution attacks for securing the sys-
tems adopting XOR (and normal linear) network coding. In our scheme, the source generates
MACs for each message using its random keys, and the forwarders attach to each encoded
message the MACs of the source messages that are used to encode the message. Since each
MAC authenticates some number of codewords of the message, a forwarder with some shared
keys can verify an encoded message using the corresponding MACs. To prevent the compro-
mised forwarders from polluting the codewords using the revealed MACs, we let each codeword
authenticated by multiple MACs. By carefully controlling the overlapping codewords authen-
ticated by different MACs, we achieve that a polluted message can be detected within several
hops with high probability. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first one that
address pollution attacks for XOR coding. It does not rely on any extra secure channels and
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is extremely efficient. The experimental simulation results show that it is 200 or even 1000
times faster than existing ones, so it is parti suitable for resource-constrained networks such
as wireless sensor networks.
Our scheme falls into the category that allows the forwarders to filter polluted attacks. On
the contrary, Jaggi’s scheme can recover the source messages at the sinks without the help of
the forwarders. Although Jaggi’s scheme introduce no interference with the forwarders, it has
several disadvantages. First, it makes a great sacrifice in network throughput, because it has
to tolerate pollution propagation. In our scheme, if a forwarder finds a pollution message, it
can drop the message and encode the unpolluted messages using a new encoding vector. Ho
et al. [34] proved that a random generated network code allows the sinks to recover the source
messages with a high probability, so our scheme can keep a higher source rate. Second, Jaggi’s
scheme does not take the forwarders’ energy consumption into consideration, while our scheme
is more suitable for resource-constrained wireless networks by filtering the polluted messages
as early as possible. Third, the success of Jaggi’s scheme is determined by the estimation to
the power of adversaries. However, it is very hard to make an accurate estimation. So, it has
to reduce source data rate by overestimating the adversarial capability. Otherwise, the whole
scheme becomes failed.
In this work, we assume that the source is never compromised. In the future, we will study
how to detect the forged messages injected by false or compromised source(s). In addition, we
will implement CJL’s signature scheme on MicaZ mote and conduct experimental evaluation.
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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY
7.1 Conclusion
In this research, we focus on enhancing information assurance for resource-constrained
wireless networks such as wireless sensor networks. Particularly, we study three important
problems: (1) key management for wireless sensors networks, (2) filtering false data injection
and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks, and (3) secure network coding. Solving these
problems provide enhancements for several aspects of information assurance such as confiden-
tiality, authenticity, availability and integrity.
We investigate various malicious attacks in wireless sensor networks and propose a number
of practical solutions for wireless sensor networks for establishing pairwise keys between sensor
nodes, detecting and filtering false data injection and DoS attacks, and securing network coding
against pollution attacks. Our solutions are efficient for wireless sensor networks in terms of
transmission range, memory cost, computation and communication overhead.
In summary, our contributions from this research are fourfold.
1. We classify the malicious attacks into different categories and provide a taxonomy of
these attacks.
2. For enhancing confidentiality, we design a group-based key pre-distribution scheme using
deployment knowledge for wireless sensor networks to establish pair-wise keys between
sensor nodes. Compared with others, our scheme achieves higher connectivity with lower
memory cost and shorter transmission range. It also outperforms others in terms of
resilience against node capture attacks.
3. For enhancing authenticity and availability, we propose a dynamic en-route scheme for
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filtering false data injection in wireless sensor networks. Compared with others, our
scheme offers higher filtering capacity with lower memory cost. It can effectively mitigate
the impact of DoS attacks and better deal with dynamic topology of wireless sensor
networks.
4. For enhancing integrity, we present several schemes for securing network coding against
pollution attacks. Our solution is the first one that addresses security problem for XOR
network coding systems. Compared with others, our schemes do not need any extra
security channels and can improve computation efficiency by two to three orders of mag-
nitude. Hence, our solutions are promising for resource-constrained wireless networks.
7.2 Future Work
To provide efficient key management for wireless sensor networks, we propose a solution
for establishing pairwise key between sensor nodes. However, within this research area, there
are many other problems that have not been well solved. Some of the problems that we want
to study in the future include end-to-end key establishment, group key management and key
revocation.
• An end-to-end key is required when two nodes far away from each other want to ex-
change their own information. It may be established by exploiting the pairwise keys of
multiple hops or with the help of the base station. However, either approach involves
high communication overhead and is head to be applied into wireless sensor networks.
• Group key management is another challenging problem. Group keys are highly desired in
wireless sensor networks, because sensor nodes are often organized into groups or clusters
to detect the events occurring locally. However, sensor nodes may frequently join and
leave their groups due to unexpected failures, temporary disconnection, or node renew.
Therefore, it is very hard to maintain group keys with low communication overhead
while keeping strong resilience to key disclosure in wireless sensor networks. In addition,
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group keys are often required to be self-healing for accommodating unreliable wireless
communication, which greatly increases the complexity of group key management.
• Another untouched problem in key management is the revocation of compromised keys
(or nodes). Majority voting is a promising solution to this problem. However, it cannot
be applied trivially, because the compromised nodes whose keys should be revoked can
also make use of the votes to attack benign nodes. A carefully designed voting scheme
is necessary to tackle the key revocation problem.
For filtering false data injection and DoS attacks in wireless sensor networks, we come
up with a solution that allows neighbor nodes to mutually monitor each other by exploiting
the broadcast nature of wireless communication. However, this mutual monitoring approach
brings two problems:
• Wireless communication is essentially unreliable and may not be bi-directional, which
pose challenges to the implementation of mutual monitoring. We may enforce retrans-
mission to overcome unreliability or eliminate directional links. However, this incurs high
communication overhead and is inefficient for wireless sensor networks.
• Mutual monitoring requires that sensor nodes be awake always or within a long period.
This causes conflicts with many energy-efficient approaches that turn off sensor nodes
frequently to save energy of sensor nodes.
We will further investigate these two problems and keep on improving our proposed solution.
For defending network coding against pollution attacks, we design a homomorphic signature
scheme for securing normal network coding and further present a MAC-based approach for
XOR network coding (including normal network coding). In the future, we would investigate
other malicious attacks against network coding systems and study how to address them in the
environments of wireless sensor networks. Some possible attacks that we have identified are as
follows:
• So far, we assume there exists a single source within the networks. However, in wire-
less sensor networks, it is quite likely that multiple sensor nodes may broadcast their
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information simultaneously. In a network coding system with multiple sources, existing
solutions addressing pollution attacks are no longer applicable, because the signatures (or
the MACs) generated by different sources using different keys (or using different code-
words) cannot be encoded together. So, multi-source poses new challenge to securing
network coding against pollution attacks.
• Besides pollution attacks, the adversaries have other ways to prevent the sinks from
recovering source messages. They can either selectively drop some messages, or generate
new messages that are linearly dependent on previous ones. The purpose of both ways is
to reduce the number of linearly independent messages received by the sinks. Introducing
redundancy of source messages can solve the problem, however, it reduces the throughput
of networks.
• The adversaries may even insert some false sources into network coding systems, which
violates the security goal of authenticity. Our homomorphic signature scheme provides
authenticity, however, our solution for XOR coding based on symmetric keys does not.
So, how to achieving authenticity and integrity in XOR coding systems simultaneously
is still an unsolved problem.
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